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Most readers of politically committed literature dismiss it either because they 
disagree with the content presented in it or because its ostensibly crass 
instrumentalization of art in the service of a socialist program negates its aesthetic 
value. In the 20th century, these views were more often than not borne of a prejudice 
against Socialist Realism, the official method for producing art in the Eastern Bloc, 
which relied on a didactic relationship between art and its message in order to 
communicate with and educate its audience. 
The socialist literary and theoretical works by Maxim Gorky (Russia/USSR), 
Peter Hacks (East Germany), and Heiner Müller (East Germany) stand in stark 
contrast to this didacticism of Socialist Realism, as they are underpinned by 
philosophical and aesthetic commitments drawn from romanticism, classicism, and 
avant-gardism, respectively. In the works I examine, artistic form is embraced as the 
quality that makes art a vehicle uniquely suited to the political education of its 
audience. The authors’ depiction (Gorky), description (Hacks), and staging (Müller) of 
 the aesthetic theories upon which their pedagogical artworks depend do not aim to 
reduce those literary works to the communication of a specific socialist message; 
rather, the audience arrives at a more general and truthful way of thinking principally 
by engaging with the form of the artwork. As in Socialist Realism, the radical 
education promoted by Gorky, Hacks, and Müller has political consequences, but for 
them, this education takes place both as readers and audiences assimilate the 
tendentious content of the texts and as they engage with the artworks’ formal 
structures. 
 For these authors, art has the capacity to inspire spiritual (Gorky), 
ontological (Hacks), and behavioral (Müller) exercises that in turn enable readers 
(Gorky), viewers (Hacks), and participants (Müller) to participate in and create new 
forms of thinking. In the process, they become agents, creative producers of thought 
who have received a more sustainable and liberating education than the didacticism of 
Socialist Realism could ever provide. What these works share is a commitment to 
teaching how to think over learning what to think. 
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 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Literature has no necessary imperative to be anything more than an end unto 
itself. Nevertheless, the twentieth century was a site of unprecedented drives to 
productively instrumentalize the arts in the service of political programs. While 
reasons for the opportunity and prevalence of such tactics range from the technical 
(the advent of relatively inexpensive reproductive equipment and distribution 
strategies) to the cultural (rapidly proliferating literacy and increasing leisure time), less 
clear are the methods of the appropriation of literature as a form and method of art for 
political ends. Deservedly or not, politically committed literature is often dismissed as 
mere propaganda—as that which offers little more than an external didactic 
content—and one of the greatest offenders in popular opinion is the method of 
Soviet Socialist Realism. 
Although it will serve as the common point of reference for all of the 
discussions that take place in the following pages, it is not the intention of this project 
to rehabilitate socialist literature for modern readers by convincing them of the quality 
of the art produced according to its methods, that is, in line with its practices and 
goal-oriented procedures.1 My focus is neither evaluative nor confined to Socialist 
                                                 
1 Boris Groys is one example of a critic whose work has sought to make Socialist Realism more 
acceptable to contemporary audiences. In The Total Art of Stalinism (1988), Socialist Realism is 
presented as the inheritor of the premises of the early twentieth-century Russian modernist avant-
garde. This argument is extended in a later essay in which Groys argues that Socialist Realism’s 
“modernist ideal of historical exclusiveness, internal purity, and autonomy from everything external” 
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Realism. Instead I will describe and reveal the consequences of the poetic and 
philosophical aesthetic commitments of various methods of (explicitly or implicitly) 
socialist literature from Russia and East Germany, beginning with the proto-Socialist 
Realism of Maxim Gorky’s Mat’ (Mother) and moving on to Peter Hacks’ theory of 
Socialist Classicism and Heiner Müller’s avant-garde dialectical theatre. The work of 
these three figures share an attempt to raise the consciousnesses of their readers and 
viewers by bringing together in the artwork a politically beneficial socialist education, 
whether or not it was in line with the official Party line, and the means to gain access 
to Truth with a capital “t.” While these aims are also at the heart of the official 
Socialist-Realist method, the distinguishing feature of the individual works I analyze 
by Gorky, Hacks, and Müller is that they take art itself seriously in these endeavors.2 
Their depiction (Gorky), description (Hacks), or staging (Müller) of an aesthetic 
theory in the service of socialism does not simply subordinate the artworks and the 
artistic experience of them to their political import, but rather complements it. Again, 
just as in Socialist Realism, in the works to be analyzed by these three figures, a radical 
education has political consequences, but for the latter group, this education takes 
                                                                                                                                                             
is serviced by a “proto-postmodernist strategy of appropriation” and that this combination classifies 
it as a “Style and a Half” (79). Groys’ work is often very exciting and convincing; it simply a 
different project than this one. 
2 I make no claims to be communicating the intentions of the authors, nor do I mean to speak for 
their entire oeuvres. The scope of my project is limited to a handful of pieces, not because they 
represent the broader agenda of a single author or cadre, but because the aesthetic claims and 
assumptions patterned in the fabric of the individual texts are powerful rejoinders to critics, then 
and now, who reduce committed Soviet-era literature to its message and ignore its status as an art 
object. 
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place both as readers or the audience assimilate the tendentious content of the texts 
and as they engage with the artworks’ formal structures. Whereas this type of content is 
a familiar account of the operations of didactic literature, the implication that the 
formal structures of art have potentially powerful educative effects is radical for its place 
and time.3 
As will be demonstrated in the course of the following chapters, the critical 
assimilation of leftist political art from the Eastern Bloc to Socialist Realism is not 
sufficient to describe all activity in some of the less routine, yet still politically 
committed, literary projects from the region. The field is far more varied and 
complicated. In Gorky’s canonized—if not appropriately canonical—novel Mat’, the 
book itself is didactic, but the model depicted for radicalization is not a didactic 
experience in the sense that it an external, inoragnic truth is assimilated by the title 
character; instead, “mother” is radicalized via experiences that resemble German 
Romantic theories on the education of the subject and, perhaps ironically given the 
heavy-handedness of the novel, the autonomy of art. Additionally, Hacks’ essays from 
his collection of literary criticism Das Poetische (1966) describe the revolutionary 
potential of a classicist form of aesthetic experience, which he argues best reflects the 
harmony, order, and greatness that resulted from the realization of actually existing 
                                                 
3 There are, of course, other artists and critics who tout the revolutionary potential of artistic form, 
from the contributors to the Russian journal Levy Front Iskusstv (Lef or Left Front of the Arts, published 
in the 1920s) to Brecht and Adorno in Germany. After the articulation of the Socialist-Realist 
method, however, a radical content was championed before all else. 
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socialism in his day.  And Müller’s play Mauser (1970) builds off of a Brechtian avant-
garde aesthetics that insists on the inherent potential in the dramatic work to provoke 
radical and dialectically open forms of thought through its performance. 
The following chapters will not be concerned with whether or not the image 
of reality presented by these texts is accurate. On the contrary, this project seeks to 
tease out the underlying assertions or assumptions made by a particular group of 
works about the nature of the relationship between art and truth when the former is 
put in the service of a socialist politics. The unabashedly didactic aesthetics at the 
heart of the Socialist-Realist method is founded upon the belief that art can serve a 
specific program because it can educate the reader through the imposition and 
consequent transmission of an external message that, here, is Marxist-Leninist. One 
major point that the texts discussed in the subsequent pages will reveal is that this was 
not the only school of thought being experimented with in the Eastern Bloc. Just 
because these aesthetic theories are politically committed and pedagogical does not 
mean that they are also didactic in the sense that they serve a truth outside of 
themselves, a la Socialist Realism. As will become clear, revolutionary truth need not 
be imposed on the artwork; it can instead develop in relation with its target audience. 
Art itself has revolutionary potential, and it is the form of that potential that is of 
interest here. 
The implicit or explicit claim of the texts that are the subjects of this analysis 
is that the artwork can be a heuristic. When the reader or audience engages with it, 
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there are/should be pedagogical consequences that at the extra-textual level may be 
harnessed for a political effect. With each author a different angle of this claim will be 
analyzed. For example, in Mat’, Gorky models for his readers the process of 
consciousness raising in the figure of his destitute titular character, Pelegea Nilovna, 
who is being pressured by her son to join the struggle for the revolution. While she is 
initially incapable of grasping the platform of the struggle from an intellectual angle, 
the truth of that platform eventually discloses itself to her as she listens to music (the 
chorus of a protest song; a piece for piano by Grieg). Hacks’ literary theoretical essays 
on the so-called “play of tomorrow” and the “poetic” describe the emancipatory 
potential of theatre when it aims to indirectly reflect the historical process—i.e., what 
could be—through the staging of great ideas and great men in a unified, well 
composed, and well balanced classical form. The process of imagining a possible 
world free of contradictions and contrasting it with the actual, still flawed (but 
improving!) world is liberating for both the playwright and his viewers because it 
reveals the truth to each of them by engaging their critical faculties as they try to 
figure out why the latter is not yet the former and, consequently, by working to close 
the gap between them. Finally, in Mauser Müller revises the Brechtian conception of a 
Lehrstück, or teaching play, into what I will call a Lernstück, or learning play, which, in 
its staging, seeks to provoke in the minds of its own actors a form of dialectical 
thought that can have radical consequences. Unlike Brecht’s Die Massnahme, which 
was the inspiration for Müller’s play and concludes by covering over the 
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contradictions its author had worked so hard to flesh out, Mauser refuses to teach or 
resolve any of its tensions, and this forces the actors as well as the audience to think 
for themselves within the terms given to them by the artwork and confront the ugly 
truths of their still unequal society. 
All of these pieces either portray or describe the potential for art to function 
as a method of education or teaching for political ends; but while there are similarities 
in the basic content of the truths communicated by them and by works of Socialist 
Realism, the process required to access the truth in these texts is remarkably different 
from that in didactic Socialist Realism. For Gorky, aesthetic experience is the catalyst 
for the emergence of the uneducated Pelagea Nilovna’s intellect, which eventually 
joins with her intuition to create a unified figure in a good position to serve the 
revolutionary cause; and for Hacks and Müller, aesthetic experience compels the 
comparison of what is presented (aesthetic appearance) with the actual world, and this 
analysis of what is and what could be inspires truly dialectical, radical thinking. 
Although the content of the texts described may still be tendentious and even didactic 
at times, their status as works of art grants a pedagogical potential to the experience of 
art that does not—or does not merely—issue from their content, as in didacticism, 
but rather arises from the development of certain forms of dialectical thought that can 
also be liberating. Committed art does not have to serve solely as a vehicle for a 
lesson; the mere experience of some provocative art may have its own political 
potential. 
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Socialist Realism: Background 
At this stage, it is worth taking a step back to review the so-called “method” of 
Socialist Realism and even to note that it is alive and well today in East Asian and 
post-colonial literature, in particular. Critic Xudong Zhang has published on the 
ubiquity of its master narratives in the Chinese variations (“The Power of Rewriting” 
1997), and scholars M. Keith Booker and Dubravka Juraga have traced its theoretical 
principles through the works of certain African writers in the second half of the 
twentieth century (“The Reds and the Blacks” 2005). In the West, however, Socialist-
Realist literature has long been out of fashion. Ever since the break-up of the Soviet 
Union, artists from the Eastern Bloc are, of course, no longer required to produce art 
according to the Socialist-Realist method, and most experiment far beyond their 
previous confines. Similarly, literary critics also tend to condemn most of what 
appeared between 1934 and 1989 as having ostensibly arrested the development of an 
otherwise remarkable literary tradition. Many find absurd the fact that a writer like 
Alexander Fadeev (The Rout 1927) would have been asked (or would have claimed) to 
pick up where Tolstoy left off, and in so doing they wrongly judge Socialist Realism 
according to a value system different from the one that spawned it. For the original 
theorists of Socialist Realism, the literary merit of a work is measured by its 
truthfulness, not its artfulness. 
During the Soviet Era, the Socialist-Realist method was mandatory for artists 
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in the Eastern Bloc, and because of this, all artistic works from there—particularly 
those that shared the aim of melding truthful representation (broadly defined though 
it was) with radical consciousness-raising efforts—must inevitably be compared to the 
tenets of Socialist Realism. In order to best understand the context in which Gorky, 
Hacks, and Müller were writing and their work was consumed so as to appreciate the 
boldness of their own undertakings, it is important to understand that Socialist 
Realism’s major themes and supposedly realist style had been taking shape for decades 
before it was officially legislated. Prominent philosophers and literary critics like V.G. 
Belinsky, Nikolay Chernyshevsky, and Friedrich Engels had been calling since at least 
the 1830s for writers to “show society in its development” (Belinsky 192).4 While 
Gorky’s Mat’ (Mother 1907) and Fyodor Gladkov’s Tsement (Cement 1925) were 
consistently named as forerunners, a loose theory of an explicitly Socialist-Realist 
method, style, and content for literature was not codified until the 1934 Writers’ 
Congress in Moscow. Gorky himself presided over the proceedings, while party 
functionaries like Andrei Zhdanov explained to these “engineers of human souls” 
(author Yury Olesha’s term) that their charge was to “[know] life so as to be able to 
depict it truthfully.” They were not to mirror the “objective reality” of life, but “reality 
in its revolutionary development,” with the “tendentious” aim of the “ideological 
                                                 
4 For more, see Belinsky’s various articles on Alexander Pushkin, his letter to V.P. Botkin from 
September 8, 1841, and his essay, “A View of the Principle Aspects of Russian Literature in 1843”; 
Chernyshevsky’s novel What Is to Be Done? (1863) as well as his self-review of his dissertation, The 
Aesthetic Relation of Art to Reality (1855); and Engels’ letter to Margaret Harkness from April 1888. 
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remoulding and education of the toiling people in the spirit of socialism” (21). 
This pedagogical demand is what Zhdanov called “the method of socialist 
realism,” and it speaks more directly to the belief he shared with many other writers 
and functionaries at the Congress regarding what should be the relationship between 
art and truth in Socialist Realism than it does to an artistic process that his audience of 
writers could follow when they picked back up their pens (21). When Zhdanov 
demanded that Socialist-Realist literature present “reality in its revolutionary 
development,” he correspondingly implied that its function is merely to serve a truth 
that exists outside of art, and, not coincidentally, a truth that will serve the interests of 
his political party by convincing readers that the country was headed in the right 
direction.5 
One of the primary goals of this dissertation is to argue that Soviet Era 
socialist aesthetics are worthy of attention and far more complicated than Zhdanov 
would have wanted. This is not a commonly held belief, and that is largely due to the 
critical reception of Socialist Realism, whose poor reputation has been over-
generalized to virtually all leftist literature: its didacticism is typically blamed for its 
alleged lack of literary merit (a focus on content over form), or, still worse for party 
functionaries longing for an extensive and captivated readership, its banality. Yet, as 
stated, it is not my intention to appraise the literary value of this socialist literature; 
                                                 
5 The content of the Truth here is Marxist-Leninist historical materialism, but because the substance 
of this Truth is not the focus of the present study, it will not be discussed further. 
 10 
rather, I will argue that, despite what sometimes appears to be a facile 
instrumentalization of art, socialist literature from the Eastern Bloc deserves a 
prominent place in the broader tradition of thought about the problem of the 
relationship between aesthetics and politics. In the Soviet arena, this issue is nowhere 
near as black and white as it is often assumed to be. Socialist literature of this period is 
an extraordinary site for examining how problems of aesthetics and politics can be 
worked on and worked out: it is expected to completely subordinate art to the 
political, as Zhdanov encourages writers to do, but I wish to strongly qualify that all-
too-easy reduction by describing and contextualizing how certain literary works and 
theories, one of which is even a much-modeled work of Socialist Realism, portray, 
define, and act out other non-exclusively didactic ways of locating and making use of 
the pedagogical potential of art and of aesthetic experience. 
The aesthetic problem of the relationship between truth and art was of 
paramount importance for the theorists and practitioners of the Socialist-Realist 
method, and it was a, if not the, big issue steering the discussions at the 1934 Writers’ 
Conference. During the meetings, the participants sought to articulate what came to 
be identified as the undergirding purpose of Socialist Realism, namely the 
employment of literature in the effort to radicalize readers “in the spirit of socialism.” 
This endeavor was thought to be legitimated by a pledge among willing artists to be 
truthful to life and to work in a realist style and with a realist content, and they 
defined this in a way that was contrary to conventions of the day, claiming that 
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realism reflects life as it is and where it is heading, which for this group was towards 
socialism.6 Of course, this definition stands in stark contrast to more popular 
descriptions of the realist style as the objective and faithful representation of reality. 
But the definition of “realism” provided by proponents of Socialist Realism was often 
defended by the philosophical concept of necessity: this method of art is realist 
because it provides a truthful presentation of the movement of life both as it is and as 
it will necessarily come to be. Andrei Sinyavsky (writing under the pseudonym Abram 
Tertz) calls this principle concept of Socialist Realism “Purpose with a capital P” in 
his essay “On Socialist Realism,” and he adds that “a tendency toward purpose”—a 
tendency to see all events as “subject to a higher destiny”—“is part of human nature.” 
It provides the story in a Socialist-Realist work as well as its reader (or better, pupil) 
with a direction or even a telos, with the aid of which she can “transform nature into 
[her] own image” and see the world as she wants it to be (150-1). 
Interestingly enough, Sinyavsky’s characterization of the “realism” of Socialist 
Realism as a kind of master narrative perspectivism is not all that distinct from 
contemporary criticism on literary works more broadly accepted as either fitting or 
demanding a place in the more conventional definition of “realism.” As recently as 
                                                 
6 Gorky: “‘realism’ would cope with its difficult task if [...] it depicted man not only such as he is 
today, but also as he must and shall be tomorrow” (“Talks on Craftsmanship” 179). Karl Radek: 
“Socialist realism means not only knowing reality as it is, but knowing whither its moving. [...] And a 
work of art created by a socialist realist is one which shows whither that conflict of contradictions 
[in capitalism] is leading which the artist has seen in life and reflected in his work” (157). Zhdanov 
on the duties of Soviet writers: “it means knowing life so as to be able to depict it truthfully in works 
of art, not to depict it in a dead, scholastic way, not simply as ‘objective reality’, but to depict reality 
in its revolutionary development” (21). 
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2005, Peter Brooks has argued in a study of 19th-century Victorian literature that 
realism derives from mankind’s playful interest in making models, which are exciting 
because they “give us a way to bind and organize the complex and at times 
overwhelming energies outside us” (1). Novelists like Balzac and James “play with the 
world seriously,” because it provides them and their readers with a sense of having 
“master[ed] the world,” but, Brooks warns, it can get out of hand (5, 2). If they close 
themselves off too much, fantasies can end up taking the place of reality (“the 
fantastic represents a labyrinth plotted by men, a labyrinth destined to be deciphered 
by men”) and become totalizing myths (214). Such is often the fate of Socialist 
Realism. 
The coimplication of Sinyavsky’s Purpose-driven theory of Socialist Realism 
and its contention that it is indeed a type of realism returns the focus of this 
discussion to the question of aesthetics. In the chapter “Art and Philosophy” from his 
Handbook of Inaesthetics (1998), Alain Badiou offers concise, generic schemata for 
discussing the truth-art relation, the first of which would locate Socialist Realism 
under the heading of “didacticism,” as that which subscribes to the “thesis that art is 
incapable of truth, or that all truth is external to art” and thus not immanent to it. 
Didactic art is controlled by something outside of itself—its “public effect” or 
educative role—which renders gratuitous any search for truth in the artistic work. 
Above anything else, a work of art that operates according to a didactic schema is a 
means to an end and is experienced “not so much as an imitation of things, but as the 
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imitation of the effect of truth” (2-3). (Credit is given here to Plato’s writings on 
mimesis in Book X of The Republic in which he correctly identifies art as aesthetic 
appearance and not actual reality.) The same holds true for Socialist Realism, for 
which the Purpose is right on the surface and plays a more important role than any 
reported faithful reflection of (the appearance of) the outside world. Consequently, 
what is really at stake in a discussion of the method of didactic and allegedly realist art 
is not the believability or coherence of its depiction of the outside world or even the 
content of the message it desires to convey, but how reality is presented as truth. The 
issue of “how”—the method and the form—is what reveals the aesthetic theory 
governing a work of art and uncovers what the artwork implicitly or explicitly 
professes to be the relationship between art and truth. Moreover, this provides the 
critic the opportunity to take committed socialist literature in general more seriously 
as art and find a place for it in the long tradition of aesthetics, rather than simply 
dismissing it because its purported all-determining didacticism runs contrary to our 
collective modernist tendency to value artistic autonomy. 
  
The Matter of Realism 
Whereas the aesthetics of the Socialist-Realist method is unquestionable and 
uncompromisingly didactic, critics have long identified a lack of consistency and 
logical unity elsewhere in its theoretical underpinnings. This is an intriguing accusation 
against a method deeply committed to the promotion and dissemination of a singular 
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way of understanding the world. In its most typical manifestation, this argument takes 
the form of a complaint not just about individual works that are representative of the 
style of Socialist Realism, but also, more generally, about its theory and practice. 
Almost any study or review of this style, by armchair and professional critics alike, 
features the specific objection that the content of the artwork produced according to 
the Socialist Realist method is, contrary to its name, far from realist in any customary 
sense of the term. 
 The cynicism about the ostensibly fake-looking realism of Socialist Realism 
might even be a major factor in turning Soviet Literature into the pariah that it 
became in the West long before 1989. Realism itself, however—or at least the 
pretention to it—has experienced a resurgence in the past twenty years in the United 
States, most prominently in the visual medium of television. Debates about the 
cultural stakes of realism now extend beyond the academy and are being negotiated in 
popular culture.7 As the novelist Jonathan Franzen explains in a 2011 article in the 
New Yorker, ours is an age defined to a large extent by simulacra of reality on the 
internet and in reality television. It is virtually impossible for us to tell fact from 
fiction when we are constantly bombarded with different versions of our world, all 
presented simultaneously, all impossible to untangle (“Farther Away”). According to 
                                                 
7 For more on scholarly discussions about the return of realism, see Jean Baudrillard’s Simulacra and 
Simulation (1981, trans. Sheila Glaser 1994), Guy Debord’s The Society of the Spectacle (1967, trans. 
Donald Nicholson-Smith 1995), Fredric Jameson’s Postmodernism, or the Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism 
(1990), and Slavoj Žižek’s Welcome to the Desert of the Real (2002). 
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Franzen, “there’s no end of virtual spaces in which to seek stimulation, but their very 
endlessness, the perpetual stimulation without satisfaction, becomes imprisoning.” 
Because of this, actual fictions that are designed to look and feel like reality are more 
important and satisfying than ever because they alleviate our anxiety about what is real 
and what isn’t. They focus our attention on one world. In our search for truth and 
meaning, Franzen says we turn to realism: he reads Robinson Crusoe, while millions of 
viewers watch television shows like Law and Order (franchise run, 1990-present) and 
The Wire (2002-2008). In its various incarnations, the former show has been on for 
more than twenty years and has produced almost a thousand episodes in the United 
States alone. The latter, which follows the “kitchen sink” realist style of filmmakers 
Ken Loach and Mike Leigh, was created by the former journalist David Simon. In a 
2010 New York Magazine article, Simon explains that he left journalism behind to 
create “drama, not documentary” because realist art can share more about humanity 
and “fundamental truths” than historical reports can: “We know more about human 
pride, purpose, and obsession from Moby-Dick than from any contemporaneous 
account of the Nantucket whaler that was actually struck and sunk by a whale in the 
nineteenth-century incident on which Melville based his book” (qtd. in Nussbaum 
“Pugnacious D”).  
The way realist fiction helps us focus on the truth of just one world is only 
part of its power today; at the same time, it is both publicly available and widely 
circulated. As Franzen observes, realism gives us a “way off the island[s]” that we 
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each create for ourselves when we retreat into ourselves to try to make sense of all 
that is around us. It allows us to experience the “urgent and fresh and honest news” 
and truths of a single world we can actually share, which in turn establishes a network 
among individuals.8  
The desire to build a community around a common understanding or world 
view has been at the heart of many the realist projects over the past two centuries. 
That this is also the core of the Socialist-Realist method is, I think, what makes it such 
an attractive and easy target for so many people today who were brought up in a 
world increasingly dominated by visual culture. Unlike the critical darling The Wire, 
which can largely rely on the camera to record life as it is, realist literature has to feel 
true to life without relying on the seemingly innate realism of photographic 
technology, and for many readers now and in its heyday, Socialist Realism does not.9 
What exactly this means can be examined and more clearly fleshed out through the 
case of Gladkov’s Tsement. 
Even though it was published before the term was ever coined, Gladkov’s 
Tsement was celebrated and canonized as a model of Socialist Realism, and it will serve 
as a test for the charge that the mode of the Socialist-Realist method is not genuinely 
                                                 
8 The core of Franzen’s essay is a meditation on his relationship with the late David Foster Wallace 
and his perspective on the latter’s troubled inner life and suicide. While the quotation above is from 
a comment about why the lonely Wallace wrote fiction, the allegorical layers of Franzen’s essay, 
which also deals with his travels to an actual island and the metaphorical existential “islands” on 
which all individuals occasionally find themselves living, sanction the extrapolation of this image 
beyond its specific object of description. 
9 Roland Barthes’ Camera Lucida (1980, trans. Richard Howard 1981) is a classic text on the 
relationship between realism and photography. 
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realist.10 It is easy to find fault with several aspects of the book that would appear 
dramatically out of place next to the 19th-century Realist novels of, for example, 
Tolstoy or Dickens. However, I will begin with an even more generous description of 
realism and note what the novel shares with its predecessors, namely, its “attempt to 
come to grips with the fact that we live in a historical world,” which critic Harry Shaw 
identifies as a criterion of realism in Narrating Reality (1999). For the sake of 
contextualization and further elaboration, it is noteworthy that Shaw’s claim draws on 
his discussion of Georg Lukács’s The Historical Novel (1938), in which the philosopher 
and critic also labors to define the character of “good” 19th-century literature. Here 
Lukács asserts that the great Realist Balzac’s work was able to “achieve 
representations of ‘the present in history’,” or, as he puts it in a later preface to his 
collection Studies on European Realism (1948), Balzac’s fiction is capable of illustrating 
the “purposeful development” of historical materialism (5, 2). Accordingly, to the 
extent that Gladkov’s novel intricately describes the dire conditions of the 
protagonist, Gleb’s hometown after the Russian Civil War (destroyed homes and 
businesses; a dearth of manpower) as well as the deep social structures and activities 
that necessarily lead to its precipitous decay (class conflict) and eventual renewal 
(community organization and activism), it is a realist work.  
                                                 
10 Despite the security of his place in the canon, Gladkov drastically revised the prose of Tsement 
several times in order to strip it of any latent experimentalism or ornamentalism and to conform it 
more to the style of Socialist Realism codified under Zhdanov. For a detailed discussion of these 
changes, see Robert L. Busch’s essay, “Gladkov’s Cement: The Making of a Soviet Classic” (1978). 
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Yet Lukács’s criteria for properly realist subject matter reach far beyond the 
demonstration of the effects of history on the present. To this he adds the following 
two attributes: (1) the “type”—not as a “lifeless average,” but as that which “binds 
together the general and the particular in both characters and situations”; and (2) the 
three-dimensionality of presentation—that totality of which Adorno is so critical and 
to which Jameson offers his qualified support, as it “depicts man and society as 
complete entities” and “endows with independent life characters and human 
relationships” (Studies 6).11 Gladkov’s Socialist-Realist novel falls short of satisfying 
each of these principles. It is heavy on history, to be sure, but it is also heavy on 
stereotypes drawn from oversimplifications and prejudices, i.e., what Lukács calls in 
“The Ideology of Modernism” the “outer world” of characters, or their social being 
(25). Gladkov flattens out the supporting cast of Tsement to the extent that they have 
no depth and neither the ability nor the opportunity to develop further. Take 
                                                 
11 In “Reconciliation under Duress,” which is his a counter-argument to Lukács’s The Meaning of 
Contemporary Realism (1962), Adorno rebukes the latter for creating a false homology between what is 
presented in the artistic work (aesthetic appearance) and actually existing reality. This, he believes, is 
a conflation that unwittingly cancels out the true source of art’s critical power—that is, not the 
straightforward reflection/disclosure of the totality of life in the artwork, but rather the aesthetic 
distance afforded by the contradiction between the object in the artwork and the actual object. Later, 
in the essay “Commitment,” Adorno altogether rejects popular faith in “realism” and the idea that it 
offers any kind of liberating potential in the education it provides. Any call for art to be faithful to 
reality by illustrating the “totality” of society or by “spotlighting alternatives” to the dismal status 
quo is, for Adorno, a “conservative authoritarianism”: “within a predetermined reality, freedom 
becomes an empty claim” (179-80). For Jameson’s support of Lukács, see “On Interpretation” in 
The Political Unconscious (1981) where he defends Lukács’s use of totality. Jameson writes that this 
concept is primarily a “critical and negative, demystifying operation” that serves to expose ideology 
as comprising “strategies of containment” in the “confrontation with the ideal of totality which they 
at once imply and repress” (52-53). It quickly becomes clear that this theory takes center stage in 
Jameson’s own model for interpretation. For a perspective from intellectual history on this debate, 
see Martin Jay’s The Dialectical Imagination (1973). 
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Comrade Badin, who is the Chairman of the Executive Committee in the town and is 
a caricature of a relatively powerful, upper-level provincial bureaucrat. Badin ignores 
the ideas and opinions of everyone below him, procures whatever or whomever he 
wants for his own use, and is repeatedly described as “cold and reserved.” Moreover, 
Gladkov’s protagonist is larger than life; mythical, even. At one party meeting, Gleb 
rips off his shirt to exhibit the physical scars he bears from fighting in the Civil War. 
This explosion of brute force is precipitated by the friction he feels between himself 
and those around him. He is committed to do everything he can to revive his town, 
including rebuilding and reopening the local factory that is the isolated community’s 
life force, but his neighbors—whom he straightforwardly and publicly shames for 
their impotence—lack motivation. In this moment, this act, which superficially 
appears to be a raw expression of Gleb’s inner life is, more accurately, just a 
performance for others and for the benefit of the movement. Readers never have 
more than an inkling of who Gleb is as an individual, but they certainly know him as a 
hero, a status conferred upon him by the external world in the novel’s final scene: 
perched high above the masses while they celebrate the factory’s resurrection, Gleb 
brandishes the Soviet flag and is lavished with admiring gazes and wild cheers from 
the crowd below.  
This quick discussion of Tsement helps to illustrate the most apparent 
problems (atypical heroics; one-dimensional characters) with Socialist Realism’s 
assertion that it presents content that is explicitly realist. In the end, however, the 
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substance of these disparities is only superficially related to a supposed infidelity to 
the generic conventions of Realism with a capital R, that is, 19th-century Realism. As 
Shaw puts it, “The term ‘realism’ resists the status of the purely descriptive” (6). A 
piece of Realist literature carries with it not just the epistemological and moral claims 
subsequently described by Shaw, but, as a work ostensibly devoted to the presentation 
of what is actual and real, also certain beliefs about the communication of truth in art, 
even if they are only implicit. For Socialist Realism, this relationship is didactic, in that 
its art is tasked with communicating a truth external to it, which in turn allows for that 
art to be used as a vehicle for political ends in this case. With this in mind, it would 
seem that what bothers most critics of Socialist Realism who harp on its unrealistic 
content is the fact that the legitimacy of Socialist Realism’s entire project is asserted 
on the grounds that it provides an allegedly realist and truthful content. What makes 
these complaints more common among critics of Socialist Realism than those of 
bourgeois 19th-century Realism is the manifest and unequivocal fidelity of the former 
to an extra-literary political program, i.e., its unflinching rejection of artistic autonomy, 
which is itself ostensibly underwritten by a commitment to presenting the truth. 
In “On Socialist Realism,” Sinyavsky offers one solution to Socialist Realism’s 
publicity problem: rebrand. Doing so would allow the actual truth of the text—the 
Purpose—to shine through and not be weighed down or distracted by weak attempts 
to negotiate with so-called realist content. “In its content and spirit, as in its central 
figure,” he explains, “socialist realism is much closer to the eighteenth century,” that 
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is, to Neo-Classicism and early Romanticism, “than to the nineteenth[-century]” 
Realism (195). Sinyavsky’s solution for this supposedly bogus claim to R/realism is to 
drop all pretense of verisimilitude, for only then “will [Socialist Realism] be able to 
express the grand and implausible sense of our era,” namely, a purposefulness that is 
radically different from the “superfluousness” he identifies as the defining quality of 
the characters and events of 19th-century Realist fiction (215).  
Sinyavsky’s suggestion opens a chapter in his essay which aims to draw a 
connection between the author’s subject and the 18th century by demarcating what 
Sinyavsky sees as two relatively distinct stages of Socialist Realism prior to his writing. 
The first is the romantic period (1917-1930) of novels like Tsement, which is 
characterized by the presentation of “the seeds of the future” that everyday life 
contains; it “affirms an ideal,” but does not idealize or embellish. Its failure as realism, 
according to Sinyavsky, is that “it takes the wish for the reality,” unable to distinguish 
between what is and what is desired (200-206). The second period is classicist (1930-
1953) and is presided over by Stalin’s imposing, “disciplined rationali[sm]” and high 
ideals. It indicates a modal shift from the stage before it, because rather than 
mistaking the ideal for the real, the ideal is simply presented as what is (200-201, 206-
208). The period following the romantic and classicist eras (1953-Sinyavsky’s present) 
is one of suffering in the wake of Stalin’s death and is akin to the death of God, of the 
Purpose that had sustained the nation and given meaning to everything its people had 
sacrificed for so long. Sinyavsky says that, at this moment, art finds itself between an 
 22 
“insufficient realism and an insufficient classicism” because the people of the Soviet 
Union (lead by Khrushchev) “blew up the foundations of that classicist colossus” 
created by Stalin’s cult of personality and the unambiguous direction it provided and 
thereby destroyed any possibility of a future with Socialist Realism as it had hitherto 
been defined and practiced (216-217).  
For Sinyavsky, the name is the problem. Rebranding Socialist Realism as 
something other than “realism” will finally relieve it of the burden of struggling to 
“combine the uncombinable,” that is, the ideal and the prosaic. The grandness of the 
former cannot help but overshadow the latter, and a mockery is always made of this 
unhappy couple’s pretentions to verisimilitude (214). Such an effort would have 
effectively solved the political problem Sinyavsky identifies in the content of Socialist 
Realism by allowing the ideal to be labeled as such. It would still give the people a 
Purpose to strive for and towards, all while acknowledging that the goal is, in fact, just 
a goal and not yet a reality. 
Sinyavsky broadens the discussion of the content of the Socialist-Realist 
method—of what is being communicated or taught by this didactic literature—to 
include the issue of form, and two of the most recent and most popular studies of this 
aspect come from Katerina Clark in The Soviet Novel (2000) and Régine Robin in 
Socialist Realism: An Impossible Aesthetic (1986). Each critic discusses what the former 
calls a “modal schizophrenia” or “fatal split” between the presentations of what is and 
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what will or ought to be (37).12 For Robin, this is representative of a kind of confusion 
in Socialist Realist literature where the matter of “epics, heroic narratives, [and] 
legendary verse-chronicles” masquerades in the “forms of verisimilitude, realism and 
representation.” This is the “impossible aesthetic” of her title, impossible because, 
logically, it would seem that the promised ideal would cancel out the real and vice 
versa; but she is quick to point out that, for her, impossible does not mean 
“ineffectual” with respect to the work’s pedagogical and political intentions (xxiii). 
Clark would agree with this assessment, as she explains that this is, in fact, the 
character of the successful and “particular Stalinist cosmology,” which relied on the 
simultaneity of “two diametrically opposed senses of reality” that mirror the generic 
definitions of epic and novel from Mikhail Bakhtin’s 1941 essay on the two forms 
(Clark 39, 38). In the latter’s analysis, the epic is a “genre that has not only long since 
completed its development, but [...] is already antiquated,” closed, and sacred; it is 
situated at an “absolute epic distance [separating its] world from the contemporary 
reality,” and it portrays what ought to be (Bakhtin 3, 13). Opposed to this is the genre 
of the novel, which is open to all possibilities, in that it “continues to develop, [and] is 
as yet uncompleted”; it is future-oriented, and, contrary to the epic, its style is not 
                                                 
12 For an earlier identification of this same problem, see Edward Mozejko’s Der sozialistische Realismus: 
Theorie, Entwicklung und Versagen einer Literaturmethode (1977). In it, Mozejko notes that, were a Soviet 
writer to give a “fully objective picture of reality,” he would be reprimanded for “bourgeois 
objectivism,” which is an indictment Lukács levels against authors like Zola and Ernst Ottwalt. 
Mozejko continues, “the theory and practice of Socialist Realism is founded on two opposed theses 
of Marxism. Opposed because one postulates the dream of a happy future (and this is an ideological 
thesis par excellence [...]); the other thesis encourages the reflection of the present” (38). 
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poetic and its hero is not heroic (3, 10). A work of Socialist-Realist literature makes 
the effort to somehow meld these diametrically opposed forms and worldviews into 
an individual work. 
The “modal schizophrenia” or “impossible aesthetic” of which Clark and 
Robin write is not just a commentary on the arguably inconsistent content or style of 
Socialist Realism as realism. On the contrary, it is the acknowledgement that the form 
that the Socialist-Realist content takes encourages competing ways of viewing and 
understanding the world. Yet, as noted above, for Gorky, Zhdanov, and others, the 
inconsistent ontology and Weltanschauung of the Socialist-Realist novel is neither a 
secret nor, apparently, a problem. This “impossible” combination is intentionally built 
into the very first articulations of its aesthetic theory. Zhdanov even goes so far as to 
declare that Socialist Realism should actually be a “romanticism of a new type, 
revolutionary romanticism,” which Gorky also coins as “essentially a pseudonym for 
socialist realism” (Zhdanov 21, Gorky qtd. in Becker 487). Here “revolutionary” 
denotes a critical understanding of reality qua historical materialism as what is and 
must be, and “romanticism” connotes its future orientation and the part it plays in the 
struggle for socialism.13 
Interrogations and evaluations of the realism of the Socialist-Realist method 
often dwell on and limit themselves to criticizing its atypical content or to interpreting 
                                                 
13 Gorky continues, writing about “revolutionary romanticism”: “the purpose of [it] is not only to 
depict the past critically, but chiefly to promote the consolidation of revolutionary achievement in 
the present and a clearer view of the lofty objectives of the socialist future” (487). 
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its form, coherent or not, as the direct extension of that straightforward, didactic 
content. They mull over the possible consequences of the paradox of its 
revolutionary/realist romanticism and interrogate its lack of a unified world view. But 
in doing so, they miss the more salient and primary avenue for critiquing Socialist 
Realism as a theory and practice of art: its aesthetic assumptions and underpinnings, 
what it presupposes to be the relationship between art and truth. For all committed 
art, the matter of how truth is experienced must precede the concern for what is 
experienced, as this speaks to the very inception and intention of its entire project and 
ultimately its political potential.  
 
Socialist Literature 
Insofar as Socialist-Realist theory avers that the purpose of art is to serve a particular 
external Marxist-Leninst conception of truth—and thereafter a particular Soviet 
communist politics—it is didactic, presenting an external truth or content. Yet, as 
already noted, this term is insufficient to describe other Eastern Bloc leftist political 
literature tackled in the present project.  
One way of further refining the key differences between the works to be 
discussed here and Socialist Realism is with the help of the chapter “Revolutionary 
and Socialist Art” from Leon Trotsky’s Literature and Revolution (1924) in which he 
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distinguishes between “revolutionary literature” and “socialist literature.”14 The 
aspirational themes of Socialist Realism as “socialist literature” can only mimic the 
“disinterested friendship, love for one’s neighbor, [and] sympathy [that] will be the 
mighty ringing chords of socialist poetry” one day down the road once socialism is 
becomes a reality. But that time had not yet come when Trotsky was writing, nor had 
it arrived in East Germany when Mauser was written. Consequently, in scenes like the 
one described in the final chapter of Gladkov’s Tsement, the Socialist-Realist method 
presents an image reality that is premature; it is a non-contradictory reality that has 
achieved the harmonious realization of its revolutionary development, which is to say, 
an illustration of what will be, masquerading as what already is. Gorky, Hacks, and 
Müller, however, portray or champion art that is appropriate to their historical 
moment by “reflect[ing] the contradictions of a revolutionary social system” and by 
being “thoroughly imbued with it, [...] colored by the new consciousness arising out of 
the revolution” (188, 187). It is their presentation of the form of the contradiction as 
opposed to the content of the equal relations between individuals that distinguishes 
the subjects of this study. Of greatest importance to their transitional societies was the 
truthful replication of the contours of the tensions that persist, as they are what can 
set the minds of individuals, not just their hearts, in motion. The aim of truly 
“revolutionary” art, then, is to educate by supporting the development of the 
                                                 
14 My use of the term “socialist literature” as a catch-all for the works discussed in this dissertation, 
including Socialist-Realist ones, is not related to Trotsky’s; mine is merely shorthand for Eastern 
Bloc literature that is committed to the socialist cause. 
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revolutionary consciousness, not by forcing truths into them and willing them into 
completion, but by re-forming the operations of consciousness to match the contours 
of life as it is. 
Through this educational process—and it is significant that it is, indeed, a 
process; one that can take many forms—those who engage with art are encouraged 
not just to think critically about their own world, but to envision a new one with the 
aid of the artwork. This practice is liberating for the mind and could even be called a 
worldbuilding exercise. It taps into and fosters the readers’ or audience’s most human 
qualities: their position not only as thinking beings (homo sapien), but as creative ones 
(homo faber). The activation and development of their imaginations through the 
academic dialectical exercises they experience with the artwork reveal in each 
individual the “intellectual,” who, in Antonio Gramsci’s formulation from the Prison 
Notebooks (written in the 1930s), is a philosopher as well as an artist. An intellectual is 
a conscious participant in a “particular conception of the world” and either works to 
keep the world as it is if it suits him, or, for those like Gorky, Hacks, and Müller’s 
intended revolutionary audiences, to change it by “bring[ing] into being new modes of 
thought” (9).  
Accordingly, for the individuals who actively and consciously interact with it, 
the committed “revolutionary” work of art thus conceived facilitates an approach to 
learning that is guided by the artwork, not determined by its message. The 
consequence of this is that art can help to assist in the achievement of freedom in its 
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audience members, even as they take the position of students, because it can work 
according to a method of autonomous learning or self-directed education through art. 
This facility of aesthetic experience as portrayed, described, and staged by the authors 
discussed here stands in stark contrast to the didactic educational style of Socialist 
Realism. Works of Socialist Realism can only hope to produce an audience who will 
swallow and later regurgitate its platform in the service of politics. Artistic works as 
conceived by the latter may hold the same intentions regarding the dissemination of 
their radical content; but thanks to the formal “training” the audience members 
receive in their individual aesthetic experiences, the artworks also help to set in 
motion minds that will develop the ability to draw their own conclusions about the 
world (by fitting a given content into one rubric of understanding) as well as generate 
their own ways of changing it. The mostly non-didactic socialist literature discussed in 
the following pages thus functions according to aesthetic theories that promote the 
reader not simply as a knower of a certain content, but as an agent in line with the 
Gramscian intellectual who is also a “‘philosopher’, an artist” of new modes of 
thought (9). 
The epigraph to this introduction comes from Gramsci: “to discover a truth 
oneself, without external suggestions or assistance, is to create—even if that truth is 
an old one” (33). His statement that both creativity and agency are products of 
autonomous learning emphasizes further the emancipatory promise of the 
pedagogical artistic methods of Gorky, Hacks, and Müller and stands as a reminder of 
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the investment this committed and educational art has in the truth. At its most 
fundamental level, this is less a concern for content than one for form, because the 
sustainability of the lesson depends on the audience’s ability not to just reproduce 
information, but to recreate the path that led them to that conclusion; the audience 
must know how to think properly before they can get a handle on what they should 
(or do) think, and the cognitive and creative labor involved in honing their faculties to 
this end is meaningful regardless of the novelty or uniqueness of the truths discovered 
in that process or as a result of that education.  
 
Recurring, with a Difference 
Gramsci helps to make it clear that the topic of sustainable and politically 
consequential education is, at its core, a concern of form, and when this theory is 
applied to pedagogical literature, it becomes a concern of the form of aesthetic 
experience as education. In the cases of Gorky, Hacks, and Müller, investment in the 
pedagogical and political import of art does not mean that the committed work simply 
serves as an instrument or a convenient package for the propagation a specific 
message. A work of art—and precisely because it is art—has a greater radical potential 
than a message alone (or even dressed up) does. 
As previously mentioned, each of the methods and authors to be discussed in 
the subsequent chapters is affiliated with a different theory of how committed art can 
educate, that is, what the structure of the revelation, communication, or experience of 
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truth in art is and how these different forms can lead to political outcomes. Socialist 
Realism, for instance, is didactic and claims to be the highest form of art. As the 
reflection of a world in the process of development and culminating resolution of 
every social contradiction, proponents of the method maintains that Socialist Realism 
itself also sublates all tensions in the art that came before it.15 Although its didactic 
aesthetic is far from novel, Socialist Realism insists that it is a new art for a new time.  
Counter to this are the texts of Gorky, Hacks, and Müller to be discussed 
here, whose formal models for radicalization through art are reminiscent of romantic, 
classical, and avant-garde philosophical aesthetics, respectively. Rather than professing 
that they had overcome all that had preceded them, the authors explicitly place 
themselves in close contact with the greater tradition in their reappropriation of these 
older forms. Similar to the way that dialectical materialism conceives of socialism as a 
necessary stage that is a higher and qualitatively better version of the more primitive 
phase of tribal communism, their work does not try to erase the fact that it is 
historically figured; it initiates a recursion of forms and concepts from older 
generations, though always with qualitative differences attentive to the historical 
                                                 
15 As Karl Radek notes, “The methods of Soviet art […] are commensurate with the tasks which 
revolutionary literature sets for itself” in the same way that the proletarian revolution overcomes the 
reality of capitalism in order to “oppose it by another reality” (155). Moreover, “If we praise our 
literature as first in the world, we realize at the same time that our literary successes represent not 
only the merit of our literature, but are first and foremost a result of the fact that we have built the 
foundation of socialism”;  “our literature reflects the idea of a new, socialist society” (160, 161).  
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situation of each cohort.16 
Examining these texts in light of their relationships to the broader traditions 
of literature and of philosophical aesthetics has two major benefits. First, it makes an 
even stronger case for taking seriously committed art, in general, and committed 
literature from the Eastern Bloc, in particular. It shows that, even though several 
major proponents of the Socialist-Realist method arrogantly dismiss all that comes 
before them and show little concern for the status of their literature as art, there are 
indeed others who are also invested in producing tendentious socialist literature but 
who are at least sensitive to and at best deeply engaged with the philosophical and 
artistic traditions that they insist on participating in. Gorky, Hacks, and Müller’s 
radical lessons are built into the structure of their artistic creations. The forms of their 
works are not merely convenient and entertaining channels for the dissemination of 
their politics; they are useful tools in their own rights. Secondly, any investigation that 
wishes to situate these authors in the tradition undertakes an immanent analysis that 
respects the works of art as art and as players in the wider field of the arts, rather than 
an analysis that dismissively filters out all of the artistic qualities in these works and 
thereby instrumentalizes committed art just as much as the Socialist-Realist method 
                                                 
16 It is worth remembering the irony that, despite the willful forgetting of the architects of Socialist 
Realism and their claims to have invented a thoroughly new method, the literature produced 
according to that method, like the historians who spun their own narratives beside them, were 
strictly bound by a Marxist materialist conception of history. In fact, the imperative to “society in its 
revolutionary development” (Zhdanov), as it is and as it will be (Gorky), was such a ubiquitous and 
rigid feature that Andrei Platonov’s The Foundation Pit (1930), a satire of Socialist Realism, was set in 
a seemingly isolated and never-ending present. 
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has long been derided for doing.  
Approaching the work of Gorky, Hacks, and Müller from this perspective is 
also to engage in a Gramscian-style self-education. While it is true that there is 
nothing new in the critical approach of identifying homologies across time, this 
process will create an alternate and far more open understanding of the place of 
Eastern Bloc literature than that which was held by their own critics. It will refute the 
thesis that post-revolutionary committed literature only negates and sublates all that 
comes before it, and it will also reject efforts that seek to understand these works and 
theories or justify the study of them through either a linear conception of evolution or 
a passive conception of heritage. I will instead locate these works in the philosophical 
and literary tradition in which they prove themselves to be willing and active 
participants through their appropriation of earlier theories of non-didactic aesthetic 
education. Accordingly, in contrast to critical narratives that relegate committed 
literature from the Soviet Union and East Germany to one of a variety of 
inconsequential positions, I seek to identify and articulate the ways that this literature 
puts itself in contact with the greater tradition of literature and of philosophical 
aesthetics and to make sense of these gestures not as conservative retreats into the 
past, but as recursions with a qualitative difference, respectful of the historical 
specificity of each period and the specificity of the artwork as a work of art. 
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CHAPTER 1 
 
GORKY’S LATENT ROMANTICISM AS  
MOTHER’S AESTHETIC EDUCATION 
 
 Although their methods vary, tendentious narratives of any kind rely on models 
for instructing their readers/pupils. This holds true for the stronger (fables, the 
gospels) or relatively weaker (19th-century Realism) varieties alike. In the following 
chapters on Peter Hacks and Heiner Müller, these models will appear in the formal 
descriptions of intellectual operations (i.e., what should happen in the mind of the 
audience as they experience a play) and in the staging of a play (i.e., in the experiences 
of the actors as they perform), respectively. In their most simple incarnations, 
however, these models are positive characters whom the audience is encouraged 
explicitly or implicitly to mimic. From the determined tortoise to feminist icon Vera 
Pavlovna, authors like Aesop and Chernyshevsky depict the journeys and conflicts 
experienced by their protagonists and carry their narratives through to their ultimate 
successes, which then serve as justification for their particular perspectives. The 
illustration of one character’s path thus becomes a model for receptive readers: we 
remind our children to be more patient and persistent like the tortoise, while we aspire 
to boldness in the face of a judgmental society like Vera Pavlovna. 
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Maxim Gorky’s early novel Mat’ (Mother 1907) falls unmistakably into the 
category of tendentious literature that depicts aspirational characters, or characters 
whom they wish to emulate. Based loosely on events leading up to and including the 
1902 May Day celebration in Sormovo, near the author’s hometown of Nizhny 
Novgorod, Mat’ will be the primary site for this chapter’s examination of an aesthetic 
theory of committed socialist literature and, to some extent, that of Socialist Realism.1 
It was first published in 1907, almost three decades before the 1934 Writers’ Congress 
in Moscow, during which the Soviet method of art was first fully articulated and 
essentially legislated; nevertheless, it has been embraced widely as perhaps the earliest 
example of literature exemplifying the style and content of what was later coined 
“Socialist Realism,” which was designed chiefly after Gorky’s work.2 A variation on a 
Bildungsroman, Mat’ is less of a coming-of-age story than one which narrates the 
coming-to-consciousness of a middle-aged mother, Nilovna, as she is radicalized “in 
the spirit of socialism” (Zhdanov) over the course of the novel. The journeys of other 
characters are also included, but it is clear that Gorky expects his readers to follow the 
mother most closely down her path to enlightenment. As an impoverished and 
uneducated woman, she, like most of her author’s undereducated Russian readership, 
must “travel” much further than the others. Gorky makes it easy to identify first with 
                                                 
1 For more information on the connection of Mat’ to Sormovo, see Freeborn (1982), pp. 42-44. 
2 Katerina Clark discusses Gorky’s privileged position in the development of a Socialist-Realist 
aesthetic theory and style in the first chapter of her well known study, The Soviet Novel (2000, 3rd 
ed.). Because of this close relation, I will refer to Mat’ as a work of Socialist Realism. 
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her struggles and measured growth and in due course with her grasp of and 
commitment to the greater Purpose (Sinyavksy) or direction of life, as the forward, 
revolutionary movement of History (the theory of dialectical materialism) and in 
history (the actual organized masses). 
As a kind of Bildungsroman, the novel focuses on the topic of growth, which, 
in its variation here, is illustrated by a character’s progress toward the comprehension 
of the Purpose, and it takes place on two different planes: at the descriptive level, or 
in the accounts of how characters search for and arrive at the truth; and at the 
performative level, or in the operations of the novel itself as it guides the reader along 
the same path. The import of Mat’ for the purposes of this chapter is that the novel 
makes certain implicit claims both about the aesthetic assumptions that fall under the 
method later labeled Socialist Realism, in particular, and about aesthetics, in general. 
In its presentation of the search for truth, not only does it describe the status of art 
relative to the truth, but, as a work of art, it also illustrates this relationship. 
Like the Socialist-Realist works that followed it, Mat’ is unambiguously 
didactic (Badiou) in its ambition: its characters and readers are to straightforwardly 
accept the greater Purpose or truth that has been imposed on the work, and, at the 
same time, the latter are expected to pattern their own development on that of the 
former as they read, because they are in positions similar to the book’s characters and 
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the novel offers them an alternative to the only path they have ever known.3 But while 
the commitment to a didactic thesis holds true for the experience of the majority of 
the characters in the novel and for Gorky’s audience in the education they are 
expected to receive, it appears to fall short in the title character’s portrayal. 
For Nilovna, radicalization takes place not when art is put in the service of an 
external truth, but rather when Nilovna experiences art as truth and achieves a higher 
self-determination. A brief detour to discuss Chernyshevsky’s remarkable protagonist 
Vera Pavlovna in Chto delat’? (1863) will help to make the case that Nilovna’s 
experience and education has the character of a theory of art thoroughly different 
from a didactic education; it is instead romantic. If, for Badiou, didactic aesthetic 
theory subordinates the artwork to a truth always external to it, romantic aestheticism 
endorses the thesis that “art alone is capable of truth,” that is, it holds and reveals 
what philosophy and didactic education can only gesture toward and try to explain 
(“Art and Philosophy” 3). I will eventually turn from Badiou’s schemata for various 
theses on the art-truth relation to writing on aesthetic experience and aesthetic 
education by the early German Romantics, or Frühromantiker, in order to tease out 
further the stakes of this distinction, for the latter’s conceptual frameworks closely 
resemble Nilovna’s process of coming-to-consciousness. 
                                                 
3 To review Badiou’s definition provided in the introduction, didacticism is that which subscribes to 
the “thesis that art is incapable of truth” in itself, “or that all truth is external to art” and thus not 
immanent to it. It is guided by its public effect rather than its own laws and consequently demands 
no effort on the part of the reader searching for truth in it, as its truth is directly on the surface (“Art 
and Philosophy” 2-3).  
 37 
The coincidence of the competing didactic and romantic theories in Mat’ will 
be drawn out over the course of this chapter with the intention of exploring how 
Gorky’s description of Nilovna’s romantic aestheticism interacts with the didactic 
aims of the text. If the protagonist, in whom readers are expected to see at least part 
of themselves and after whom they are implicitly told to model themselves, is only 
radicalized by way of romantic experiences, what, then, is the status of the didactic 
project in Gorky’s novel? Can these two fundamentally opposed theses about art and 
truth coexist in a work of art itself, or in any theory? 
  
Didacticism in Mat’ 
The intended didactic aesthetic of Mat’ as a Socialist-Realist novel is thoroughly 
intertwined with its status as a variation on a Bildungsroman in that it narrates the 
particular journey of a character. The two variations here are (1) that, instead of 
describing an individual’s ascendency from naïve youth to sophisticated, bourgeois 
adulthood, Mat’s protagonist is already physically mature and must instead work 
towards radical intellectual enlightenment, and (2) that, “unlike a Bildungsroman 
hero,” Clark explains, “her final incarnation has already been determined when she 
begins her progress to ‘consciousness’” (57).  
 A brief comment on terminology: although both terms may sound patronizing, 
as they are typically used to describe novels about young people coming-of-age and 
Gorky’s Nilovna is 40 years old, Mat’ is best located somewhere between a 
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Bildungsroman and an Erziehungsroman (novel of upbringing or educational 
development). The primary difference between the two is that the Bildungsroman is 
usually confined to “a developmental process guided by educational authorities and 
oriented to pedagogical problems” during the protagonist’s youth, whereas the 
Erziehungsroman tends to follow the protagonist from naïve childhood through 
“intellectual and artistic” maturity in his active, self-driven integration into bourgeois 
society (Jacobs 230). Correcting for Nilovna’s age, both terms may be said to loosely 
describe the structure of Mat’, as, on the one hand, the novel is concerned with 
pedagogy and educational authority and, on the other, it depicts her self-directed 
Bildung, even as it takes place over a more condensed period of time and actively 
avoids integration into the bourgeois order, such as when she finds herself living with 
the well-to-do urbanite, Nikolai.  
 For the sake of simplicity, I will refer to the novel as a Bildungsroman, relying 
principally on the definition provided by Mikhail Bakhtin in his unfinished manuscript 
on the same topic. He writes that a Bildungsroman is a work which presents “an 
image of man in the process of becoming”; it is a “novel of human emergence” (“The 
Bildungsroman” 21). The term aptly describes Gorky’s protagonist’s own 
Bildungsgeschichte and the teleological structure of Nilovna’s story, and it also highlights 
the vital relationship between readers and the hero identified in 1819 by Karl 
Morgenstern, who initially coined the term “Bildungsroman,” whereby the former’s 
own development is fostered by their identification with the latter (Jacobs 230). 
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Perhaps even more significantly, however, Nilovna is like other Bildungsroman 
protagonists in that, even in her compressed storyline, “[s]he emerges along with the 
world and [s]he reflects the historical emergence of the world itself.” Not only is she 
on the path to her own revolutionary consciousness, but, as Gorky writing after 1905 
knows, Russia is also on the path to revolution (Bakhtin 23). 
Accordingly, neither of the two primary ways that Mat’ differs from a 
traditional Bildungsroman is a problem for Gorky: Nilovna, no matter her age, has set 
out on a path to enlightenment, and just how she will reach that end has yet to be 
determined. The goal is known, but the path is unclear. And as in the typical 
Bildungsroman, readers following along experience everything through Nilovna’s eyes 
and thus have little choice but to identify with—and, it is hoped, eventually end up 
with the same raised consciousness as—Nilovna and the other less prominent 
characters, like her son Pavel and his friends, who undergo ostensibly similar, though 
importantly different, transformations. While the lives his readers lead and the 
environments they inhabit may differ significantly from what Gorky describes in the 
novel, the events in it and the experiences of his characters are so superficially 
portrayed that they can be easily abstracted and mapped onto virtually any modern 
experience of economic injustice and/or alienation.4 The basic structure of the text is 
                                                 
4 As Mette Bryld details in a 1982 essay, despite Gorky’s massive popularity, early Russian critics 
condemn Gorky’s novel as ideologically suspect, as it focuses too much on the characters’ private 
lives and seems to end with the mother sacrificing herself for her son, rather than for the 
revolutionary cause. It is only after 1932, Bryld claims, that critics finally grasp the “mythical” 
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determined by the characters’ mission to solve these problems and set the world right. 
This is what gives Mat’ its Purpose. But unlike other canonical Socialist-Realist novels, 
like Gladkov’s Tsement (Cement 1925), which focuses on the mobilization of resources, 
human and otherwise, and the bureaucratic legwork necessary to affect change in the 
hero’s community, Gorky’s novel is less concerned with what happens after the 
demonstrations in the factory around which the novel is set than what come before 
them. That is, he is more invested in the presentation of the process of education and 
consciousness-raising through the identification of what is wrong, understanding why 
it is wrong, and learning how to fix it.5 
This is the form of the education undertaken in and provided by Mat’. It takes 
place on two different, though, as seen above, directly related planes—an 
identification that sets the novel firmly in line with the program defined later as 
Socialist Realism. Not only are Gorky’s positive characters like Nilovna and her son 
Pavel radicalized, but his eager readers are, as well. Further more, all—at least 
initially—seem to be educated according to a didactic method, as the message in 
Gorky’s work appears to be tethered to an external truth that can only be imposed on 
                                                                                                                                                             
dimension of the novel whereby characters like Nilovna and Pavel become meaningful symbols for 
readers, seeing in them “more or less direct portraits of people from the evolution of the workers’ 
movement” (“M. Gor’kij’s Mat’: Eine mythische Wanderung” 46-49). 
5 In their discussions of characters’ rapid change throughout the novel, both Clark and Alyssa 
Dinega remark upon how seemingly uncomplicated their extreme transformations are. For her part, 
Clark draws a parallel between the descriptions of Gorky’s characters and depersonalized and cliché 
descriptions of heroes in medieval hagiography. Following Clark, Dinega writes that both “are 
largely schematic and their personalities shallow and superficially drawn: two-dimensional icons 
rather than three-dimensional portraits.” “Both are malleable and manipulable,” particularly to an 
empathetic reader’s particular situation (94).  
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the medium of transmission (the novel itself, the music that moves Nilovna), as 
opposed to one that is somehow embedded in the artwork itself. Given that the 
search for truth and the dissemination of it once found are precisely what structure 
the story of the novel and that this method also characterizes the experience of 
Gorky’s truth-seeking readers, Mat’ relies heavily on didacticism as an approach to 
both education through art and education as such. However, the extent to which this 
project is successful remains to be seen. 
First on the matter of what works in Gorky’s Socialist-Realist method of 
didacticism. The task he implicitly assigns to the characters and readers of Mat’ is not 
unlike the philosopher and literary critic Georg Lukács’s description of what the study 
of Marxism affords its students: “[It] searches for the material roots of each 
phenomenon regards them in their historical connections and movement, ascertains 
the laws of such movement and demonstrates their development from root to flower, 
and in so doing lifts ever phenomenon out of a merely emotional, irrational, mystic 
fog and brings it to the bright light of understanding” (“Preface” 1). At the opening of 
Mat’, this fog lies heavy and stagnant over the unnamed provincial settlement in which 
Gorky sets the first half of his story. Like Pavlov’s dogs, workers rise each day to the 
sound of the whistle of the town factory, which is the single source of employment 
for men who have no land to till. Then, when work is over, they empty onto the 
streets. “The day had been devoured by the factory,” Gorky writes; “Man had 
advanced one more step towards his grave. But now he was looking forward to rest 
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and to the delights of a smoke-filled tavern, and he was content” (10). The eyes of the 
workers are clouded by both the pollution of the factory and the smoke exhaled after 
drawing on their pipes. The combination of this cloudiness and the overwhelming 
“lurking sense of animosity” toward one another helps to perpetuate the unrelenting 
“malady of the spirit inherited by from their fathers” (11). Any newcomer who 
attempts to disrupt this routine and clear the air by “sa[ying] things that were new to 
the settlement” and by telling the workers that life need not be this way is listened to 
“skeptically [...] as if they feared he might upset the dull regularity of their lives” (23). 
At least this is the case for the first few chapters of Mat’, during which Gorky 
eases from this description of the average workers’ routine into that of one worker in 
particular, Mikhail Vlassov, and his son, Pavel, who takes after his drunken lout of a 
father in both occupation and recreation after the former dies. But young Pavel’s 
delinquency does not last long, as he quickly finds that he has neither the 
temperament nor the constitution to keep up with the other men of the town. This 
shift pleases his mother Nilovna, while also worrying her, as she is both happy and 
fearful that he has found his own path apart from the “dark stream of common life” 
(18). Pavel’s new course features sobriety and a voracious intellectual appetite, leading 
him to read a great deal and stay out late at discussion groups, rather than drink at the 
local tavern. 
For Pavel, the fog is lifting, and he is finally able to see more clearly. The 
purpose of his self-driven education is not simply pleasure: he is seeking knowledge, 
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but, even more importantly, answers. “I am reading forbidden books,” he responds 
when Nilovna tentatively asks him what has been keeping him so intently occupied. 
“They are forbidden because they tell the truth about us workingmen. [...] I want to 
know the truth, do you understand?” (2). That she does not understand is evident in 
Nilovna’s reaction: “Opening her eyes, she looked at her son and scarcely knew him” 
(21). While she may be capable of seeing her son, she does not yet fully know him or 
comprehend his new mission. Thus, for one character, this personal quest is nearly 
complete, as Pavel’s studies have taken him far. When he talks politics with his 
mother in the statement that follows this heart-to-heart, it is “his first speech on the 
truth he had just come to know,” and it is a meaningful moment for him (ibid). For 
Nilovna, however, this journey—her desire not simply to see, but to understand—has 
only just begun, whether or not she knows it. 
The novel is set principally around Nilovna’s own development, but for now 
this discussion will focus on Pavel and his fellow intellectuals and revolutionaries and 
their own process of coming-to-consciousness. So far I have framed his growth, 
which more or less mirrors that of his colleagues, in terms of a metaphorical journey, 
the destination of which is the “truth.” What truth do they seek? What questions do 
they want to answer? What problems do they want to solve? As Pavel states, he craves 
the “truth of the workingman”: “We must find out and understand why our lives are 
so hart” and why “people who, anxious to do good [and sow] the truth among the 
masses” are punished so severely for their honesty (22-23). In terms that often pop up 
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in their late-night conversations and that are beginning to gain more traction 
throughout the world Gorky’s readers know, Pavel and the others want to 
comprehend the reasons for and means of the exploitation they and others around 
them have faced, as well as the nature of their alienation from themselves, from 
others, and from the state that should be their protector. 
With what appears to be little effort, they quickly find what they are looking 
for in the doctrine of Socialism, and in their individual and collective agitation for and 
display of fidelity to revolution, now simmering before the events of 1905, they reveal 
their shared understanding of modern life’s greatest ills (exploitation and alienation), 
the source of these problems (socio-economic inequalities), and the objective of their 
work as activists, which they declare in the following way: “Is it only a full stomach we 
want? [...] We want to live a life worthy of human beings” (34). They are aware that 
theirs is a slow and laborious assignment, yet “every gathering was one more step in 
the long stairway up which people were slowly climbing to some distant goal” (37). 
This journey would necessitate the gradual raising of their individual consciousnesses, 
the continuation of their educations, as well as the universal restoration of what they 
imply is the lost unity both internal to and between individuals. A “life worthy of 
human beings” demands that man no longer be alienated from himself and others; it 
demands that individuals form a community, but not one nostalgic for a totality 
allegedly in existence prior to the ravages of modern life, but rather one that would 
negate and transcend the problems and contradictions of the present day. 
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While this is clearly the greater aim of the principle characters in Mat’, the 
scope of the novel is limited to the period prior to the wise-spread upheaval of 1905, 
and it is a stage marked by personal education (reading, debating with the like-
minded) and early agitation (production of propaganda and other literature, small 
demonstrations, actions of civil disobedience). The revolution has begun, but it is not 
yet in full swing. The powerful ideas and logical tools that Pavel and his co-
revolutionaries cull from their readings and late-night discussions have not just 
provided them with answers to their initial questions about (in)justice. That is to say, 
their education is not simply negative, pounding away at the walls of ideology that are 
situated between their understanding and the hidden truth of it all. Rather, this work 
is also positive in the sense that it provides them with the Purpose, as Sinyavsky 
defines it: more than simply a goal to work towards, it is a blueprint for how to 
understand and then revise and eventually reconstruct what their studies have told 
them to demolish. Additionally, the truth they eventually grasp is presented to them 
by books and mentors. As the perspective of the narrator is largely limited to what 
Nilovna comprehends, readers are not privy to every step of the edification of Pavel 
and his comrades as they accumulate more and more information. Nevertheless, it is 
clear that they are undergoing a didactic education whereby they are given the answers 
to the questions they have been pursuing, the most inspiring of which is undoubtedly 
the idea at the root of their suffering—ills like poverty and hunger—are social and 
economic inequality and the contradictions therein, which lead initially to exploitation 
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and alienation and eventually to proletarian revolution. Even though the evening 
gatherings of Pavel’s circle certainly feature debates and the working-through of 
various issues, most if not all of these moments are (1) predicated on a shared 
understanding of the problems of their day and the forces that produced them and (2) 
concerned less with what the future must look like and more with the negotiation of 
how and when that promised future should be realized, that is, how and when to 
agitate.6 
The edificatory process of the group appears to parallel directly the 
experience of Gorky’s readers: the opening of the novel provides them with the 
information they need to identify the troubles of workers in and beyond this town; 
then, in the Nilovna household and alongside Pavel’s circle, they learn (and relearn, 
and relearn...) the root causes of and solutions for these problems; and, finally, in the 
last three-quarters of the book, various potential avenues for action (demonstrations, 
dissemination of radical literature) are tested and their likely positive (wide-spread 
consciousness-raising, labor reforms) and negative (unemployment, jail, exile) 
consequences are openly pondered. 
In order to best draw out this parallel, the ways that these characters, and, if 
the novel succeeds in its self-given pedagogical task, Gorky’s readers are radicalized 
                                                 
6 For examples of these discussions, see the following: Natasha examines the social origin of 
suffering (31); Vesovshchikov says, “If it’s time to fight, why sit with folded hands?” (34); 
Vsovshchikov on Sasha’s perspective: “for her it’s a ‘must’; for us it’s ‘can’ and ‘want to’” (40); and 
Pavel calls for the production of propaganda (43). 
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can be broken down into three aspects. First, the nature of the education of the subject. 
For both the characters and readers, the advancement of their radicalization is mostly 
dependent on teacher-student-like relationships. For readers, Gorky’s narrator 
assumes the same role that various books and mentors play for Pavel and the others, 
namely, the didactic and authorial role of the one who possesses and discloses the 
truth. Moreover, while the characters all may read alone, the environment in which 
these ideas are cemented is communal, for it is in their discussions that they 
effectively pool the knowledge they have gained from the various texts they have read 
and people they have been in contact with. Finding agreement in the acquired 
information, they thereby confirm the accuracy of what they have been told. For 
readers, the communal aspect is located in the relationships they form with these 
characters. The novel itself serves as the pedagogical text that hands down truths, and 
its veracity is confirmed both in the discussions taking place around Pavel and in the 
greater narrative of Mat’. In her essay, “Maksim Gor’kij’s Mat’: A Primer for 
Consciousness Raising” (1987), Virginia Bennett explains that even the structure of 
the novel is pedagogically calculated, starting with its division into two parts (before 
radicalization and after), each of which contains 29 chapters “meant to be read a few 
pages at a time and [...] intended for serialization in newspapers or for distribution in 
leaflet form [to be] easily assimilated by the unskilled reader in a relatively short period 
of time” (86-87). 
Secondly, the subject’s grasp of the truth or Purpose. For Pavel and his comrades, 
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the object of their studies is seized through the gradual process of reflecting on 
personal experiences of injustice and accumulating information by reading and then 
working through the connections presented in those texts. What results is an ability to 
mechanistically apply categories (labor, owner, exploitation) to explain the suffering 
they read about and endure personally. While the terms of political economy are, 
admittedly, never explicitly used by the group, they nevertheless help to illustrate how 
the characters come to see that their own dire situation (call it phenomenon C) results 
from, for example, the concentration of the forces of production in the hands of the 
minority class (condition A) and the government’s oscillating indifference to and 
aggressive hostility toward the masses (condition B), where A+B=>C. Of additional 
importance is that the group comes to find an explanation for this and all relations in 
the totality of capitalism, which they believe is more than just a personal nightmare, as 
it also holds the promise of something better, superficially, its eventual sublation 
through revolution emancipating all people and creating a “life worthy of human 
beings.” And, once again, the didactic messages and Bildungsroman structure of the 
novel obliges readers to apply the same explanatory categories used by the characters 
in order to understand the events of Mat’. As Bennett notes along these same lines, 
each of the bite-sized chapters “ends with a provocative statement, a moment of 
suspense, or a link to the next chapter” so as to train readers and mold their 
understanding of causality, of the consequences of the past for what follows it, and, 
even more generally, of the way the world works (87). In so doing, readers finish the 
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novel with the same revelation of the Purpose as Pavel and his comrades: the totality 
of our historical moment is determined by capitalism, and although it has a plethora 
of negative consequences for both the individual and society, it also harbors a latent 
revolutionary potential which must be excited if it is to become manifest. According 
to Bennett, all of this is accomplished by using “simple language and striking, direct 
imagery” and “elements from oral traditions [that] are very skillfully combined with 
political and social terminology and with Party doctrines and slogans” (93). 
Finally, the status of politics relative to the subject’s education and knowledge of the truth. 
The candid aim of all of the pedagogy of this text relative to the characters and the 
readers is not just to impart the truth, but ultimately to reveal politics as action—
demonstrations, marches, strikes, etc.—which the characters expect will eventually 
result in the complete overhaul of the existing governmental and economic power and 
authority. And while this demand is for change on a grand, revolutionary scale, it 
starts at the grassroots, or rather, factory floor, where readers see that political action 
means more than just disrupting the authority of the state or managers in the 
workplace. It is also tied to the political power that ideas themselves have, and, 
consequently, the activity of real revolutionaries must also be devoted to educational 
campaigns, i.e., campaigns of political radicalization that drive to mold minds and 
behavior at the individual level, producing both the soldiers and the didacts of 
tomorrow. Once this message is clear to the characters of the novel, it takes Gorky’s 
readers no time to identify in Mat’ the same connection between pedagogical text and 
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political engagement. 
In their studies, Pavel and his circle seek explanations for the various ravages 
of modern life, and when they uncover them, they find that simply identifying the 
truth of the matter will not satisfactorily resolve these problems. They must also 
engage in meaningful political action by laying bare the truth for all to see and 
working hard to defeat and eventually overcome the status quo. Accordingly, the role 
of didactics is prominent in the narrative of Mat’, for it is the method by which Pavel 
and his comrades learn and also teach: the truth and greater Purpose is revealed to 
pupils, who understand by simply applying the categories given to them and then 
acting in accordance with what they have been told. The novel is also didactic: Even 
though readers do not necessarily pick it up because they want to know something 
specific, the text addresses something specific. It not only posits questions and 
problems to which particular answers and solutions are given, but it also teaches 
readers what to do with this newfound knowledge—and both of these activities are 
modeled by the characters discussed here as they blaze for their readers the righteous 
trail of intellectual development and political radicalization. 
For Pavel and his comrades and for the readers of Mat’, the process of 
education is eclipsed by the truth it uncovers, and its work, while part of the struggle 
for emancipation, is considered superfluous once the revolution is successful. Even 
Gorky’s own novel appears to be a mere means to this end, as it serves an external 
truth of an altogether external aim. A somewhat brief, though not entirely tangential, 
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interlude to this discussion of Mat’ will help illuminate that this is limited reading of 
Gorky’s novel. 
 
The Limits of Didacticism I: Chernyshevsky’s Chto delat’? 
Before delving further into Gorky’s novel—after all, his protagonist has largely been 
left out of the discussion thus far—I now turn to another classic radical Russian text 
which had, it would be easy to argue, a far more widespread impact than Mat’: Nikolai 
Chernyshevsky’s Chto delat’?. While the consideration of these two novels side-by-side 
is nothing new, as critics like Bennett and Clark have aptly identified common 
feminist themes and hagiographic character descriptions, respectively, my aim in this 
comparison is to give Chernyshevsky the space to draw out the representation of an 
alternative radicalism, one which may seem akin to, but is in fact quite different from, 
the solely didactic approach to education provided in Gorky’s description of the 
characters in Pavel’s group (Bennett 91; Clark 59). In the end, this distinction will help 
to define the unique contours of Pavel’s mother, Nilovna’s own Bildung, or, otherwise 
defined for the aims of the Socialist-Realist novel, path to enlightenment and radical 
consciousness. As she is the principle character—the only one through whose eyes 
readers can see and try to understand the world presented to them—and thereby the 
one after whom readers are ostensibly expected to model their own development, the 
proposition that her journey is fundamentally and meaningfully different from the 
more traditional and ordinary one shared by her son and his comrades demands a 
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great deal of explication, especially because I have already shown how easy it is to see 
a close parallel development between these characters and Gorky’s readers. A quick 
look at Chernyshevsky’s heroine, Vera Pavlovna, as well as the author qua narrator’s 
own literary-critical meditations in the text will help to open up this argument. 
There is one principle aspect of Chernyshevsky’s novel that will eventually 
facilitate the illumination of the hitherto ignored, yet certainly more provocative 
dimensions of Gorky’s Mat’, and that is the status of education, which enjoys a 
broader definition in Chto delat’?, and its relationship to politics. First, a closer look at 
narration will provide a vantage point for closer attention to the intersection of these 
two concepts. The narrative modes of both novels is a third-person and limited 
omniscient point-of-view, and it is clear from their analyses of the events they 
recount, the scenes they detail, and the character commentaries they offer that each of 
them is well educated and that their presentations are equally tendentious. 
Furthermore, the way that education—less as the search for, and more as the 
uncovering and receiving of, knowledge and truth—and the propagation of the fruits 
of that learning via political agitation are not merely themes of Mat’ but are actually 
intrinsic to its Bildungsroman form is another aspect of its similarity to 
Chernyshevsky’s work, which narrates all of the twists and turns of Vera Pavlovna’s 
Bildung. Both narratives are didactic, or instructional, and the truths imposed on the 
text must slowly be revealed throughout the course of the novel alongside their 
characters’ development. 
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The most visible truths given to readers of both texts are not entirely alike, 
though they do rotate around shared arguments about modern economic exploitation 
and the necessity of emancipating and empowering human beings as individuals and 
as partners in a given collective effort. Gorky’s narrator imparts these messages as his 
characters arrive at them in their own studies; the combination of his characters’ 
virtually blind and fully embracing acceptance of them and his own preaching tone 
when describing scenes of abuse and dehumanization underscores their veracity. 
Chernyshevsky’s narrator, on the other hand, propagates his messages even more 
directly. It is possible that he has to, given that the arc of his characters’ growth over 
the course of the story does not have the same dramatic breadth or cover as much 
ground as those who inhabit Gorky’s novel. Because of the formal (school, access to 
high culture) and informal (personal libraries, access to the elite of society) education 
the main actors in Chto delat’? already have access to, they start ahead of the game. In 
view of that, the fact that Vera Pavlovna’s development from intelligent, self-driven 
petit-bourgeois girl to intelligent, self-driven emancipated woman seems less 
extraordinary and of less significance than Gorky’s characters’ movement from virtual 
ignorance to radical consciousness. If he were to rely only on his characters’ 
development to model for readers the process of coming-to-consciousness and 
thereby reveal the knowledge he seeks to impart to both groups simultaneously in the 
novel, Chernyshevsky’s narrator would likely leave a good part of his audience behind 
given that, when Vera Pavlovna and her friends are first introduced, they are already 
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at a relatively advanced stage in progress towards their goal. This fact is more or less 
acknowledged in the preface, where, in an address to his readers, the narrator declares, 
“Good, strong, honest, capable people,” that is, people like his characters, “you have 
only just begun to appear among us [...]. [...] But you’re not yet my entire audience, 
although some of you are numbered among my readers. Therefore, it’s still necessary 
and already possible for me to write” (49). 
Because only a fraction of his audience would be capable of following 
alongside his remarkably advanced characters, the pedagogical method of 
Chernyshevsky’s narrator cannot rely solely on the Bildungsroman aspect of his novel 
to educate his readers. Consequently, his didactic approach depends far less than 
Gorky’s narrator’s on a parallel intellectual development shared by his characters and 
readers in order to reveal the truths he endeavors to convey. Instead, Chernyshevsky’s 
narrator typically states these truths outright and then offers supporting evidence in 
the way the narrative itself unfolds in accordance with his claim. In fact, he already 
begins to share what might be considered the great truth of the entire novel in the 
opening section of his first chapter when the largely self-educated protagonist’s 
ignorant and drunkenly rambling mother asks Vera Pavlovna about her studies: “[I]n 
those books of yours it says that in order not to live like this, everything has to be 
organized differently; now, no one can live any other way. So why don’t they hurry up 
and set up a new order.” Even though Marya Aleksevna’s monologue tapers off with 
her advocating for everyone to “live by the old” order because, as of yet, “there’s no 
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new order,” she has prepared readers to see the clear correlation the narrator draws 
between education and political action throughout his story (58-59). The remainder of 
the novel is quite simply a demonstration of what that new order will look like (a 
blend of cooperative business, like Vera Pavlovna’s workshop, and what 
Chernyshevsky calls in other writings “rational egoism”) and how exactly it will be 
manifested.7 All along the way, this presentation is supported by a number of 
axiomatic statements by the narrator as well as references to truths imparted to Vera 
Pavlovna and her likeminded friends/lovers in their studies, both formal and 
informal.8 But this display of the connection between demonstrative, didactic 
pedagogy and political action does not exhaust the educative function of 
Chernyshevsky’s novel, as his narrator strongly insists on the inclusion of a third 
                                                 
7 Intellectual historian Andrzej Walicki has defined Chernyshevsky’s rational egoism as an attitude 
that affirms the equality of all men as long as they act in accordance with egalitarian principles, 
which is a behavior justified by the belief that “Egoism that is truly rational makes men understand 
that they have an interest in the common and ought to help each other” (196). Readers of Chto delat’? 
recognize this as the code by which Vera Pavlovna and her close friends live. For a non-fictional 
account, see Chernyshevsky’s “The Anthropological Principle of Art in Philosophy” (1850). 
8 Often this formal education is signaled by the wide-ranging references included in conversations 
between characters and in descriptions of their interests. A selection from just the first half of the 
novel: Verdi (96), George Sand and Dickens (103), Feuerbach (112), Gogol (154), Archbishop 
François de Salignac de la Mothe Fénelon and Rousseau disciple Stéphanie-Félicité du Crest de 
Saint-Aubin, comtesse de Genlis (208), the journal Revue étrangère de la literature, des sciences et des arts 
(209), the pathologist Rudolf Virchow, the physicians Claude Bernard, Hermann Boerhaave, 
Christoph Wilhelm Hufeland, William Harvey, and Edward Jenner (all 213-14), The Thousand and One 
Arabian Nights (230), and Harriet Beecher Stowe and John Howard (231). The narration of the story 
is also packed with references. Again, a selection from the first half of the novel: Hume, Edward 
Gibbon, Leopold von Ranke, and Augustin Thierry (all 76-77), various historians of Napoleon’s fall 
(83-4),  the manufacturer Francis Gardner (98), various historical figures from the Near East (109), 
Louis Philippe and Metternich (ibid), Saxon the Grammarian (114), Baron Justus von Liebig (180), 
Feuerbach again (ibid), Comte (204), Voltaire (210), Aesop (232), and Gogol again (233). 
(This collection of citations his heavily indebted to William G. Wagner, whose excellent annotations 
are found in the Cornell UP translation of What Is to Be Done? (1989).) 
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element in this configuration. 
Up to this point, Gorky and Chernyshevsky’s novels have not differed greatly 
in their descriptions of and own attempts at presenting truths through an education 
that is didactic, but there is still a significant point of divergence between the two that 
has yet to be discussed. In Chto delat’? radical politics is not reduced to the mere 
outcome of a sufficiently agitating didactic education, which is what superficially 
appears to be the sole aim for the characters and readers of Mat’. For the latter, 
grasping at the answers provided in and by the novel equips them with a truth that 
can be mobilized in the service of revolution. As already shown, this line of causation 
is certainly not absent in Chernyshevsky’s novel; relative to Gorky’s novel, however, 
its use of didacticism is limited because it explicitly ruminates on the very medium 
through which these two authors choose to convey their own truths: literature. And in 
reading these two texts together, the definition of education operative in Mat’ can be 
broadened by Chernyshevsky’s narrator to also take into account the potential of the 
novel as a work of art. 
The preface to Chto delat’?, which follows a short section called “Durak” ‘A 
Fool’ and precedes the novel’s first chapter, is the first of many times the narrator 
speaks directly to the audience. In response to “the reader,” who states that he has 
solved the mystery set up in the first short section, the narrator explains, “Why, you 
know nothing at all by yourself!” (47). The remainder of the preface and the 
numerous asides to and discussions with the reader in the nearly 400 pages that follow 
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seek to diminish that ignorance by “spell[ing] everything out” for Chernyshevsky’s 
audience, “since you’re merely amateurs, and not at all experts at deciphering unstated 
meanings” (48). In the moments dedicated to the elucidation of these supposedly 
veiled and difficult-to-grasp points and of the narrative and character choices the 
narrator makes while relaying the story, even more light is shed on Chernyshevsky’s 
own aesthetic theory, which weaves together the strands of education and politics 
already seen in Mat’ with the concerns of fiction, particularly, and of art, more 
generally.9  
First, the introductory short section appears to betray what literary 
convention encourages readers to take to be the climax of the novel (what seems like 
the suicide of one character and the reaction of another to it), but it does so with 
mostly anonymous characters and without plot exposition. The preface, which comes 
next, explains and justifies to readers the choice to divulge so much so early on in the 
book, a choice, they are told, that is pedagogically motivated. This decision, the 
                                                 
9 I do not intend to conflate carelessly Chernyshevsky’s narrator with the author himself, but even a 
cursory look at some of Chernyshevsky’s literary criticism demonstrates their virtually identical 
positions. The most productive text on this matter is a review (1888) the author wrote of his own 
dissertation (“The Aesthetic Relation of Art to Reality” 1855), in which Chernyshevsky clarifies, 
simplifies, and, when necessary, corrects his earlier text. The review begins with the assertion that 
literature must follow contemporary science in distinguishing between man’s true needs and his 
desires or dreams, because once his needs are met and life is satisfactory to him, he will find that 
“the dreams of the imagination are far less beautiful and attractive than what we find in reality” 
(388). Accordingly, the first purpose of art is “to reproduce nature and life” so as to “assist the 
imagination and [to] work with a real aim,” and this aim should be “a judgment [by the artist] on the 
phenomena reproduced” that allows readers to see “life as it should be according to our 
conceptions,” that is, a satisfactory and beautiful life (401, 404). For this reason art also has a 
practical purpose, namely, “its beneficial influence on life and education” (409). “[N]ature does not 
always correspond to [man’s] needs,” so art takes up the slack by “alter[ing] objective reality in order 
to adapt it to the requirements of his practical life” (410). 
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narrator argues, “reveal[s] that I have a very poor opinion of my public,” which is that 
“You have poor instincts that are in need of assistance.” He goes on to warn readers 
that they will have relatively little work to do as they move through the novel. In his 
words, “No mysteries lie ahead: you will always know the outcome of every situation 
at least twenty pages in advance. [...] I shall even tell you the outcome of the entire 
novel: it will end happily, amidst wine and song.” Thus, readers are expected to 
change their mode of engagement with the text so that they may pay attention to the 
narrative itself rather than merely anticipating big plot points.10 The primary hope here 
is that this shift in attention will cause readers to more actively notice that which they 
could so easily gloss over in a plot-driven novel (and perhaps even in the world itself). 
In pointing this out, the narrator believes he is preparing his audience for more than 
just the shape of the novel to come, for, according to conventional standards, “I 
possess not one bit of artistic talent,” and this lack, he continues, must be 
compensated by serving the truth: “any merit to be found in my tale is due entirely to 
its truthfulness” (47-48).11 
Despite this display of self-deprecation, the narrator makes this statement in 
                                                 
10 While his style varies greatly from that of Chernyshevsky, Brecht also discusses the benefits of 
“spoiling the story” for the audience. The essay “The Modern Theatre Is the Epic Theatre” (1930) 
in particular calls for a theatre that keeps the spectator’s “eyes on the course” (the process of how 
things happen) rather than the “finish” so as to educate and thereby arouse “his capacity for action” 
instead of merely “provid[ing] him with sensations” (37). 
11 As the musings of the positive, developed characters in the novel almost always run parallel to the 
narrator’s own stated beliefs, they provide even more explication of the aesthetic theory dominating 
the novel. From a statement by Lopukhov later on: “[T]heory is prosaic, but it reveals the genuine 
motives of life; poetry resides in the truth of life. Why is Shakespeare the greatest poet? Because his 
works contain more truth of life and less delusion than those of other poets” (116). 
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the subsequent paragraph: 
When I say I have not one bit of artistic talent and that my tale is a very weak 
piece of work, you should by no means conclude that I’m any worse than 
those authors whom you consider to be great, or that my novel is any poorer 
than theirs. That is not at all what I mean. I mean that my tale suffers from 
imperfections when it’s compared with the works of genuinely gifted writers. 
As far as the worth of its execution is concerned, you can confidently place 
my tale side by side with the most famous works of your well-known authors. 
Perhaps you’d not do wrong to place it even higher than theirs! It certainly 
contains more artistry—rest assured on that point. (48) 
According to the narrator, “the worth of its execution,” the value of the labor that 
went into the novel, is—at least!—as remarkable as the greatest works of literature, 
and the reason for this is that it “certainly contains more artistry” than “the most 
famous works of your well-known authors.” His artistic ability secures him a position 
among the best of the best not because of the artistic quality or refinement of his 
work, which he acknowledges “suffers from imperfections,” but because he is capable 
of presenting truth and chooses to do so, and this commitment serves the additional 
aim of educating his readers, who, he claims at the end of the preface, are “on my 
side” (49). The significance of this truthfulness for the instruction of readers depends 
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on the situation.12 For instance, in one scene the narrator points out that “Marya 
Aleksevna’s relationship with Lopukhov”—her son’s tutor and Vera Pavlovna’s 
eventual husband—“verge on farce and show her in a comic guise. Both of these 
outcomes are decidedly unintended. If I had wanted to concern myself with what we 
usually call artistic merit, I would have concealed” their relationship, as it “lends an air 
of vaudeville to this part of the novel.” He continues to say that his intention was 
merely to show what really took place and not what would have been most beneficial 
for his “artistic reputation” (119). The significance of his truthfulness in this instance 
has little pedagogical weight beyond characterization and validation of the narrator’s 
own artistic project. 
A second example, however, will begin to tie together the three strands 
hitherto discussed. In the second half of the novel is an eighteen-page aside about the 
character named Rakhmetov, whose commitment to the truths he holds is 
unparalleled and, yet, whose function in the events of the main storyline is of virtually 
no consequence. Upon the completion of this aside, it is said that the reader must 
assume, given literary conventions, that this character will hereafter take the place of 
the protagonist, a shift in focus that the narrator resolutely rejects: “Rakhmetov has 
been introduced to fulfill the principle, most fundamental requirement of art, and 
                                                 
12 For more of the narrator’s claims to be devoted to distilling and presenting only the truth in his 
novel, see the following notable examples: attesting that Vera Pavlovna’s story is remarkable when 
compared to other girls of her station and that her story is being told “with her permission” (88-89); 
asserting that the only material included is that which describes thoughts, actions, and minimal 
additional information for the purpose of characterization (151); describing what he “could have and 
would have done” as narrator if he were less concerned with being truthful (163). 
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exclusively to satisfy it” (294). The exact nature of that principle is not spelled out 
until a later discussion between the narrator and the reader, which is also the most 
complete statement of the aesthetic theory governing the choices made in the 
production of the novel as a whole. Here readers learn that Rakhmetov’s role is to 
bring out the “true form” of Vera Pavlovna, because the “depict[ion] of objects so 
that the reader can perceive their true form” is the “first requirement of art.” And 
since the narrator “wanted to depict decent, ordinary people of the new generation” 
and not an “idealized figure” who might be “inconceivable in reality,” he explains that 
he had to contrast them with someone as extraordinary as Rakhmetov so that readers 
would not “look at a picture of an ordinary house and mistake it for a luxurious 
palace” (emphasis added, 311-13).13 
Despite the fact that they are clearly much more advanced than the people 
they pass on the street and, likely, the readers of Chernyshevsky’s novel, the narrator 
insists that Vera Pavlovna and her friends are ordinary because he believes that his 
characterizations contrasting them with the mighty Rakhmetov give the audience the 
sense that they, too, can and should aim to be just as successful. He continues, still 
speaking to his audience: 
[I]t’s not they who stand too high, but you who stand too low. Now you see 
that they’re simply standing at ground level; they appeared to be soaring 
                                                 
13 On the narrator’s claims that he does not depict “ideals of perfection,” see the discussion where 
he admits that, “Without feeling the least bit ashamed, I’ve compromised Vera Pavlovna many times 
form a poetical standpoint” (348). 
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above the clouds because you’re sitting in some godforsaken underworld. [...] 
Come up out of your godforsaken underworld, my friends, come up. It’s not 
so difficult. Come into the light of day, where life is good; the path is easy and 
inviting. Try it: development, development. Observe, reflect, read [...]. (313) 
The narrator calls for his audience not only to be inspired by the story he is telling and 
the characters he presents, but also to spend time with them and meditate on the 
truths that are revealed through their development, that is, the way they cultivate 
themselves and their relationships (which, of course, are guided by the narrator’s own 
pedagogical goals). At the point this call to advancement is made, it is clear to readers 
that there is a political plea behind it, as the plot of Chto delat’? focuses so strongly on 
the efforts of the characters to progress beyond the status quo of St. Petersburg and, 
if the narrator is to be believed, status of his readers, as well. Even though Marya 
Aleksevna is unable to see it, a “new order” is indeed forming, one in which 
businesses thrive when organized as cooperative workshops and romantic couples 
find their greatest happiness in respect for each partner’s complete self-determination. 
These are the concrete political recommendations of the novel. 
What Chernyshevsky’s narrator explicitly discusses here is also, it could be 
argued, what is implied throughout Gorky’s novel, and it has to do with the capacity 
of didactic art, not just didacticism as such, to inspire meaningful action.14 In Chto 
                                                 
14 The closest Gorky comes in Mat’ to acknowledging outright the potential power of the written 
word (in media other than a newspaper or brochure) is through the mouth of the character Rybin, 
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delat’? the political power of art is borne out of a truthful presentation of what is 
possible, as long as it is tempered by readers’ ability to maintain perspective, that is, to 
keep their feet rooted firmly in reality while they learn to strive for a better life; not to 
mistake the real for the ideal or vice versa, but rather to see how, for instance, Vera 
Pavlovna’s intelligence and many gifts are a result of her actualizing the latent 
potential in the culture of her time. The latter point has the additional significance of 
demonstrating just how much broader the concept of education is in Chto delat’? than 
in Mat’. Not only does it attend to the specificity of art for politics—what art in 
particular makes possible that other kinds of work can’t—but it also communicates 
another possible role for art with respect to education and politics, namely, how self-
cultivation as radicalization is itself an art. 
This final point is no more apparent to readers than in the figure of 
Chernyshevsky’s own heroine. Despite the narrator’s claims to the contrary, Vera 
Pavlovna’s is far from “ordinary,” an assertion that is most persuasively corroborated 
by a dream she has near the end of the novel. In this scene, readers are told that a very 
happy Vera Pavlovna discovers that she is able to observe her true self for the first 
time, as this “true self” takes a form external to her, one that she can engage with an 
examine. In the exchange that follows, Vera Pavlovna is finally able to take in the 
magnitude of her development over the past several years (all documented in the 
                                                                                                                                                             
who, after a long diatribe on everyday class warfare, exclaims, “Give me books, the kind that won’t 
let a fellow sleep after he’s read them. We want to plant a hedgehog under their skulls, with sharp 
bristles! [...] Let them write so’s the letters sizzle! So’s the people will die for the cause!” (152). 
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story), and she sees that she has turned into a goddess. As she talks with the goddess 
“Vera,” she gradually realizes that her satisfaction with and affection for the life she 
has created for herself makes her “lovelier than all the famous beauties known 
before,” and that, in the eyes of the man who loves her, “all ideals pale beside” her 
(366-67). 
Accordingly, Vera Pavlovna comes to exemplify fully the values to which 
readers are told they should also aspire, and she represents the truth in the sense that 
she embodies the still quiet potential in all mankind. In her activation of that 
potential, she rises to a realm beyond the mere mortal, a domain where her 
relationships with others and her own faculties operate in such harmony that she, as 
the goddess Vera, can state, “I am freedom” (368). By the end of the novel, Vera 
Pavlovna is both emancipated and the figure of emancipation, the former an effect of 
her didactic education and the latter an effect of her own self-directed Bildung. 
Vera Pavlovna’s ascendency to the immortal stage where “all ideals pale 
beside” her offers and appreciably different method for conveying truth (as the cause 
of what is wrong; as what is possible for ourselves and the world; as what is needed 
and how to act) than the one illustrated by the development of Gorky’s characters 
and, for that matter, the statements of Chernyshevsky’s own narrator. Pavel and his 
cohort seek, are given, and latch onto truths that they then pass on to others in a 
similar fashion; this is also the approach advocated by Chernyshevsky’s narrator in his 
discussions of how truthful literature—literature that displays real artistry—must 
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operate if it is to be successful, that is, to have a genuine political impact. Admittedly, 
Vera Pavlovna’s own approach to education is somewhat similar, in that she, too, 
spends a great deal of time looking for answers in books and in messages from other 
authority figures that she can then put in the service of her own agenda.  
Nevertheless, this didactic method of learning is supplemented by what might 
be called a romantic education whereby Vera Pavlovna molds and reforms herself 
according to higher ideals and, through her efforts in the community, works to ensure 
that the same achievement be realized in the world around her. As the narrator writes 
in praise of her growth half-way through the novel, “Vera’s development was not only 
moral. If a woman’s beauty is genuine, then [...] such a woman continues to improve 
with each passing year. Yes, three years of life at such a period do a great deal to 
develop much that is good in the soul, in the eyes, in facial features, and in the whole 
person, provided that person is good and life is, too” (218). For Vera, the wholeness 
and goodness she strives for, as well as the immortality she eventually achieves, is also 
a kind of beauty in a romantic sense; her political action has an aesthetic character, as 
Vera Pavlovna turns herself into a work of art. 
The benefit of reading Chernyshevsky’s novel alongside Gorky’s is that Chto 
delat’? brings to the fore problems that are merely implicit in Mat’ and that may easily, 
though, I think, at great cost, go unnoticed. Chernyshevsky ensures that his decision 
to disseminate his message in an artistic work does not go unnoticed or unreflected, as 
he forces his readers to consider what fiction alone can contribute to the effort to 
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build a new world as Vera Pavlovna does. This greater attention to the specificity and 
unique strengths of art then shines a light on the way that, once they have reached 
their culmination, Vera Pavlovna’s own political projects, be they personal (herself) or 
public (her workshop), are portrayed as works of art in their completeness and self-
determination. In the end, the imperative of a didactic aesthetics preached by the 
narrator appears to be undercut, or at least challenged, by what readers come to see as 
the telos of his own protagonist’s development. The question then remains: is it 
logically possible for a didactic path of education, dependent as it is on an externally 
imposed truth, to culminate in a romantic ideal of human perfection, for which truth 
(as balance, harmony, self-determination) is immanent? If possible, would it even be 
desirable? 
 
The Limits of Didacticism II: Gorky’s Mat’ 
In Vera Pavlovna’s realization of her full potential as a human being and her 
continued striving to assist others in that same endeavor, she reaches the telos of the 
journey also embarked upon by Pavel and his circle, but with surprising and different 
results. Although all of them undertake a similar approach to self-education, Gorky’s 
characters end up as radical didacts who are free-in-spirit if not in actuality, whereas 
Vera Pavlovna achieves self-determination. She is freedom. Interestingly, the 
development of Gorky’s protagonist Nilovna more closely resembles Vera Pavlovna’s 
own growth than that of her son. 
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 Due to a lack of worldly experience and formal education, as well as the 
seclusion of her station as a homemaker, the mostly illiterate Nilovna does not and 
even cannot learn the same way that her son and his friends do. As the protagonist 
and thus model character of the novel qua Bildungsroman, her development is of 
central importance to both the narrative and the didacts of the texts, and readers 
follow her down a route that is an alternative to that of the young revolutionaries 
meeting in her living room. The latter educate themselves by forming intimate 
pedagogical relationships with books and with other individuals, and it is clear from 
the disproportionate attention these meetings are given in the novel that Pavel and his 
cohort are most engaged and inspired by their communal study sessions. Nilovna’s 
comparative isolation, then—in her intellectual life and general day-to-day existence—
signals that her emergence as a radical subject must be attributed to a self-directed 
pedagogy that is undertaken both consciously and unconsciously and is relatively 
private and individual.  
Initially, she does not study, write, or even read fluently, though she can 
identify most letters, but she is motivated nevertheless by Pavel’s friend Andrei to 
pursue some course of education. He encourages her formal studies by making such 
claims as, “The only people worthy of the game are those who devote themselves to 
freeing the mind of man” and declaring to Nilovna that “You’ve simply got to learn” 
to read. Her first response to his imploring is exasperation, dejectedly asserting that 
“Everything’s simple when you’re young. But when you grow older—so many cares, 
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so little strength, and no brains at all!” (103). Needless to say, influenced by the 
incessant studying of those around her, Nilovna’s opinion quickly changes, and she 
begins to re-teach herself to read. However, these moments are mostly left to the 
imaginations of Gorky’s audience, as there are only a couple of brief 
acknowledgements of the progress she makes in her self-directed sessions: one from 
Pavel, which is forgotten as soon as it is mentioned, and one in the narration in the 
second half of the novel where readers are told that, “She had by this time learned to 
read, but it required such great effort that she quickly tired and could not grasp the 
relation of one word to another” (126, 230). The parts are now recognizable, but the 
whole is still beyond her grasp. 
 For Nilovna’s son and his comrades, the highest level of education in 
preparation for revolution is to be achieved by working through written texts, that is, 
seeking out a didactic education often in the company of others, and then sharing 
what is gleaned from those activities with the larger group and society, more broadly. 
As Pavel succinctly puts it, “First study, and then teach others” (22). But for Nilovna, 
whether or not she gains anything from reading is ambiguous at best. This kind of 
intellectual labor exhausts her. What, then, does she find stimulating? Insofar as this 
novel chronicles one woman’s path to radicalization, what experience or engagement 
is to be credited for raising her consciousness? As far as Gorky’s readers know, 
Nilovna’s reading seems to have little impact on her. Additionally, the diatribes of 
Pavel and Nikolai, the teacher with whom Nilovna lives after her son is put in jail, 
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appear to move her, but little is shared about what exactly that means.  
Only closer attention to the narration can reveal that the greatest influence of 
all on Nilovna is beauty or art, which, as far as readers can surmise, is absent from her 
life prior to living with Nikolai. Continuing the quotation about her difficulties 
understanding the “relation of one word to another” will underscore this claim: “But 
she took a childlike pleasure in looking at pictures. They revealed to her a new and 
wonderful world which she understood, and which she found almost tangible. [...] 
Life kept endlessly expanding, opening her eyes to one wonder after another, exciting 
her thirsting soul by an exhibition of its lavish treasures, its inexhaustible beauty” 
(230). 
Before discussing the privileged status of beauty, in general, and art, in 
particular, additional comparisons of Nilovna and her son’s cohort must be made in 
order to best highlight the mother’s unique path apart from the agitators around her. 
Her goals—what she wants and seeks over the course of the novel—parallel those of 
the group, and, at least at the beginning of the novel when readers first see that Pavel 
and his friends have piqued her interest in these issues, she seems to set out on the 
same course to the same end as the comrades: she, too, has experienced the dark side 
of modern life and senses that there is injustice around her, but she, unlike the others, 
can neither see nor understand the sources of her society’s ills. In fact, she pursues 
them only once Pavel becomes interested in these very issues and problems that so 
deeply affect her; they are a “familiar truth” that she intuitively knows, yet never 
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“[seeks] an explanation for” (22). However, her lack of a conventional education as 
well as her initial timidity and fear (of the unknown, of stirring the pot) hold her back, 
and she eventually finds herself—not entirely consciously—on an alternative route 
toward radicalization and revolutionary engagement. 
This failure to achieve the same successes as those in her midst via traditional 
educative methods could easily leave Nilovna feeling abandoned and resigned, which 
she does for a brief time. But mostly she is patient and remains open in the hope that 
one day she will be able to see what they see and grasp the truth they have already 
assimilated. To this end, she enthusiastically participates in their various actions, 
mechanically passing out pamphlets and attending stump speeches at the factory 
without fully comprehending the content of what is conveyed in either. In one telling 
scene, Pavel takes her hands in his and laments that she is still unable to “feel” (“Esli 
by ty pochuvstvovala,” loosely translated as “If you could only see”) “how low and 
shameful” the state is in the way it wields power, for if she could, she “would 
understand the truth we are fighting for.” Nilovna pleads with her son to simply “Be 
patient. I’ll feel” (“chuvstvuju”) (146). Soon after this moment, she overhears a 
colleague of Pavel explain what exactly is entailed by and in the activity of “seeing”: “I 
see how things are, how people are wronged, but I can’t put it in words. I’m like a 
dumb brute” (158). The latter qualification seems to be taken to heart by Nilovna, as 
she, like Pavel’s friend, comes to believe that seeing, that is, finally “felling” the truth 
in a way that is more nuanced than her initial intuitive hold in it, is only useful or 
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meaningful if that truth can be articulated. Only then is there a guarantee of not 
simply feeling and sensing what is wrong, but also understanding how and why such 
injustices happen and grasping the greater Purpose. 
 All of the elements begin to come together when Nilovna attends a May Day 
rally organized by her son and his comrades. After the speeches and after the march, 
after Andrei declares adamantly that “those who don’t see our goal mustn’t march 
with us” and the police try to break up the crowd, a collection of voices begin to sing 
“Vy zhertvoiu pali” (“You Fell Victims” by A. Arkhangelsky 1878) in unison, and, 
suddenly, “The mother’s gaze could not embrace all that she saw” (166, 176). This 
instance is meaningful not only because Nilovna can “see,” but also because she now 
sees more than she can take in, and her response to this experience is, for the first 
time, a “vague desire to tell [those around her] something,” to produce something 
(177). Eventually, she does speak briefly to the crowd, which is an emotionally and 
physically charged moment for her, but her words are only in defense of “Our 
children” and their struggle, rather than the universal struggle of which she rightly 
sees herself a part (180). To be sure, she is still struggling with the same issues as 
always; but her mouth and eyes are open. 
 At this moment readers can see that Nilovna is close to achieving the goals she 
has set for herself, and the point at which it all comes together for her arrives just 
after the May Day demonstration. Pavel is arrested for displaying a banned flag during 
the rally, and, because his mother must move in with someone who can support her, 
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Pavel’s friend Nikolai, who lives in a neighboring city, takes her in. Upon meeting her 
host’s sister, Sophia, Nilovna notes the personal changes she has been going through, 
admitting that “There was a time when I had to know a person through and through 
before I’d open my heart to him, but now my heart’s always open, and I’d say things I 
never would have dreamed of saying before.” She continues, “Looks as though that 
First of May had done something to me [...]. [A]s if I was going down two different 
roads at once. Sometimes I seem to understand everything, then again everything’s a 
fog” (198). Nilovna recognizes the progress she has made, which she attributes to her 
experiences on May Day, but she also acknowledges how much still lies before her. 
The real turning point comes almost immediately after this in yet another 
conversation. This, like the last, is also with Sophia (as well as Nikolai), and it is a 
discussion that Nilovna patently does not want to have. Yet she feels as if she is 
drawn continuously into it despite wanting to recede into the background and simply 
passively listen to a piano piece by the Romantic composer Edvard Grieg that the 
sister is playing while the siblings talk. The music has a crucial role in this scene, as it 
“unnoticeably reach[es] the heart of the mother” and evokes in her difficult and 
painful memories that appear in “bitter clarity” (200). When she suddenly finds herself 
“at the edge of consciousness,” she has a remarkable insight: “There are people who 
live together in a friendly, peaceful way,” a reference to her present company. As 
Sophia continues to play, she insists that Nilovna “understand” the music she is 
producing, and, immediately following this demand, the mother hears in the hard 
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striking of the keys a “loud, wrathful cry” and “[f]rightened young voices,” followed 
by “a strong voice” that she finds “persuasive and alluring” (202). 
 Sophia’s music has two remarkable effects on Nilovna: (1) the mother grasps 
for the first time the message that the newcomers in her village have always failed to 
successfully transmit, namely, that life can be otherwise and that it can be good; and 
(2) her intuitive understanding of this general truth, which will guide her until her 
death, is the result of an attempt to understand a particular work of art, that is, it 
emerges from within an aesthetic sense experience. The gravity of this moment and 
the truth delivered in it is indicated by Nilovna’s reaction, which follows the 
description of her immediate impressions: the mother wants to speak; “To say kind 
words to these people”; “[T]o do something for them [...] as though consoling her 
heart with words meant as much for herself as for them.” She begins by explaining to 
Nikolai and Sasha that people like her, “people from that dark life—we feel 
everything, but it’s hard to put into words [...]—we understand, but we can’t say it” 
(202). As “The chords merged softly with the simple, heartfelt words in which the 
mother was giving expression to her feeling,” she affirms that “Now I can say 
something about myself and about all people because—I begin to understand and am 
able to compare” (202-03). She goes on to share her life story with the siblings, who 
are enraptured by what she has to say, despite, readers are told, already knowing the 
essential content of what is so new and exciting for the mother to articulate. As she 
opens up, the narrator notes that, to the attentive Sasha and Nikolai, “It seemed that 
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thousands of people were speaking through” Nilovna, and thus “her story assumed 
the status of a symbol” (203). 
 In this moment, Nilovna is forever changed. Her consciousness is been raised, 
and she comes to stand for something greater than her finite self, for her self-narrated 
story takes on a near universal quality in the eyes of her audience and Gorky’s 
readership. That she not only can, but also wants to articulate what she has hitherto 
known only intuitively to be true is testament to the fact that now she can both see 
and understand, and it is worth remembering that these are her own criteria. After 
May Day and after her afternoon with Sasha and Nikolai, Nilovna devotes her time, 
her energy, and her voice to the campaigns of Pavel and his circle. She even helps to 
print propaganda that she later distributes during secret trips to the countryside and in 
public places around town. But unlike her meek participation in actions prior to May 
Day, her engagement is far more active and productive, and she comes to propose 
and initiate a great deal of the group’s political activity. Furthermore, as she works, she 
discovers that she has “no difficulty finding words” when she is asked or feels 
compelled to speak about their cause, for now it is a campaign that not longer belongs 
to “our children,” but to her, as well (296). 
Consequently, this closer look at the way Gorky depicts Nilovna’s personal 
journey to radicalization reveals just how drastically her path differs from that of her 
son Pavel and his friends. The latter begin by submitting themselves to a mechanical, 
didactic education controlled by authorities, both living and textual, that provide them 
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with the truth that they seek through an understanding of the relations of different 
phenomena within and the governing dialectic of the totality of capitalism. Grasping 
the greater truth and Purpose, i.e., the promise of what can and must arise from the 
devastation caused by the current system, is the prerequisite for their political activity, 
which involves engaging in a didactic pedagogy of their own by parroting back and 
forth to each other and out in the world all that they have been told and accept as 
true. The novel’s own didactic tone and structure aim for the same result with the 
reader: truth, as such, is sought in the text; the text presents seekers with what it labels 
as truth; that truth is grasped through a series of demonstrations, both performative 
and descriptive, of how the world works; and then (Gorky hopes) that truth is spread 
by the former seekers in various political activities. 
For Nilovna, however, this series of steps (learn it, understand it, spread it) is 
interrupted early on. She begins on this path by re-teaching herself to read, but she 
finds it exasperating and discovers that she would rather engage with beauty. And it is 
indeed with in particular aesthetic experiences—the joining of defiant voices in chorus 
at the May Day rally; Sophia’s playing through a piece by Grieg—that the truth is 
somehow revealed to her, and she seizes it. She can finally articulate what she has 
always known intuitively to be true but could neither see nor understand and thus 
could never put into words. 
In stark contrast to the didactic education pursued and received by her son 
and his friends, Nilovna undergoes what I will call a romantic education. Turning 
 76 
from the Badiouian vocabulary employed above to that of the early German 
Romantics or Frühromantiker will more clearly elucidate the unique character of this 
distinction. As both Nilovna and the Frühromantiker know, in the drive to create a life 
“worthy of human beings,” it is not enough to “see the way” leading toward the goal; 
one must also “know how” to reach it (302). 
 
Consulting selections from Frühromantik philosophy (roughly 1797-1801) on 
the relationship between aesthetics and politics will make clear the fundamental and 
perhaps even irreconcilable differences in the foundations of Nilovna and Pavel’s 
radical consciousnesses. Doing so will thereby refine further the distinctive contours 
of the mother’s unusual (given the context) development, with the aim of evaluating 
its impact on the novel and its status as an archetype of the Socialist-Realist project. 
Her unique path to radicalization is significant not only because it emerges in the 
midst of so many other more traditional ones, but also because it is experienced by 
the protagonist of what is effectively a didactic Bildungsroman and through whose 
personal narrative readers are expected to learn. 
The Frühromantiker arrive early in the modern tradition of philosophical 
aesthetics, which is initiated by Immanuel Kant in the Critique of Judgment in 1790, less 
than a decade before key figures like the brothers August Wilhelm and Friedrich 
Schlegel begin publishing. One of the basic problems motivating the work of the 
young Romantics resembles the major question driving the characters in the novels 
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discussed above—modern man’s alienation from himself, or how to reunify man with 
himself—and they find a solution in Bildung as an “ethics of self-realization” which 
they conceive of in aesthetic terms (Beiser 26-28).15 As Frederick Beiser summarizes, 
Bildung functions as the “highest good” for the Romantics in that it aims to (1) “unite 
and develop all the powers of a human being” such that “all his or her disparate 
capacities [are forged] into a whole” and (2) “develop not only our characteristic 
human powers [...] but also our individuality” (93). The aesthetic dimension of this 
concept is worked out most thoroughly by Friedrich Schiller, who was much older 
than the Romantics, but to whose ideas they were greatly indebted. His work On the 
Aesthetic Education of Man in a Series of Letters (1795) is especially influential in its 
proposition that mankind must turn to art, rather than to the state or to nature, in 
order to overcome the alienation of the modern world (Letter VII). 
Schiller begins his treatise on aesthetic education by identifying the major 
problem of his day as man’s estrangement from himself, defined as man’s over- or 
exclusive cultivation of either his reason (a holdover from the Enlightenment) or his 
sensibility. The “art of the beautiful” is uniquely suited to serve as a model for 
overcoming this estrangement because art is both an “object of the form-drive” (it 
                                                 
15 Frederick C. Beiser’s exceptional book The Romantic Imperative (2003) serves as my guide through 
the early period of German Romanticism. Unlike some other work on the same period that is read 
more widely in literary-critical circles, Beiser is both more attentive to the explicit role of politics 
(both actual and theoretical) in the early Romantic program and advocates for reading their various 
fragments and letters as pieces of a greater unified system partly engaged in the promotion of natural 
and universal laws and values. Contrary to the arguments of scholars like Jean-Luc Nancy and 
Phillipe Lacoue-Lebarthe (The Literary Absolute 1988), the Frühromantiker were not proto-
postmodernists. 
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has shape or form) and an object of sensibility (it has sensual content) (101, Letter 
XV). To the extent that the beautiful artwork represents the bringing together of form 
and content, the individual who strives for beauty also “links the two opposite 
conditions of feeling and thinking,” or reason and sensibility (123, Letter XVIII). 
Moreover, in the same way that the unity of form and content in the artwork is what 
is distinctive about its beauty, the unity of a person’s reason and sensibility in his quest 
to overcome alienation, that is, his private quest for perfection, is what makes a man 
himself like a work of art. As Beiser puts it, “aesthetic education does not consist in 
having our characters formed by works of art but in making our characters into works 
of art” (96). 
As Schiller explains in “Kallias or Concerning Beauty” (1793), the beauty of 
the artwork is not simply a subjective quality determined by the viewer; it is also an 
objective feature that, as Beiser writes, “depends on whether it is self-determining,” or 
free from external pressures and controls. Beauty is comparable to freedom; it is 
“nothing more or less than freedom in appearance” (99). Furthermore, it is precisely this 
self-determination, as Schiller argues in Letter IX of the Aesthetic Education, that makes 
the art an ideal and vital instrument for “improvement in the political sphere.” Given 
that progress in the latter must “proceed from the ennobling of character” and that 
the “barbarous constitution” of the state cannot carry out this task successfully, the 
autonomous work of art must assume the function of a symbol of freedom in the 
aesthetic education of man (55). 
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The overall concept of aesthetic education is encapsulated by Beiser when he 
writes that, “to become an aesthetic whole, to make one’s life a work of art, it is 
necessary” not only to achieve perfection by unifying the form of one’s reason and 
the content of one’s sensibility, but also “to realize one’s nature as a spontaneous and 
free subject” (100, 96). But this only attends to one branch of early romantic aesthetic 
theory that is primarily concerned with describing the formation of the ideal romantic 
subject, or how the beautiful character of art can motivate the subject to strive for 
perfection and freedom (i.e., beauty) by showing that such an effort can yield aesthetic 
pleasure. The early Romantic concept of aesthetic experience extends their aestheticism in 
its explanation of how the subject gives shape or meaning to the universe. 
Fundamental to this theory is the belief that reason aims to grasp the whole, which it 
equates with truth. It wants to find what Beiser calls a “holistic explanation—which 
would understand each part by its place within a whole.” To this end, art must serve a 
primary role in reason’s quest, because, as demonstrated above, it is through aesthetic 
intuition that the subject grasps the whole. Thus, the subject who understands the 
universe holistically must “view it as a work of art,” he must “romanticize” it (61-62, 
101).  
As Beiser explains, the call for “the primacy of the aesthetic” is really “an 
argument for the priority of holistic explanation” (62). And since the subject’s reason 
is incapable of actually seeing the whole as a whole, it harnesses the power of the 
intellectual intuition of aesthetic experience in order to “romanticize” all that it 
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encounters by giving “a higher meaning to the ignoble, a mysterious appearance to the 
customary, the value of the unknown to the known, and an infinite appearance to the 
finite” (Novalis 545, §105). When the senses are romanticized, the particulars of their 
experience come under the banner of truth, Purpose, or whole, and poetry can aid in 
this romanticization. Per Friedrich Schlegel, romantic poetry “is capable of the highest 
and the most comprehensive education (Bildung), not merely from the inside out, but 
from the outside in”; for everything that “should be a whole in its effects,” it 
“organizes organizing all parts similarly” (90, §116). This education has an additional 
political significance discussed at length in, for example, Schiller’s Aesthetic Education. 
Like the formation of the subject in the aesthetic education, community and state 
politics are dependent on the truth/Purpose of the holism modeled by the aesthetic, 
which also makes it secondary to the aesthetic. A change in the political sphere from 
“the rule of mere force to the rule of law” is, for Schiller, first dependent on a change 
in individual morality, and because a lawgiver has no influence over a free individual, 
the latter’s moral character must be shaped instead by “sense-impressions” that can 
model “a morality yet unseen” through their harmonious, balanced presentation (15, 
Letter III). 
In sum, Frühromantik philosophy offers an argument for seeing truth as 
immanent to art. The ability of aesthetic intuition to perceive beauty or perceive 
objects as beautiful is responsible not only for the subject’s grasp of the whole (or 
truth) of the universe, but also for providing him with an image of unity and freedom 
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off of which he can model his own reunification (as well as the reformation of 
relationships within the community and the form of the state). This aestheticism 
offers readers of Gorky’s novel a template for interpreting Nilovna’s unique path to 
radical consciousness and, indeed, Gorky viewed the “social romanticism of Schiller” 
to be “one of the most beautiful achievements of the West-European soul” (qtd. in 
Kostka 284). Like Vera Pavlovna, Nilovna becomes a figure of freedom and unity 
modeled on the aesthetic, as she fashions her sensibility (seeing/feeling) and reason 
(understanding) into a holism.  
It is worth mentioning here that Nilovna’s journey has never before been 
described as a process of aesthetic education or even one of Bildung in the sense 
discussed above. The closest critics have come is to call it a Bildungsroman, as Clark 
does with qualification, or, as in the case of Eric J. Klaus, to identify what Nilovna 
and Pavel go through as an educative process notably distinct from Bildung. To Klaus, 
the latter stems from an 18th-centruy bourgeois humanism unlike the proletarian 
humanism of vospitanie, which “nurtures a feeling of self-worth as well as a feeling of 
community among the working class.” Gorky’s readers are expected to mirror the 
actions of a given character, who “absorbs all that is good and positive in humanity[,] 
then acts on those impulses to better his fellow citizen [and] to educate others in the 
spirit of socialism” (81). I concur that this kind of radical “spiritual awakening,” as he 
later calls it, is the end result for Nilovna, that its content is the content of her 
radicalization, and that, as Klaus argues, readers first see this blossom in the mother 
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during the May Day rally. However, I disagree with his assertion that this is more or 
less the end of her development and that she need only agitate and organize from 
then on to feel fulfilled and do her duty. 
 Klaus’ argument hinges on Nilovna’s lack of—and lack of interest in—formal 
education, as he reminds us that “throughout the novel the mother remarks time and 
time again that she cannot grasp the abstract, philosophical arguments brought forth 
by her son and others.” This is certainly true, but his conclusion is not. He continues: 
“In the end, however, the words [of Pavel, et al.] are not important [to Nilovna], 
because the feeling of community that binds them extends beyond and speaks more 
directly to humanity than intellectual reasoning” (82). As I have already shown, 
though I hope not at the expense of recognizing the great relevance of the sense of 
community Klaus emphasizes, words and their production are of enormous 
importance for Nilovna. Articulation of the truth she knows intuitively, if not by 
reading Marx and Engels, is the great task she sets out for herself in the first half of 
the novel, and it is a skill that she utilizes to great ends promoting, for example, the 
ideals of vospitanie throughout the second half. Nilovna’s newfound facility is a direct 
consequence of overcoming tremendous obstacles with respect to the movement, 
namely her inability to understand their work and her inability to see/feel it at a 
deeper level. The great change she undergoes takes place not on May Day, but a short 
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while later after her profound experience in Nikolai’s living room listening to Grieg.16 
I might say, then, that the form of Nilovna’s private and individualized radicalization—
in its aesthetic holism, in its ultimate precipitation by a personal aesthetic 
experience—is romantic and much closer to a bourgeois aesthetic education or early 
Romantic Bildung than a politically correct and ritualized proletarian vospitanie. 
How curious to find a romantic logic of aestheticism at work in Gorky’s 
model for radicalization, in a novel with such a clear didactic purpose and from an 
author who, as Alexander Kaun already notes in a 1933 essay, is actively promoting a 
strictly didactic, “aggressive Realism” at the time he writes Mat’ in 1906. Kaun claims 
that Gorky, like many other radicals of the time, is merely reacting to the defeat of 
1905. “‘Romanticism,’” Kaun writes, becomes for the author “synonymous with 
Reactionism, as a mood resulting from weariness and despair, and as an escape from 
contemporary reality”; but it had not been and would not always be that way (434). In 
an essay on his relationship with V.G. Korolenko, Gorky recalls that, upon reading 
one of his early stories, “Chelkash” (1895), Korolekno notes, “I said you were a 
realist. [...] But at the same time you’re a romantic” (Literary Portraits 239). The elder 
                                                 
16 Seemingly every critic who is also concerned with Nilovna’s path to consciousness (e.g., Clark and 
Dinega) also remarks upon the singular significance of the May Day rally, and their arguments are 
almost always supported by the shared and ritualized tenor of the event—bringing Nilovna into the 
fold. In my research, Bryld is the only other critic to highlight the importance of the scene in 
Nikolai’s living room, but her reading focuses on “mythical” results of this change—namely, how 
Nilovna thereafter finds her calling in activism and comes to symbolize “each and any” woman—
rather than that which precipitates it. As Bryld puts it, “it is on the heels of Pelegea’s development 
into the mother of society that the book turns into the miraculous realization of utopia: the ascent of 
the people to a new life” (44). 
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author’s comments are mostly limited to Gorky’s style, and he is certainly not the last 
to remark upon this amalgamation in Gorky’s work. As Kaun explains, other than the 
years from 1906 and 1916 (i.e., between the revolutions of 1905 and 1917), the 
combination and collaboration of realist and romantic styles in a single work of art is 
something that Gorky actually embraces. But whereas the young Gorky was keen to 
limit his romanticism to “dressing up” the realist material he writes about in order to 
reflect the richness of life, the latter, post-1917 Gorky—the one who was a major 
public figure, the one who chaired the Writers’ Congress—saw great political potential 
in so-called “active romanticism,” which depicts reality in accordance with the 
Purpose, i.e., in its revolutionary development, and strives to “enrich an oppressively 
drab life” and prepare it for political action by revealing the potential latent in the 
everyday (“How I Learnt to Write” 10-11).17 
Despite the anachronism, there is something to be gained in looking at 
Gorky’s later writings, such as “Talks on Craftsmanship” (1928) and “How I Learnt 
to Write” (1930-31), alongside my reading of the much earlier Mat’.18 Comparing the 
romantic aestheticism of Nilovna’s radicalization with the explicitly romantic artistic 
                                                 
17 Opposed to active romanticism is “passive romanticism,” which is individualistic and solipsistic. It 
distracts man from the outer world. 
18 One example of the forward-looking Gorky in “Talks on Craftsmanship”: “‘realism’ would cope 
with its difficult task if [...] it depicted man not only such as he is today, but also as he must and shall 
be tomorrow. This does not mean that I advise ‘inventing’ human character, but simply that I think 
the writer is entitled, and moreover is in duty bound, to ‘amplify’ man.” And soon after grounding 
the previous statement: “ideas cannot be extracted from thin air in the way nitrogen, for example, 
can be; ideas are created on earth, spring from the soil of labor, and use the material of observation, 
comparison and study, and, in the final analysis, facts and again facts!” (170). 
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style of late Gorky, whose investment in that style is both political and philosophical, 
reveals the two ostensibly competing aesthetic theories in the novel—romanticism 
and didactic realism—as mutually constituting for Nilovna. In Gorky’s theoretical 
writings, romanticism is viewed as pedagogically (didactically) useful because it 
illustrates for readers the richness of life and the direction of history. But whereas this 
kind of romanticism is valued only for the external truth it can convey, a philosophical 
romantic aesthetics modeled on the aesthetic and striving for the truth is fully 
embraced in Mat’. The fact that the curious Nilovna cannot learn from books and 
mentors as the others (and her readers) do means that her radicalization, which 
readers know is coming from the moment she is introduced, must take a different 
form. She needs the form of a romantic aesthetic holism to give shape to the truth she 
knows in her heart but cannot verbalize prior to the living room scene, just as she 
needs the didactics of Pavel and his comrades to provide a content that first intrigues 
her and encourages her to open herself to new ideas, even when she cannot yet 
understand them. After Nilovna’s consciousness is raised, this new content melds 
with her personal experiences and produces the eager, confident, aggressive, and well 
spoken activist readers follow through the second half of the novel.19 
                                                 
19 It may be possible to draw a parallel here to one of the most common themes of Socialist-Realist 
literature: the hero’s struggle to balance his spontaneity and consciousness. Doing so would open up 
a discussion far beyond the scope of this project, but for more information, see Clark’s The Soviet 
Novel. The spontaneity-consciousness dialectic, which has deep roots in the Russian literary tradition, 
has an analogue in Marxists debates on freedom and determinism and takes on an especially heavy 
political significance around the time of the split of the Marxist Russian Social Democratic Labor 
Party into the Bolsheviks and Mensheviks. 
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 Badiou’s “Art and Philosophy” helps to show that the combination described 
above is far from unusual for its time. After he presents the three schemata for 
explaining the three primary ways (didactic, romantic, classical) philosophers have 
articulated the relationship between art and truth over the years, he claims that, in the 
20th century, these doctrines are taken to extremes (“Didacticism is saturated by the 
state-bound and historical exercise of art in the service of the people [and] 
Romanticism is saturated by the element of pure promise—always brought back to 
the supposition of a return of the gods”) and an attempt is made to bring didacticism 
and romanticism together into a single aesthetic theory (7). While Badiou identifies 
this effort (and eventual failure) with the greater avant-garde project (more on this in 
Chapter 3), it is also a perfectly reasonable description of the pedagogical convictions 
underlying Gorky’s protagonist’s education. It is didactic in its “desire to put an end 
to art” once the truth is grasped, but romantic in its reliance on art as “absolute,” as 
“its own immediately legible truth” (8).  
 While Badiou contends that this paradox spells the end of the early 20th-
century avant-garde, Gorky takes it head on and, in the education of his character 
Nilovna, portrays not just a satisfactory, but a productive and necessary balance 
between content of didactic realism and the romantic aesthetic form. For orthodox 
Socialist Realism, the political and pedagogical is always prioritized over the aesthetic 
and art itself is never more than a means to an end. It is always working towards its 
own insignificance and expected erasure. While the political is also certainly the 
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eventual goal for Gorky’s Mat’—didactic as it is for its readers—art itself is not 
portrayed in the novel as a medium like any other for the propagation of slogans and 
demonstration of truths; it is not incidental to the process of radicalization. For 
Nilovna, the holism of art is a model for her own education towards self-
determination and freedom, and in the activation and eventual realization of her own 
intellect and all that it comes to produce, she becomes a creator or artist. As with Vera 
Pavlovna, Nilovna herself is her first and greatest work of art. 
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CHAPTER 2 
 
CLASSICISM, UTOPIPA, AND THE SOCIALIST EXCEPTION:  
HACKS’ THEORY OF DRAMA 
 
After emigrating from West Germany to East Germany in 1955, the 
playwright, literary theorist, author, and poet Peter Hacks became one of the most 
performed dramatists in the German Democratic Republic (GDR). But with the fall 
of the Berlin Wall in 1989 signaling the ostensible failure of the socialist experiment in 
the Eastern Bloc, Hacks’ oeuvre—literature explicitly written for an emancipated 
socialist society—fell into relative obscurity. It was simply overshadowed by the work 
of playwrights like Heiner Müller and Peter Schneider, whose output was viewed in 
the West as more removed from the Socialist Party line and thus more favorable in 
orientation. 
It is not the purpose of this chapter to return to Hacks merely to give him his 
due, but rather because his dramatic method of Socialist Classicism (sozialistische 
Klassik) entails a politics of aesthetics that is not strictly historicist. Unlike the official 
aesthetic method of the Soviet Bloc (Socialist Realism), Hacks’ Socialist Classicism not 
only does not demand that the content of a play conform to the laws of historical-
materialism, but it also does not even call for the reflection of Marx’s master narrative 
in the events of a given dramatic plot.  
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Both the Socialist-Realist and the Socialist-Classicist methods and theories 
share a commitment to the production of tendentious, pedagogical art that can serve 
the Socialist state via the education of the audience of the work. To this end, both also 
prescribe ways that art can represent life so that it may serve or reinforce the greater 
Truth of this world, namely, the laws of historical materialism. However, the 
significant difference between these two theories is that Socialist Realism champions a 
didactic relationship between truth and art in that it calls for the content of the work 
to conform to/replicate a single Marxian perspective on the revolutionary 
development of history. In faithful Socialist-Realist novels and stories, no matter 
when they are set, the major conflicts are all concerned with the struggle to move 
from the realm of necessity into the realm of freedom; this message must then carry 
over to its audience, whose radical consciousness should be raised as a result of its 
encounter with and necessary acceptance of the truth communicated by the Socialist-
Realist work.  
The method of Socialist Classicism, on the other hand, is founded on the 
premise that the advancement from necessity to freedom is well underway in the 
GDR of the 1960s and that the East German society is just around the corner from 
achieving complete, full-blown emancipation. In Hacks’ thinking, his audience no 
longer struggles with kinds of antagonisms that result from an underdeveloped class 
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consciousness, so the didactic tactics of Socialist Realism are no longer useful.1 Hacks’ 
instrument is no less blunt than that of Socialist Realism, but its object is less the 
content of the artwork—almost any topic of social significance would do—than its 
form. For him, only the grand and unified style of the Classical artwork could detect 
and represent the great promise of his society, which he believes is close to complete 
liberation, accord, and equality following the sublation of the class antagonisms of 
capitalism.  
Hacks’ political commitments always compelled him to remain attentive to 
his concrete historical situation, and the advancements that he saw in his society 
provided the occasion for him to develop and articulate the far more important 
formal strategies for representation that are central to his conception of the Socialist-
Classicist method. The Truth of historical materialism (i.e., the harmony and freedom 
that will soon be fully realized in his society of “mature socialism” [“Saure Feste”]) 
would thus be mirrored in the style of Socialist Classicism rather than in its content. 
For Hacks, only a grand and unified exaggerated representation of the world could 
challenge viewers to compare the staged idealized reality with their own and to 
thereby identify and seek solutions for the contradictions that remain in their everyday 
lives.  
                                                 
1 Of course, it barely needs to be mentioned that not everyone agreed with Hacks’ evaluation of the 
current state of affairs in East Germany. Even literary historian and cultural critic Wolfgang 
Emmerich remarks upon the author’s naiveté when he writes in Kleine Literaturgeschichte der DDR 
(Concise Literary History of the GDR 1981/1996) that “Against Hacks’ promise of a fulfilled, successful 
culture there would be nothing to complain about, if [only] it weren’t so infinitely far from the 
disdainful everyday reality in the GDR” (358). 
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Hacks’ method is wedded to a classical aesthetic theory explaining the 
relationship between truth and art and the education that results from it. In this 
understanding, art and truth have no necessary affiliation, and the artist may merely 
choose to imitate truth in his representation of nature. Unlike in Socialist-Realist 
works, in which the audience must to some extent concede the historical-materialist 
logic determining the story in order to understand it, art in the classical vein can 
simply be enjoyed for its beauty, and its quality is not measured by the successful 
transmission of its message (if there even is one) to its audience. In Hacks’ Socialist-
Classical method, there is, in fact, no basic message to be communicated. Instead, the 
artwork is tasked with offering a heightened and honest representation of the 
potential Hacks believes is latent in his society. The great utility of this method and 
style comes from its capacity to confront its viewers with a vision of the future and 
activate and exercise their minds and imaginations. 
Hacks’ classicism harkens back not only to Aristotle’s ruminations about the 
potential educative consequences of tragedy for its audience, but also to the Weimarer 
Klassik of Goethe’s various and often fragmented literary theoretical writings prior to 
his publication of Die Wahlverwandschaften (The Elective Affinities) in 1810. The latter was 
a contentious figure among the GDR intelligentsia, including Hacks.2 He respected 
                                                 
2 For more on the reception of Goethe in the GDR, see Bernd Leistner, Unruhe um einen Klassiker 
(1978) and Patricia Herminghouse, “Trends in Literary Reception Coming to Terms with Classicism: 
Goethe in GDR Literature from the 1970’s [sic]” (1983). Leister’s book also makes the case that 
Hacks may have manifested some of his ambivalence about Goethe in the cheekiness of his most 
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Goethe deeply, but felt some ambivalence toward the immense and unchecked praise 
he received in German culture. Unlike the parallel drawn between Maxim Gorky and 
the German Frühromantiker in the first chapter of this study, Hacks’ relationship with 
the Classical tradition is explicit and is founded on his more general belief that his 
society had arrived in a classical period that only a classical style could capture 
accurately. 
In the following pages, Hacks’ proposed literary method will be synthesized 
mostly from the essays assembled in the 1972 compilation Das Poetische: Ansätze zu 
einer postrevolutionären Dramaturgie (The Poetic: Approaches to a Post-Revolutionary Dramaturgy) 
and later published as the second book of his collected writings, Die Maßgaben der 
Kunst (The Stipulations of Art 1977).3 There are three reasons why the focus of this 
chapter will be his methodological and theoretical, rather than his dramatic, writing. 
First, the analysis of his essays allows for the examination of a fully articulated 
aesthetic theory and artistic method of drama from a practitioner, which provides a 
perspective distinctly different from those in my other investigations. Gorky’s Mat’ 
illustrates and Müller’s Mauser stages the aesthetic theories analyzed in their chapters; 
Hacks’ essays, however, describe and prescribe how art can and should communicate 
truths in the service of the socialist project. In them we have the opportunity to 
                                                                                                                                                             
famous play, “Ein Gespräch im Hause Stein über den abwesenden Herrn von Goethe” (“A 
Discussion in the Stein Home about the Absent Mr. Goethe” 1974), which claims that Goethe was 
impotent and that this consequently led him to channel his productive energies into all of his other 
immensely varied work. 
3 From this point on, Die Maßgaben der Kunst will be abbreviated to MdK. 
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explore his blueprints for textual construction and the pedagogical impulses that 
inspire them. Additionally, looking directly at Hacks’ theoretical works provides direct 
access to the deeper matter of his model. As a Classicist, he is committed to the idea 
that, while the truth can be reflected in art, it originates outside of art. Conversely, 
Gorky’s novel Mat’, which partly subscribes to a romantic model of aesthetic 
education, is examined precisely because it is a work of art, as art itself is the site of 
truth in the romantic aesthetic schema. Third, Hacks was clear that critics should not 
turn to his plays when looking for a coherent expression of his ideas, for “A 
theorizing author does not normally theorize about his own art, but rather against his 
art. […] His theory and practice are in conflict […]” (“Die Ästhetik Brechts” 
“Brecht’s Aesthetic” in MdK 47). Accordingly, for details about Socialist Classicism—
which, after all, only accounts for one period of his working life—we must turn to 
Hacks’ theoretical writings rather than his dramatic work, all while keeping a keen eye 
on his historical context. 
 
Unreife DDR, Unreifer P.H. 
Because Hacks develops Socialist Classicism in response to a supposed qualitative 
advancement in the society of East Germany in the late 1950s, it is helpful to know a 
bit about the cultural-political context leading up to this change as well as which of his 
own ideas Hacks was reacting against when he articulated his new method. After all, 
Hacks’ commitment to the socialist project of the Eastern Bloc is the reason he 
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emigrated to the GDR in 1955, and by the time he moved, the Socialist-Realist 
didactic aesthetic program had already come to dominate the cultural sphere of East 
Germany. Originally articulated by literary figures and party functionaries like Gorky, 
Alexei Tolstoy, Karl Radek, and Andrei Zhdanov at the 1934 Writers’ Congress in the 
Soviet Union, Socialist Realism was the only official and authorized method for the 
production of art in the Soviet Bloc. Briefly stated, its mission was to depict life in its 
totality and history in its dialectical-materialist development so as to educate and raise 
the consciousnesses of the public. Works in this mode were also expected to focus on 
where the vector of history was headed, that is, to anticipate the future and mold the 
new man whose job it would be to create the new socialist society. In order to 
accomplish this, it was said that authors should imbue their work with a heroic or 
“active romanticism” by portraying typical characters and situations with “conscious 
exaggeration,” all according to the Communist Party’s expectations of what the future 
will look like. These elements were expected to come together to produce a content 
that could inspire in the reader a new attitude towards life and a greater sense of 
purpose and dictate to them a supposedly more accurate explanation for the way the 
world actually works. The most important element of the Socialist-Realist method of 
artistic production was the matter of life “as it is [that is,] not only capitalist reality, 
but also that other, new reality—the reality of socialism” in accordance with the 
Party’s world view (Radek in Problems of Soviet Literature 156-7, Gorky and Tolstoy in 
On the Art and Craft 10-11, 163-64). 
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Immediately following World War II, before Germany was divided, anti-
fascist and humanist works dominated the art scene; but after the Russians began to 
close off their sector and eventually founded the GDR state in 1949, the Socialist-
Realist program was taken up fairly faithfully in the East. With the exception of a brief 
period of relaxation around the time of Khrushchev’s denunciation of Stalin at the 
20th Party Conference of the Soviet Communist Party, the obligation of artists to the 
Socialist-Realist method was firmly in place by 1957 and 1958 when the Central 
Committee of the GDR’s ruling Socialist Unity Party declared that the role of art is to 
“treat the questions of culture as questions of the political work with the masses” 
(qtd. in Theater in der Zeitwende II 17). This statement of strong commitment was 
intended to remind artists that they had a key role to play in building the new society. 
The artistic visions behind their plots and illustrations were expected to aim to resolve 
lingering class antagonisms in East Germany, all while training all the hopes and 
dreams of their characters on the promised harmony and prosperity to come in the 
GDR’s great socialist future.  
Prior to 1958, Hacks is still in the early stages of his career, and, as critic 
Michael Mitchell has noted, his “theoretical writing was [still] very much determined 
by the debate going on between the literary establishment”—who promoted Socialist 
Realism—“and the supporters of Brechtian epic [or “dialectical”] drama” (28-29). 
Mitchell’s monograph, Peter Hacks: Drama for a Socialist Society (1990), is a helpful 
companion through Hacks’ oeuvre up until the fall of the Berlin Wall, and in it 
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Mitchell maintains that this double loyalty is apparent in Hacks’ work even before he 
emigrated to the GDR. As a mouthpiece for the establishment, Hacks conceived of 
his early plays as “histories” that provided proper reflections of the historical-
materialist process.4 Even the essays he writes at this time on dramatic methodology 
call for art to focus on historical matters. So in both artistic and theoretical output, 
Hacks see his work as loyal to the official method of artistic production, at least at the 
level of content. As he later publishes in MdK, “In the beginning, in West Germany, I 
held the refutation of the class society to be an acceptable primary theme,” and it 
permeates all his work for as long as he feels the topic of class struggle to be a 
relevant one for his society (qtd. in Mitchell 8).  
In “Das Theater der Gegenwart” (“The Theatre of the Present” 1957), Hacks 
summarizes his position on what should be the object of the theater: 
Socialist Realism is a dialectical realism. The ‘Dialectic of the Theatre’ entails 
the non-isolation of all phenomena, that is, [the dialectic’s] diffuse 
dependencies and reciprocal cause. It entails the changing of the world and, 
especially, the world’s mutability. Mutability of characters, of circumstances, of 
history. It shows the world as mutable, it speaks to the viewer as the agent of 
change. In dialectical theatre, the viewer is a man with the power of judgment, 
distance, worth; he is not driven to applause like lamb to the slaughter. (128) 
                                                 
4 The titles of Hacks’ Historien, which were his first four plays: Das Volksbuch vom Herzog Ernst (Herzog 
Ernst’s Chapbook 1953), Eröffnung des indischen Zeitalters (The Opening of the Indian Age 1954), Die Schlacht 
bei Lobositz (The Battle of Lobositz 1955), and Der Müller von Sanssouci (The Miller of Sanssouci 1957). 
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Of greatest significance here are Hacks’ points about the role of the audience and the 
imperative to present an always changing world in which “all phenomena” are 
connected. The influence of his mentor and fellow writer cum theorist Bertolt Brecht 
is also noticeable in each of these arguments. Both writers agree that truly dialectical 
art, which Socialist Realism also claimed to be, must not only provide a picture of 
society’s mutable, “causal network,” but it must also demand the active participation 
of the distant, yet critical, spectator. This is where Hacks starts to find himself in hot 
water.5 
Despite his clear and outspoken belief in the theory of historical-materialism 
and his commitment to conforming the plots of his artistic output to that theory, 
Hacks was still a controversial and somewhat suspect figure in the East at this time. 
To be sure, his work is didactic, for it principally served as a vehicle for that external 
truth that determined his content, but it also aimed to use artistic form to challenge 
his audience intellectually rather than just find the easiest and most effective package 
for delivering to them easily graspable truths. Although he places his work under the 
banner of “socialist realism,” the young Hacks advocates for a style of drama that was 
similar to the Brechtian “Epic Theatre” in that it placed great value on the utility of 
abstraction in which “figures and situations present models of behaviour and attitudes 
                                                 
5 For Brecht’s descriptions of his method of dialectical theatre, see Chapter 3 of this dissertation, or 
from his writings, “The Modern Theatre is the Epic Theatre” (1930). For a description of dialectical 
theatre in action, see “Indirect Impact of Epic Theatre” (1933). (English translations of the Brecht 
pieces mentioned here are all available in John Willett’s Brecht on Theatre, 1964.) 
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[that are] based on historical models but with a relevance to the present” (Mitchell, 
emphasis added 11). Hacks believes that theatre is the domain of the general or 
universal; abstractions are better at illustrating and drawing out for the still alienated 
audience—and thus encouraging them to think more about—any broader issues and 
problems that are related to the historical specificities of the plot. In other words, he, 
like Brecht, strays far from the establishment’s accepted definition of “realism” by 
using his historical “material poetically, not sociologically,” as Mitchell puts it (10).6  
The specter of formalism, the death knell of any artistic method or aesthetic 
theory in the Soviet Union after 1934 and for most of the existence of the Soviet 
satellites, hung ominously over Hacks’ abstract, “dialectical theatre.” A focus on form 
was thought to eclipse the all-important content of an artistic work and risk the 
dehistoricization of its real material issues. Hacks launches a defense against this 
accusation in “Einige Gemeinplätze über das Stückeschreiben” (“A Few Platitudes 
about Playwriting” 1956), asserting that artist need not focus exclusively on creating 
work that reproduces the stuff of reality as exactly he sees that stuff, because “Form 
comes from content” and “Form is a cipher for the social structure” (126, 120).  
Another aspect of Hacks’ method that strays from that of the Socialist 
Realists is approach to presenting the content the two shared. While they are both 
committed to presenting reality in line with a historical-materialist understanding of 
                                                 
6 On Brecht’s broadening of the term “realism” contra those who are “bound by formal prejudices,” 
as he puts it, see his 1958 article “The Popular and the Realistic” (110). 
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the world, Hacks does not believe that artists should provide resolutions for the true-
to-life conflicts they staged. As he wites in “Gemeinplätze,” “The contradictions [of 
society] are not overcome; consequently, there is no form that shows the 
contradictions as overcome” (120). This position puts him at odds with the 
theoreticians and practitioners of Socialist Realism, as the latter method relies on the 
presentation of tidy conclusions and often definitive resolutions that would, it is 
hoped, lend credence to the Party’s claims about the imminent arrival of socialism and 
freedom.  
While he always intends for his underlying message to be clear, Hacks leaves 
his plays open to audience analysis, an approach that he justifies by gesturing to his 
historical situation. In the 1950s, the recently founded GDR is in a period of 
transition, defining itself as the utter negation of fascism as it works through the 
lingering socio-economic contradictions of capitalism. Hacks knows just as well as the 
Socialist Unity Party functionaries that East Germany is still in the realm of necessity 
and deep in the throes of class struggle; the individual is not yet emancipated. 
Consequently, for Hacks, who is steadfastly committed to allowing the socio-historical 
situation to determine his work, the neat resolutions offered in Socialist-Realist art 
have jumped the gun and are essentially lying to their passive audience. More work 
needs to be done before art can show everything wrapped up so neatly. Hacks’ 
investment is in a more humanist historical materialism (emphasizing the 
development of the present out the past for an audience whose minds he is helping to 
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liberate) than in the mechanistic one of Socialist Realism (anticipating the resolution 
of present contradictions for an audience that, per Hacks, is not quite ready for them). 
 
From Dialectical Theatre to Socialist Classicism 
Hacks’ statement in “Gemeinplätze” about form functioning as a cipher for the 
societal structure means that he, writing in the GDR of the mid-1950s, is duty bound 
to both his own aesthetic commitments (realism) and his audience (still struggling) to 
call for art that reflects, but does not resolve, class antagonisms. The ensuing 
assumption is then that, were the state of society to change, so, too, would Hacks’ 
method, responsible as it is to—or, contingent as it is on—the development of 
history. This is precisely what happens in the late 1950s, leading to the writing of the 
poetic Die Sorgen und die Macht (1962) and a number of adaptations of classical works, 
such as Amphitryon (1967) and Die Vögel (1973).  
The literary theoretical texts cited in the previous section were released in 
1956 and 1957, and Hacks marks a major advancement in his early method of drama 
just one year later with the publication of the essay “Das Poetische” (“The Poetic” in 
MdK 136-152), which later became part of the collection of the same name, and then 
again two years later with the publication of “Versuch über das Theaterstück von 
morgen” (“Essay on the Play of Tomorrow” in MdK 58-75). That this change 
amounts to the replacement of a modern “dialectical” and didactic method with what 
Hacks calls a “Socialist-Classicist” one could invite an interrogation of my claim that 
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the latter was an “advancement” of his earlier method of drama. From our present 
perspective, prim and staid Classicism likely may seem like a regression from the self-
aware and playful Brechtian model. Neither their relation nor the supposedly superior 
status of the latter is manifest. There is, however, a clear and logical thread that can 
guide us through development of Hacks’ thought from one to the other, a thread that 
begins with Hacks’ already familiar insistence on the utility of abstraction—that is, a 
playwright’s attention to and portrayal of the general in the particular—in socialist 
literature and his attention to form, more generally.  
Instead of gradually moving more in line with the state-authorized artistic 
mode the longer he lived in the GDR and the more pressure came down on artists 
from the upper echelons of the Party, Hacks binds himself even more strongly to the 
notion that there is radical potential and utility in the form of the artwork. The move 
even further away from the Socialist-Realist insistence that, above all else, art reflect 
the truthful content as defined by the Party ultimately pushes Hacks’ theoretical work 
from 1959 through the 1960s in the direction of utopia. It must be made clear, 
however, that Hacks insists that the reason for his shift from dialectical theatre to 
Socialist Classicism is founded on the concrete reality of his time. Even though it is an 
unrealizable (unmachbar) possibility, utopia is at that point in history actually 
conceivable (denkbar), he maintains, as his contemporary reality has liberated the 
individual and the imagination.  
After Khrushchev’s denunciation of Stalin in 1956, several states in the 
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Eastern Bloc enjoy a brief moment of relaxation from the hard pursuit of 
transformation to a socialist society. But in the GDR, this respite lasts only until the 
5th Party Congress in 1958 when the SED reaffirm their founding anti-fascist, 
supposedly democratic goals. Translated into the realm of the arts, this new policy 
draws an even firmer, harder line in terms of what it meant for artists to be accepted 
as politically sound—namely, the production of work that assists in the creation of the 
“new man”—and what it means for them to be rejected as ideologically pernicious to 
the Party’s aims. In a 1974 article on GDR cultural politics, Gerd Henning and 
Gunner Huettich call this development the “second phase of the socialist cultural 
revolution.” It is “second” because it comes after a period during which the GDR 
essentially mirrors the cultural policies of the early USSR, and they explain that the 
intent of the Party’s new strategies is the “re-educating the educators” and intellectuals 
by “reestablish[ing] cultural life and break[ing] the educational-cultural monopoly of 
the bourgeoisie” (42-43). As Mitchell also notes, the consequences of this renewed 
focus on complete overhaul of the economy and society are, for theatre, explained 
quite plainly by Siegfried Wagner, “the head of the Central Committee’s cultural 
section,” who in no uncertain terms dismisses the “theories and practice of young 
dramatists such as Hacks, Heiner Müller, Heinar Kipphard and Helmut Baierl” as 
“these erroneous (falsche) artistic methods” (35, Wagner qtd. in Mitchell 35).7 
                                                 
7 The stress put on artists of this time to produce the “right” kind of work is far more extensive than 
just the statements of the 5th Party Congress. Two additional decrees brought enormous additional 
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Even though Hacks is on board with the spirit of the Party’s project, he does 
not play along the way that party functionaries insisted artists should, which is to say, 
he does not simply fall in line with the Socialist-Realist program. Yet, alongside the 
reaffirmation of the Party’s goal to advance into a fully realized socialist society, Hacks 
observes the greater pushes towards the collectivization of farms and the 
nationalization of businesses and interprets them heralds of the GDR’s rapid progress 
towards completing its socialist transformation. The qualitative advancements in 
everyday living that, he believes, are brought about by this transformation are so 
meaningful and successful to him that they demanded a correction of his earlier 
method of dialectical theatre. The roles of various entities change as social relations 
change; a new society demands a new dramatic method and way of understanding the 
relationship between art and truth. If East German theatre is to remain responsible to 
the society in which it operates, it has to adjust to accommodate and reflect the 
revolution underway, i.e., the imminent arrival of actually existing socialism. Brecht’s 
epic, didactic theatre, which influenced Hacks so greatly, becomes outmoded, 
according to Hacks. In “Die Ästhetik Brechts,” he explains that his mentor’s “reality 
was that of the first half of the twentieth century. Our reality is already different; our 
                                                                                                                                                             
pressures: (1) the enacting of the so-called “Bitterfelder Weg” (Bitterfeld Way) of 1959, which seeks 
to elevate the ostensibly limited consciousnesses of and facilitate new experiences for writers and 
workers by sending the former to factories and encouraging the latter to write; and (2) the report 
given in 1965 by then Secretary of the Socialist Unity Party (SED) of the GDR to the 11th Plenum 
of the Central Committee rehearsing the state’s commitment to Socialist Realism and calling for “a 
clean slate with unyielding standards” that would flush itself of any “negative” and harmful morality 
and adhere strictly and exclusively to SED’s agenda (Honecker).  
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methods must look different than Brecht’s if they want to be Brechtian methods” 
(MdK 76). 
Hacks develops the dramatic method of “Socialist Classicism” in light of his 
belief that actually existing socialism would be achieved in the immediate future. 
Instead of defending this claim with the support of the economic details of East 
Germany’s great socialist economic achievements, Hacks focuses on the qualitative 
differences he saw (or expected to see) by merely declaring that this young society is 
becoming a truly exceptional one founded on reason and equal relations between 
individuals. This is a position he maintains throughout Das Poetische, but one he 
espouses particularly forcefully in the preface, where he argues the following: 
In history, there are no conditions equal [to these today]; what looks similar is 
actually something different. The fundamental difference between the present 
time and other art-friendly epochs consists in the fact that, in all previous social 
states, nonsense was the main side of the fruitful contradiction between reason 
and nonsense and that today reason is. (MdK 48) 
Furthermore, the recent “success of the GDR, in connection with its greatly animated 
contradictions, made possible the Neuentdeckung of art and the reopening of the 
greatest aesthetic questions” (48). Appropriately for Hacks, who is engaged in the 
Bearbeitung (reappropriation and reworking) of old classical forms for what he believes 
was a new classical era, the word “Neuentdeckung” means a newfound discovery, as 
in the uncovering (ent-decken) of something already in existence, something found once 
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again. The advanced status of his society sanctiones Hacks’ return to and adaptation 
of a classicism style for the new era and supportes his assessment of aesthetic 
questions as, if not above, then on par with, historical ones. 
At this point, Hacks deems East Germany to be in a historical moment that is 
approaching harmony and stability. He tells an imaginary interlocutor in “Versuch” 
that “we find ourselves […] in a period of the transition from the revolutionary 
tradition to the classical tradition,” as in other times when classicism reigned, such as 
the periods of English and Spanish absolutism (MdK 72). There is, however, a 
qualitative difference between then and Hacks’ present, for he believes the coming 
socialism will be the first “continuous synthesis of revolution and stability,” and the 
form of any art that is committed to the presentation of the truth must adapt 
accordingly (73).  
Representing a liberated society does not mean for Hacks that the picture art 
offers should be uncomplicated. Even though he believes that, at this time, his society 
has ostensibly sublated all lingering capitalist class antagonisms, art, “in order to be 
art,” still needs conflict. In declarations such as these, Hacks is clearly at odds with 
GDR state officials, who, in light of the supposed resolution of class antagonisms, 
also declared the resolution of all conflicts arising out of capitalism and whose views 
Hacks correspondingly charges as ultimately undialectical and stagnant. The 
playwright’s correction is to argue that, although significant conflicts have been 
overcome, it must be recognized that “even the best of all actual worlds must contain 
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a flaw: that it is worse than the best of all possible worlds” (48). 
Hacks conceives of this remaining contradiction as one of the “relationship 
of utopia to reality,” i.e., of das Denkbare/das Mögliche (the thinkable or possible) to das 
Machbare/das Tatsächliche (the doable or feasible), and it is of paramount significance 
for Hacks’ method. It is, in fact, what he identifies in the preface to Das Poetische as 
“the object of young art,” for the possible, though not actual, reality of utopia is 
finally thinkable after socialism partly because the staging of that utopia requires an 
advanced audience capable of comparing it with the “ugly reality” outside of the 
artwork (MdK 47-48). This opportunity to present what he elsewhere called the “unity 
of action and plan” (of das Machbare and das Mögliche) is, Hacks believes, the great 
benefit of working “from a standpoint of mature socialism” (“Saure Feste” 137). 
Because his is a period of relative harmony, the artist is sanctioned and encouraged 
once again, as in other classical eras, to use art to depict mankind at its greatest, as 
long as his illustration remains attentive to the reality that gave birth to the 
possibilities he presents. For Hacks, this approach amounts to the “formula[ion] of a 
new grade of socialist classicism” that can reflect the totality of his progressive society 
by depicting both what was and what (now) could be (emphasis added, MdK 47).8 
This great, unified, and liberated era calls for great, unified, and liberated form 
                                                 
8 Hacks is well aware of the threat of being labeled an idealist, so it is important to keep in mind that 
he views reality as approaching utopia asymptotically. As he writes in the preface to Das Poetische, 
“Utopia has no way to exist other than in a reality that develops towards it” (MdK 48). In his 
reasoning, utopia can never actually be achieved, but because the arrival of socialism makes it 
thinkable or possible, it is accordingly useful as a kind of thought exercise.  
 107 
of art. With its progression from the realm of the necessary to that of freedom, 
society achieves a kind of subject-object unity that was missing under the exploitative 
and alienating conditions and relations of capitalism. For artists who want to dedicate 
themselves to reflecting at the level of form this material development, Hacks 
encourages the unification of Haltung (the subject/artist’s attitude or mindset) and 
Wirklichkeit (the object/reality) in the work, represented by the organic whole of the 
work, its unification of form and content (MdK 113). Throughout Hacks’ writing of 
this period, this relationship is articulated in a number of different ways: das Denkbare-
das Machbare; das Mögliche-das Tatsächliche; the future/tomorrow-the present/today; 
what could be-what is; mind-nature. All, however, boil down to essentially the same 
point about subject-object unity. Unlike the scientist’s attempt to separate these two 
domains in an effort to achieve objectivity, “the artist shows the world in his most 
personal way” (ibid). “The illustration of reality [in the artwork] is the means” that the 
artist uses to achieve his “aim,” that is, how he communicates his point of view or 
way of viewing the world; consequently, the form that his mind gives to this matter is 
“for the artwork the principle political issue, and so the most interesting one” (ibid, 
103). Thus, should a Socialist-Classicist author respond to reality by identifying 
progressive tendencies in it and portraying them in his work, he would no longer 
allow his object to define him as it did under the reign of the reifying Naturalism, for 
example. Rather, the artist would be exercising his intellect and giving his own shape 
to this matter as a free man.  
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The goal then for the Socialist-Classicist artist of Hacks’ time is to use his 
advanced mind to mold the unformed matter of reality (Wirklichkeit) in accordance 
with the broader historical-materialist explanation (the proper Haltung) of that reality. 
In so doing, the artist endows his artwork with the utopian tendency already operative 
in his advanced, post-revolutionary consciousness, for he is already able to see the 
manifold possibilities (Möglichkeiten) available to him and his society. In order to 
communicate this in the artwork, Hacks explains that das Mögliche must take the form 
of die Größe, which entails the illustration of a person or situation in its full extent. All 
events, characters, and opinions have to be of great (groß) consequence and be 
presented accordingly, or their good characteristics need to be exaggerated to 
greatness. The purpose of this exaggeration is for artists to turn all of this content into 
symbols of the great potential of everything around and in them; the GDR society 
would be presented as a utopia and the everyman would be presented as a hero. At 
last, in the late 1950s, this greatness is “possible” to imagine and, for Hacks, still in the 
realm of the realistic precisely because the contemporary political subject and society 
have been liberated; there is simply no longer any reason to present man and his 
world simply as they are rather than what they can be. It is time to show them in their 
full potential, thereby allowing the artist to capture in his work what he sees as the 
größen (in “the double meaning of good and spread out”) possibilities of the historical 
process (MdK 59-60).  
Hacks also characterizes die Größe as a kind of “pomp,” which he said is 
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defined by its ability to serve as a “means of illustrating intent” rather than an “aim” 
or final destination. Pomp would be “sensual and celebratory,” and it shows the 
“pride of men in themselves.” As a form of artistic exaggeration, it is the “celebration 
of human possibility” according to the mind of the artist and the audience. It is, 
Hacks stresses, the natural poetic form of theatre and “essential” to it. As he explains, 
because “The structural generic rules of art depend on the sociological structure of 
the audience” it is intended to affect, theatre, which was available to all classes in the 
former GDR, is the “most open and sociable” of all arts. Theatre is “not quiet”; it 
must play big. Its “emblem,” its “most human human being,” according to Hacks, is 
the “king with the purple cloak and his golden paper crown,” for on stage he, unlike a 
president or prime minister, symbolizes social power and becomes a “cipher for 
human greatness.” He “suffers and determines not only his fate, but that of his 
people” (MdK 150-152). 
The pompous or große presentation of people and events according to Hacks’ 
grand stipulations is, he believes, a means of poeticization, and he contrasted this with 
the presentation of the “everyday,” which he unhesitatingly calles the “death of art.” 
Artists of the everyday, whom he implicitly likens to naturalists, “sit in their tree and 
chirp” and believe that “the wind that moves the tree is a characteristic of the tree.” 
They mistake appearance for essence (MdK 62). Artists of die Größe, on the other hand, 
have an imagination that allows them to identify and take hold of what they deemed 
most characteristic, good, and, as will be discussed, inspirational in a given situation or 
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personality. 
Hacks aligns the form of die Größe with what he maintains is the “first 
criterion of art”: “perfection” (MdK 60). This term appears to have two related 
meanings in Hacks’ theoretical work. The first is that, insofar as the artwork is to offer 
a utopian image of the future, that which it presents has to be perfect. The second is 
that of great “ästhetische Vollkommenheit,” or aesthetic completion, which is telling 
of Hacks’ faith that, in his day, unity was not only achievable between the artist and 
his object, but also within the artwork itself (45). Implied here is that individual 
characters and situations, as well as their relations to one another, must all be 
presented in such a way that they form organic wholes at the various levels of the 
dramatic work. This “completion” can be achieved, for example, through the 
avoidance of mere contrariness or stereotyping of characters and, at the textual level, 
through the presentation of well-composed dialogue and, where appropriate, verse 
(“Poetische”). 
The critiques that Hacks levels at artworks that are too factual or too 
emotional and at artists of the everyday seem to have come from the same source in 
his literary theory, namely, his concern with balancing the two aspects he believes are 
central to an artwork’s style: its “Unwirklichkeitswert” (U-Wert) or value of unreality 
and its “Identifikationswert” (I-Wert) or value of identification. The latter does not 
stem entirely from an emotional identification, but rather an intellectual one in which 
the reader or viewer is given the chance to “identify himself with [the] protagonist and 
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his circumstances” and thereby “apply it directly to his position.” In “Poetische,” 
Hacks offers an example to demonstrate that the success of his version of the folk 
ballad “Die Räuberbraut,” which is included in the essay, is directly related to its high 
I-Wert, and he sought to exhibit this success by “translating it, line for line, in the 
undisguised language of things,” for he believes this was what is fundamentally 
responsible for the poem’s I-Wert (MdK 139). While the story of the ballad, which 
deals with the themes of lost innocence and manipulation in love, remain in tact and 
meaningful after Hacks’ “translation,” the poem itself loses all of its charm and 
interest.9 As Hacks notes, when “we reduced the poem to the basis of its success, we 
retain a poem that wouldn’t be successful” (MdK 140). Art requires more than the 
objective reporting of facts that appeal to the intellect; it also needs U-Wert, which can 
bestow it with a sense of the “unreachable,” “gushing,” “unbelievable,” or, quite 
simply, “ideal.” In a second “translation” of “Die Räuberbraut,” Hacks limites the 
ballad to the Haltung and feelings of the speaker. In so doing, the poem becomes 
“overwrought, romantic,” “incomprehensible,” and, as Hacks confesses, more or less 
                                                 
9 A sample stanza will help to illuminate the distinction Hacks is making. Original text: “Nimm 
diesen Ring, und sollte jemand fragen, / So sollst du sagen, ein Räuber hat ihn getragen, / Der dich 
geliebt bei Tag und bei der Nacht / Und der schon viele Menschen umgebracht.” Reduced to its I-
Wert: “Hier schenke ich dir einen Ring (echt Bernstein und echt Silber). Wenn dich einer fragt, / 
Kannst du ruhig sagen, daß du ihn von mir hast, / Und daß wir uns umarmt haben jeden Mittwoch 
nach sieben, / Und daß ich weniger fad war als die, die ernstlich für dich in Frage kommen” (MdK 
138, 140). 
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intolerable (MdK 141-142).10 
In each of these “translations,” the content of the ballad remains the same. 
Only the style in which they are presented, that is, the form they take, changes. Hacks’ 
point is that the Haltung of the socialist poet, in its presentation of any given material, 
has to balance the objective with the subjective. Furthermore, both the poetic totality 
of the text and its political import inheres in the combination of these two values. Not 
only does it represent subject-object unity in the free society, but the artist’s poetic 
presentation of utopia—of man in his full development—can also confront the 
viewer with a fruitful contradiction between the best of all actual worlds—the 
tatsächlichen GDR—and the best of all möglichen worlds, the latter of which is only just 
becoming imaginable. 
The achievement of the unity Hacks calls for does not offer the audience any 
“Endlösungen” or final solutions, but rather “a direction” (MdK 49).11 As he observes 
in Poetische, “Utopia has no way of existing other than in a reality that develops 
towards it,” and the direction of this development is to keep the artist’s attention on 
what will be possible tomorrow. Of course, this is something that many could 
                                                 
10 The same stanza from fn. 10, now limited to its U-Wert: “Nimm dieses einmalige Kleinod; es wird 
Aufsehen erregen. / Sprich dann: ich schäme mich meines Hernn nicht. / Sprich: seine liebe war 
groß wie die Welt, / Menschen, mich ausgenommen, waren wie Ungeziefer vor ihm” (MdK 141). 
11 The rhetorical force of the word “Endlösung,” an allusion to Hitler’s “final solution,” is surely not 
accidental. Although Hacks believes his method and theory of art to be political through and 
through, he certainly does not want to be understood as totalitarian. In fact, unlike Socialist Realism, 
which Hacks views as a self-confined, single vision of the future, the Socialist-Classicist 
methodology was designed to open the audience’s mind to the host of ideas about what might come 
to pass.  
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speculate about: the sociologist and the weatherman, for instance, can follow the 
“lines of progress” or metrological developments; but they are not “prophets” and 
cannot “draft vivid images of the particular appearances of future life.” Artists, 
however, can. This is their unique talent. In this way, Hacks presents his method of 
Socialist Classicism as a means for artists to offer a vision of “tomorrow” and his 
dramatic theory as an explanation of the “play of tomorrow” (a response to his 1957 
proposal of the “play of today”) (58-59). “The art of tomorrow,” he emphasizes, “will 
be made today [because] tomorrow” now bears all the utopian possibilities ushered in 
by socialism and, for that reason, “has a greater effect on artists than yesterday.” 
Unlike the sociologist and the weatherman, only artists have “the passport to the 
future” and can therefore make predictions about the various forms that the promised 
utopia can take, for only they have the imagination—“the medium of tomorrow”—to 
do so (59, 66). Only those with such imaginations can also communicate what they 
predict by illustrating their image in the idealized and pompous form of die Größe, of 
mankind and society in all of its great potential (58-59). “The greatest poets,” Hacks 
affirms, “abstain from the bickering of today and anticipate the clear, secure, and great 
human viewpoint of tomorrow” (71). 
Hacks fully admits that an artist who predicts what might happen tomorrow 
from the possibilities latent today will run the risk of being wrong: “There is a 
sufficient danger of error, and when I write here how it will be, I confess at the same 
time that it can also not be that way.” “Why then,” he asks, “do I write at all? Because 
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I hope that it will be that way” (MdK 59). Such prophesying would help to increase 
the possibility that the artist’s hopes and dreams, thought to be the hopes and dreams 
of all people, would come true. It would create a “thought-path in the thicket of all 
that is coming” by offering suggestions to the audience that could motivate them to 
make an effort in that direction (ibid). With this we arrive at the educative value of 
Hacks’ Socialist Classicism and the special role that art and theatre, in particular, are 
granted. 
For Hacks, the value today of the play of tomorrow is not merely that it is 
enjoyable in its grand and unified style. The play of tomorrow is also pedagogical, in 
that it can encourage the audience to think a certain way and perhaps even to act a 
certain way in order to affect change. But the Socialist-Classicist artist would not be a 
didact; he would not impose a particular circumscribed truth on the text the way that 
Socialist-Realism does or even the way that Hacks views Brecht’s epic theatre (as well 
as the younger Hacks’ own dialectical theatre) as doing. Hacks does not necessarily 
dismiss either of these approaches, but merely explains that they were borne of and 
responded to a different era with different needs. “Such an attitude is not wrong; it is 
historical,” he insists. Brecht’s period, for instance, was “wissenschaftlich,” or 
scientific, according to Hacks, and so Brecht’s role as a leftist artist had to be focused 
on teaching his less-educated audience the way the world works, which is to say, the 
doctrine of historical materialism (MdK 54-55). The imbalance between the knowledge 
of the artist and that of the audience at the time demanded that the former directly 
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instruct the latter. 
The artist of the Socialist-Classical period also has to have command of all 
that which was wissenschaftlich, but he “no longer needs to simply propagate it.” His 
audience is already educated in the ways of Marxism; they are approaching, if not 
already on, on the same level as the artist and will soon stand right next to him (MdK 
54-55). Because they are a “public with socialist consciousness, socialist past, socialist 
habits,” a public whose consciousnesses has already been raised, the “worldview of 
the classical play finds itself to be in harmony with the views of the audience” (71, 69). 
Accordingly, the truth that is to be communicated in the Socialist-Classical artwork 
can be less reliant on demonstrations of the operations of historical materialism and 
more concerned with the mere fact of actually existing socialism and all of its 
attending utopian possibilities. After all, the pedagogy behind the Socialist-Classical 
work has to be appropriate for the target audience. The artist of the new era “loves—
perhaps too much—evidence, but hates proving premises,” which was Brecht’s 
vocation, and Hacks’ already or soon-to-be radicalized audience does not need to 
have anything explained to them (46).   
Rather than commit his work to explanation, the Socialist-Classical artist 
should bet on the capacity of his hungry and intelligent audience to figure out the 
truth of the work (as das Mögliche) themselves: “The true will be graspable through the 
perfected tools of recognition (Erkenntnis) and through the demand for it” (MdK 73). 
Yet the purpose of the Socialist-Classical artwork is not merely to show them what 
 116 
they already know. In their engagement with an abstract reality through the form of 
die Größe, they are expected to recognize the greatness of mankind and thereby 
confirm that the path their society is on was the right one. They are also expected to 
be encouraged to dream of all that may come and, in so doing, ask themselves how 
their lives then do not yet match what they see on stage. They are to identify 
differences between their world and the world “of tomorrow” presented on stage, 
mull over their similarities and differences, and thereby engage their critical faculties in 
an effort to figure out how what they are shown compares to reality. This necessitates 
that they tease out the I-Wert (or das Machbare) from the U-Wert (or das Denkbare) und 
labor to understand the relationship of the latter to the former, or “of utopia to 
reality,” as Hacks puts it in the preface to Poetische (MdK 48).  
In Hacks’ thinking, all of the exercises above are possible because the 
audience of Socialist-Classicism believes themselves to be free. Because their 
advanced consciousnesses are aware of the fact that everything presented to them is 
mere appearance, they feel less threatened by the great characters and more 
emboldened and confident so that they can tap into the “inner possibilities” and 
abilities and confirm what they find (MdK 143). Nevertheless, in this process, die 
Größe’s activation of the imagination will not merely portray “the greatness of 
thoughts, feelings, volitions” with the expectation that the audience should simply fall 
into self-reflexive and passive enjoyment of the play in their recognition that the 
exaggerations presented are intended to be extensions of the best of what they and 
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their society have to offer; die Größe also “demands” the greatness of new thoughts, 
feelings, and volitions and “makes them possible” (61). This is to say that die Größe will 
also facilitate the production of even more greatness in the way that it inspires the 
audience to think more critically, feel more passionately, and act more steadfastly. 
Viewers who observe and understand die Größe and thus respond and engage 
in the way that Hacks anticipates develop what he calls an “aesthetic consciousness.” 
Hacks illuminates the stakes of this advancement in self-admittedly grand fashion 
when he explaines that this achievement will be nothing short of man’s awareness of 
the fact that he has arrived at himself. Although this experience may be confined to 
specific moments in a play, the audience will have been made aware of their 
completeness, their unity as a biological (in the sense of das Tatsächliche) and a spiritual 
(geistiges, in the sense of das Denkbare) beings: the “recovery of [an individual’s] natural 
being will remain, forever made richer from the giving of his entire humanity.” The 
greater significance of this will be, of course, that “both the natural man, just as the 
human utopia, will not be met in the historical reality. They exist in the past and in the 
future, perhaps also in memory and hope,” but certainly in Socialist-Classical art, in 
which “they are two imaginary, alternate drafts for the world” (MdK 146-147).  
In this sense, one of the major and most interesting distinctions between 
Hacks’ method and that of Socialist Realism is where the imaginations of the former’s 
audience would take them: notably not to a circumscribed and necessarily socialist 
realm, but rather to a more generalized human utopia. Just as significant, however, is 
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Hacks’ ability to craft an aesthetic theory and related method that is attentive to 
concrete reality without asserting its ultimate primacy over the poetic. The form may 
“come from” and respond to the content reality provides it, but it is still the form that 
has the greatest impact on audience through its encouragement of critical thinking and 
the imagination. (“Gemeinplätze” 125). 
 
The Classical Tradition: An Old Form for a New Era 
In Hacks’ method, art mostly serves to confirm what he believed was already true, 
though perhaps not widely recognized, about the advanced and unified socialist 
society and socialist individual. In his Socialist-Classical method, truth and art have no 
necessary relation. Each can easily survive without the other. It is rather that art, 
though the presentation of the possible, can bring the truth of human potential to the 
fore, forcing the audience to confront it and enhancing their intellectual and 
emotional experience of it. Truth is not immanent to art (romanticism), nor does it 
submit the artwork to its ruling from outside (didacticism). It is recognized, 
experienced, and appreciated in the artwork. Hacks’ aim is to show that art of this 
socialist era has a unique opportunity to illustrate all that is true and great about man 
and his world through the imitation and enhancement of reality and in so doing to 
encourage his audience to ensure that society would continue to move in the direction 
of harmony and freedom, which is to say, the direction of the never-actually-
achievable utopia.  
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 In “Art and Philosophy,” Alain Badiou outlines the three schemata he sees as 
governing the many theories proposed over the centuries to explain or sometimes 
delineate the art-truth relation. One of these schema is “classical,” whose practitioners 
or advocates he views as calling for peace between truth and art. Neither of them 
fights for dominance, as they do under the romantic and didactic schemata. The 
classical perspective is openly of the opinion that art is “incapable of truth” because 
“Its essence is mimetic, and its regime is that of semblance.” But, as Badiou explains, 
“This incapacity does not pose a serious problem (contrary to what Plato believed). 
This is because the purpose of art is not” truth, again unlike in the other two schemata 
(4). The Purpose (in Sinyavsky’s sense of aim or even tendency) of art is, rather, first 
the audience’s positive identification with what is presented, and second, the 
expectation that the desires and hopes that are transferred in this identification find 
themselves in a safe place to work through them cathartically and at a level removed 
from actual reality. As Badiou puts it, “In classicism, art captures desire and shapes 
(éduque) its transference by proposing a semblance of its object.” In this sense, art 
provides a “free service” for self-analysis via education and training (“Art and 
Philosophy” 3-7).  
 In Hacks’ terms, Badiou is explaining the power of the combination of the 
Identifikations-Wert, viable because the audience recognizes and understands the 
semblance of reality presented in the artwork, and the Unwirklichkeits-Wert in the 
pompous form of die Größe, viable because the audience is encouraged to invest in and 
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unload onto the artwork their own great desires and hopes for what is possible. 
According to Hacks and, Badiou believes, other classicists, the balanced combination 
of these two values yields the poetic totality of the artwork. What’s more, the 
harmony that is achieved in the totality and unity of the artwork and in the truth-art 
relation more generally is, for Hacks and the likeminded, a direct consequence of the 
relative peace in their societies. Classical drama, for one, “is based on a more or less 
stable harmony of all politically weighty classes” (MdK 70). In a period like Hacks’, 
“the beautiful will no longer be the form of the lie” when it is presented in the 
artwork, “but rather [the form of] the truth” (73). This is to say that Hacks believes 
that any well composed artwork from a classical period, even one from the GDR of 
the 1960s that is not even aiming for his Socialist-Classical style, will contain within its 
beauty the truth of its reality. (This is a far cry from the deceptive classical art of non-
classical periods, which simply served to cover over the ugly reality.) 
 The fact that his method of Socialist Classicism (sozialistische Klassik) is based on 
an actually existing harmony between the classes is, in Hacks’ opinion, what 
distinguishes it from the “Pseudo-Klassik” or “Klassizismus” of other periods. The 
latter is always based merely on an author’s pious wishes, not reality, and it is a 
“fright” (MdK 70). Hacks admitts that the hasty reader could accuse him, too, of 
Klassizismus. But, as he is quick to point out, theorizing about the play of tomorrow 
and its methodology is not the same as actually penning it; “One may just not write the 
play of tomorrow,” he explains, for that would be to produce something before 
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society was ready for it (ibid). “Proletarian Classicism” is another title he gives to his 
method for “tomorrow,” because it, like “Socialist Classicism,” conveys the 
anticipated overcoming of an old opposition. His explanation is as follows: When 
King Servius Tullius divided the voting population of the Roman society in the 7th 
century BC, he dubbed the poorest division the “proletarii” and the economic upper 
crust “die Klasse,” the latter of which eventually became identified with excellence and 
good taste. In the centuries that followed, these two groups came to represent class 
conflict across the ages in the figures of the exploiters and the exploited, but this 
antagonism is being swiftly defeated in the period of socialism. Accordingly, Hacks’ 
proposal of a “Socialist-Classicist” qua “Proletarian-Classicist” art is the expression of 
the fact that he believes this “ancient wound is healed.” The “sublation of the 
contradiction of productivity and pleasure,” the respective domains of the proletariat 
and the ruling classes, have sanctioned the creation and enjoyment of grand (groß) and 
beautiful classical art (MdK 122). 
 The question that then remains is why Hacks returns to an old form to express 
the radically new events taking place around him, why he believes that “the classical 
mindset has greater chances than that of the innovators,” like Brecht (MdK 122). His 
response is that the great fidelity of the innovators to progress results in a kind of 
closed-mindedness that leads to the confusion of science and art, the dismissal of all 
that preceded them, and the crass desire to simply provide their audience with 
something new (MdK 68). The “classicist,” on the other hand, “has the world’s laws of 
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motion so comfortably under his belt that he is capable of recognizing all driveways to 
progress and of standing on the shoulders of his predecessors and even his enemies.” 
In this sense, the classicist learns from and then “improves” the tradition instead of 
dispensing with it (MdK 112). He undertakes a kind of Bearbeitung (often translated as 
“adaptation,” but better thought of as the process of working on and working over) 
of what precedes him in order to prepare it for a new generation so that they may 
have a sense of their own history and where they came from.  
 In the end, Hacks’ devotion to Classicism is not really about a commitment to 
ancient Greece or the Neoclassical period of the late 18th century; it is concerned 
with building a relationship to history and tradition and the author committing 
himself to the tenet that an understanding of what came before him can serve his 
future and that of his society. In this, Hacks sees himself to be following on the heels 
of authors like Shakespeare (an especially important figure for Hacks), Aeschylus, 
Aristophanes, Lope, Büchner, and Goethe, whom he alignes with the Classical 
tradition, and believes strongly that one must look back in order to move forward.12 
As Wolfgang Emmerich discusses in Kleine Literaturgeschichte der DDR, the East 
German playwrights of this period are deeply occupied with many of these same 
figures, which Emmerich takes as a sign of a search for “the exemplary cases that 
                                                 
12 For more of Hacks’ thoughts on what would count as a classical text and who was a classicist, see 
“Über das Revidieren von Klassikern” (“On the Revision of Classics” 1975), where, for example, he 
defines a “classicist” as “an artist who, calculating from his death on, survived a hundred years” 
(MdK 202).  
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were still topical, that is, for the basic problems of the occidental civilization.” 
Following this statement, Emmerich provides a list of long-respected authors whom 
he pairs with contemporary playwrights; Hacks is matched with Goethe (355).13  
The German Classical tradition specifically is an important touchstone for 
both Hacks and many of his generation. In the 1983 essay, “Trends in Literary 
Reception Coming to Terms with Classicism,” literary critic Patricia Herminghouse 
provides a brief account of the various ways that German Classicism “has been 
drafted into the service of an ideology far removed” from its own. She goes on to use 
the great Goethe as a symbol for the mixed and strained relationship between the 
GDR state, its artists, and the figures of Weimar Classicism, and to detail the various 
“political uses made of this apolitical poet” (273). As she explains, soon after the 
founding of the GDR state in 1949, major figures in the Communist Party from 
Alexander Abusch to Walter Ulbricht and Johannes Becher began “advocating [for] a 
return to the values of classical German humanism […] as the basis for the 
regeneration of a German national culture” in the wake of the horrors of National 
Socialism (274). In a gesture intended to discredit West Germany, the East German 
state eventually positioned itself as the “sole legitimate heir and perpetuator of 
Goethe’s work,” using his “‘classical realism’ […] to fortify the narrow—and often 
insecure—dogmas of Socialist Realism against deviations in form and content” (275). 
                                                 
13 Other author pairings mentioned by Emmerich include recourses to “Schiller ([Volker] Braun), to 
Shakespeare ([Heiner] Müller) and Lenz ([Christoph] Hein), to Don Giovanni ([Karl] Mickel) and 
Chekov (Braun), to Seghers (Müller/Braun) and Alexander Bek (Mickel/Müller)” (355). 
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By the 1970s, however, this acceptance found itself on tenuous ground as writers and 
critics started to question the apparent equivalence between the terms “classicism” 
and “realism” and the use of the former “as a weapon against ‘unacceptable’, 
‘unrealistic’ literature” that was viewed as too experimental (277). 
The East German reception of the Classical tradition, in general, and Goethe, 
in particular, was complicated, a situation which, Herminghouse claims, plays a role of 
central importance in Hacks’ (whom she deems “Goethe’s major advocate”) 1976 
play, Ein Gespräch im Hause Stein über den abwesenden Herrn von Goethe. In her estimation, 
Hacks “portrays Goethe not through the eyes of an artist who has suffered at his 
hands”—and it is true that many writers of the 1970s felt they had—“but through the 
eyes of a representative of the constrictive society at whose hands Goethe had 
suffered” (“Trends” 282). But Hacks is by no means uncritical of Goethe. If anything, 
he faults his predecessor for not being classical enough because the latter was too 
concerned with passing on a specific message. The best example of this comes from 
Hacks’ essay “Saure Feste” (1980), which was published as a companion piece to 
Hacks’ own Bearbeitung of Goethe’s Bearbeitung of a Greek myth about Pandora’s 
husband (Epimetheus), his brother (Prometheus), and their children.14 Even though 
she never appears in it, Goethe named the play Pandora, and he wrote it between 1807 
                                                 
14 Despite the fact that Hacks produced his own Bearbeitung of Goethe’s Pandora, which he published 
in 1979, this analysis will only deal with the literary critical essay “Saure Feste,” because the focus of 
this chapter on Hacks’ theoretical writing and because, as Hacks freely admits, his two vocations of 
theorist and artist were always in conflict. Hacks published two other Bearbeitungen of Goethe’s work 
in addition to Pandora: Moritz Tassow (1961) and Das Jahrmarktsfest zum Plundersweilern (1973). 
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and 1808, only to release released before completion in the journal Prometheus in 1810. 
For this reason his publishers have labeled it a fragment. 
Hacks’ major censure of Goethe’s play is that Pandora provided its audience 
with a clear Lehre, or lesson, rather than a provocation to think. Despite its unfinished 
status, Hacks feels the play is indeed complete. As he maintains, “All questions that 
the play raises are answered in the play” (“Saure Feste” 101). The primary conflict 
Goethe provides and eventually resolves is between the brothers Prometheus and 
Epimetheus who symbolizes “the life of action and the life of observation,” 
respectively (ibid). The latter spends the majority of the play dreaming about the past 
and longing for the return of his wife, Pandora, who left him and took one of their 
twin daughters with her. He has cloudy vision of the present, because he is haunted by 
the ghosts of his loved ones, and he is virtually impotent when his daughter, 
Epimeleia’s lover (Prometheus’ son, Phileros) attacks her physically. Prometheus, 
however, exudes all the strength that his brother lacks. Much is made of the concrete 
payoff of his labor, of his leadership skills, and of his productivity. He is firmly rooted 
in the present and can assess any given situation thoroughly and with clear eyes.  
Despite the fact that it is unfinished, Goethe’s play appears to conform well 
to the main tenets of classical model of drama. It satisfies the neoclassical 
interpretation of Aristotle’s dicta of the unity of action (it stages one primary plot), 
place (it takes place in a single—if divided—landscape), and time (it comprises fewer 
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than 24 hours) (Poetics).15 The plot is straightforward and works through the abstract 
conflict between action and mere contemplation, practice and theory, in the figures of 
Prometheus and Epimetheus, respectively, and their different attitudes towards life 
and strategies for helping their children fix the misunderstanding between them. All 
the conflict is stirred up over the course of a single night, but it is eventually worked 
out in the final few pages of the play as dawn fast approaches and sheds proverbial 
light on the matter. At this point Epimetheus begins to lets go of his hope that his 
wife will return and actually contend with the reality before his eyes. Some of this 
change comes at his brother’s encouragement, for Prometheus is more pragmatic and 
has no fear of facing the present, that is, contending with what dawn’s light will reveal. 
Prometheus does, however, have little interest in trying to imagine what tomorrow 
could be like. But by the end of the play, he at least recognizes that this narrow 
perspective is limiting, and he admires the two figures who come to represent the 
promise of the future: the young couple, Epimeleia and Phileros, who are united after 
divine intervention saves them from great tragedy and able to end their potentially 
fatal, but nevertheless minor, quarrel. 
Hacks’ major complaint with Goethe’s play is that his sense that the great 
poet is overly concerned with proving a single point. Goethe depicts “only truths, no 
                                                 
15 The stage in Goethe’s play represents one setting, but it is divided down the middle, with each 
brother assigned a “side” specifically designed for him. Prometheus’ is craggy and mountainous, 
unsymmetrical and crude. Epimetheus’ side wooden and hilly, “well-cultivated” and stocked with 
fruit-bearing trees (Pandora 3-4). 
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realities,” in Hacks’ opinion, and his figures are characterized only by predetermined 
desires and behaviors rather than the experiences they go through. (Prometheus is the 
one exception to this, as he opens his mind to the future at the end of the play; still, 
any active anticipation of or desire to “make” that future is left to the young people.) 
Developing the characters and situations more fully and presenting them with greater 
depth would have allowed them the opportunity to become conscious of their dreams 
or motivations and be self-reflexive in a way that would have also been encouraging to 
Goethe’s audience (“Saure Feste” 126-127). Goethe’s play is so burdened by its 
content and the point it wants to make that it can only “be thought with,” he explains, 
“not lived with” “Es läßt sich mitdenken, nicht mitleben” (127).  
To buttress these criticisms, Hacks offers a few corrections for improving 
Goethe’s play. One suggestion involves the transformation of the groups of workers 
in Goethe’s play, who appear a few times to wildly praise Prometheus, into a proper 
and less obviously partisan chorus that would serve as a single-voiced commentator 
on and guide through the action of the text. The second recommendation is to 
develop further the potential struggle within Prometheus that appears at the very end 
when he first allows himself to look towards the future; Hacks reads this as the 
potential conflict between “constructive grasp (Griff) and potentially harmful 
anticipation (Vorgriff),” and delving deeper into it would have prevented Prometheus 
from serving as a mere bearer of a single meaning and return him to the status of a 
great mythical hero that he is, struggles and all (“Saure Feste” 135).  
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For Hacks, more attention to this latter conflict specifically would make 
Pandora more efficacious as a pedagogical play, which it clearly is, because it would 
allow for the “Mitleben” that he found sorely missing in Pandora. Because the more 
primary conflict of the play (between Epimetheus and Prometheus) is ultimately 
resolved and subsumed by a third term (Phileros/Epimeleia), as it were, the expansion 
of the different layers of Prometheus would permit the audience to experience his 
inner world more deeply and thereby enhance both the I-Wert of the play, in their 
understanding of his and their own private motivations, and the U-Wert, in his visions 
of that “potentially harmful” future. Doing so would also have the consequence of 
providing the audience with enough material for them to not only “live with,” but also 
make their own decisions about the character of Prometheus. 
According to Hacks, improving Pandora in these critical respects would mean 
that the play would have to be turned into an “Ideendrama,” which he defined as a 
“drama that is allowed to put forth ideas.” Calling a play an “Ideendrama” does not 
mean that it simply presents of a “ton of ideas”; the label has to do with the way that 
ideas are presented, namely, as open and provocative questions rather than closed and 
predetermined positions. Hacks asserts that Pandora could advance in a more 
favorable and, frankly, useful direction if only the spotlight were put on Prometheus. 
The play would then have the capacity to dramatize and poeticize a “fight within a 
fable of the spirit” instead of in the actual words or other more heavy-handed plot 
points (e.g., the back and forth between the brothers) of the play. The audience of the 
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“Drama of Ideas” must be unencumbered and come to these thoughts on their own, 
“without letting actual events concern or strain them.” When such an execution is 
successful, the viewers “permit” the provocative issues latent in the play to come 
forward as the viewers recognize them. Because Hacks believes his audience to be 
advanced and well educated, he expects that, in his own Bearbeitung, they would grasp 
the form of the struggle between Griff and Vorgriff that Prometheus begins to grapple 
with at the end, and they would be able to do so without it being mentioned explicitly. 
This is because they would recognize it as similar to the higher-level struggles that 
they and their own society are also working to overcome. Now, for the first time and 
“from the standpoint of mature socialism[,] there is the possibility” both in the play 
and in society “to rewrite the unity between action and plan.” This is a unity Goethe 
fallaciously and prematurely imposed on his play in the figures of Phileros and 
Epimeleia and one that could be corrected by simply expanding earnestly on 
Prometheus’ various formal dialectical exercises (“Saure Feste” 136-137). (It is likely 
efforts like this that led Emmerich to label Hacks a “self-stylized socialist Goethe” 
(335).16) 
To the extent that Goethe’s play answers all of the questions that it raises, it is 
a complete, unified, and balanced classical work. Yet, also to the extent that it answers 
                                                 
16 Hacks is certainly not shy when it came to comparing himself to Goethe. As Margy Gerber notes 
in an essay on his Moritz Tassow, “In a 1974 interview with Manfred Durzak [from the FAZ], Hacks 
compared the development of his own artistic style with that of Goethe from Sturm und Drang to 
Klassik.” Because “Tasso is a transitional figure in Goethe’s work, […] Hacks’ latter-day Tasso was 
to do the same, marking his development from ‘revolutionary’ playwright to socialist classicist” 
(312). 
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all of the questions it raises, Hacks views Pandora as too didactic and thus not classical 
enough for its own good. Hacks believes that Goethe strayed from the imperative 
that, in classical art, including Socialist Classicism, “The artist should refrain from all 
contrariness, all antagonism and condemnation, anything which merely negates, 
because that is unproductive” (Essays on Art and Literature 210).17 This quotation is 
actually drawn from Goethe’s “Noch ein Wort für junge Dichter” (“Further Advice 
for Young Poets”), and it implicitly addresses the important difference between an 
artwork that tells the audience what to believe by presenting its subject matter as black 
and white and one that stimulates its audience through the illustration of “productive” 
conflicts.  
Like Hacks, Goethe believes that art should reflect not morality, but rather 
the unique and ever-developing intellectual and emotional attitude (Haltung) of the 
artist towards the outside world that inspires him to create something in the first place 
(Essays 210). He is able to bridge the “enormous chasm” between nature and art 
through the careful study of nature and the meticulous selection of the “best from 
[the] good” in it (81). His style, moreover, should be the concretization of this very 
                                                 
17 The most of the following citations of Goethe are from the John Gearey (ed.) and Ellen von 
Nardroff (trans.) English-language collection, Essays on Art and Literature (1986). In addition to 
“Noch ein Wort” (208-209), the essays cited include “Einfache Nachahmung der Natur, Manier, 
Stil” (“Simple Imitation, Manner, and Style” 71-74), “Einleitung in die Propyläen” (“Introduction to 
the Propylaea” 78-90), and “Über die Wahrheit und Wahrscheinlichkeit der Kunstwerke” (“On 
Realism in Art” 74-78). The remainder is made up of quotations from Maximen und Reflexionen, 
selections of which were published in English under the title “Aphorisms on Art and Art History” 
are taken from the volume, German aesthetic and literary criticism (1984). All of these German-language 
texts can be found in Goethes Werke vol. 12, Hamburger Ausgabe edited by Erich Trunz (1982). 
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point of view, i.e. of how he makes sense of the world and what he sees as true in it. 
After he “finally reaches the point where he becomes increasingly familiar with the 
characteristic and essential features of things,” the artist “will now be able to see some 
order in the multiplicity of appearances” that he encounters everyday, and then he will 
be able to capture the beautiful totality of life because he will be able to show how 
various parts of nature “fit” together (72). His unique talent is precisely that he is able 
to see reality as the organic whole that it is during a classical age (as Goethe and Hacks 
believe), and, accordingly, the art that he creates comes to stand for nothing less than 
the “highest achievement of mankind” (ibid). The moment he selects an object to 
represent, “he imbues it with a higher value,” for as he molds this raw material, “the 
boundaries of harmony, greatness, significance, and completeness are drawn” (84). 
In Goethe’s understanding, which parallels Hacks’, the artist achieves 
perfection in his representation of a possible reality—possible because he knows it is 
merely his vision of the world’s harmonious operation—in the form of a unified, 
“organic whole” (Essays 81). This perfection could also be presented as the synthesis 
of the idea and nature, and it is what confers beauty on the artwork (“Aphorisms” 
229). In order to experience this beauty, viewers allow the artwork to engage them for 
a time, for only then will they be available enough to be touched by it both 
emotionally and intellectually. This experience is akin to one of identification, and it 
can set the stage for the beautiful artwork to take the opportunity to encourage its 
viewers to aspire to greater things than they ever have before. “The great work of art,” 
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Goethe emphasizes, “restrains feelings and imagination, it robs us of our free choice, 
and so we cannot deal with it as we please. We are compelled to submit to it so that it 
can give us back to ourselves, elevated and enhanced” (85).  The effect of a masterful 
work of art is thus that it prepares its audience to see all of the possible greatness and 
beauty in nature because the audience has been shown the artist’s great 
representations of these qualities in nature. Consequently, the artwork trains them not 
only to recognize that which is put before them as complete and perfect, but also to 
“perceive in the smallest fragment [in nature] the vanished splendor of the whole” 
(87). They can then carry this skill with them into the world, poeticizing (in Hacks’ 
term) all that is around them and imagining the great possibilities latent in the 
quotidian.18 
Insofar as Goethe maintains that works of art that are able to communicate 
successfully with their audience “give man such a feeling of confidence and instill in 
him such a sense of serenity and freedom,” Hacks does not seem to have strayed too 
far from his predecessor (Essays 88). To substitute “die Größe” for “confidence” and 
“I-Wert and U-Wert” for “serenity and freedom” would be to say the same thing, but 
in Hacks’ terminology. Hacks and Goethe additionally agree that this kind of 
                                                 
18 It seems prudent to acknowledge that all of Goethe’s talk about seeing the whole from its parts 
may at times sound closer to a romantic idea of the truth-art relation than to a classical one. Two 
points must be kept in mind when distinguishing the Neoclassical Goethe from the Frühromantiker: 
(1) he did not believe that truth was found in art, but rather that the truth of nature could be 
represented in art; and (2) his conception of the “whole” or even “ideal” was actually achievable in 
art, whereas the Frühromantiker viewed it as what one should aspire to, but could never reach (as long 
as one is mortal, cf. Romantic irony and Vera Pavlovna in Chto delat’?). 
 133 
successful communication would be ultimately contingent upon the audience, namely, 
how intellectually developed they already were before experiencing the artwork. For 
Hacks, a popular/proletarian classicism was possible because he is convinced that the 
East German public is advanced enough to appreciate it and be inspired by it; 
however, the late 18th-, early 19th-century bourgeois audience for the art that Goethe 
encouraged was far more diverse, enjoying different levels of sophistication, 
education, and even access to that art. The consequence of this was that not everyone 
from Goethe’s time was able, in Hacks’ opinion, to “share with the true artist the 
flight to a higher level” (76). (Perhaps this unfortunate fact is in the forefront of 
Goethe’s mind as he pens the all too heavy-handed Pandora.) 
For Goethe as well as Hacks, a classical work of art is able to activate the 
minds and emotions of sophisticated viewers in its depiction of the classical artist’s 
Haltung of the outside reality. In the artwork’s harmonious and balanced presentation, 
the artist’s mind shapes and organizes the raw material of everyday life in order to 
represent nature truthfully. His “poetic” or “poeticized” image is a portrayal of “not 
things that have happened” or mere copies of events, “but things that may happen, 
i.e. that are possible in accordance with probability or necessity.” This is a position 
that can take us all the way back to Aristotle’s Poetics. In the fragments that remain, the 
philosopher also argues that art must be seen as an artist’s expression of how he 
understands the outside world. Insofar as this theory is true for the classical schema, 
the artwork must necessarily illustrate not just what is, as the historian does, but rather 
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what could be. In this tradition art is, after all, a fiction, even as it represents the truth, 
because the actual truth is never immanent to it. This modal shift from the indicative 
to the conditional also means that, for Aristotle as well as for Goethe and the always 
abstracting Hacks, art is the domain of the universal (the particular, on the other 
hand, belongs to history), and this is exactly what Aristotle believes makes art 
“philosophical,” subjecting its audience to mental exercises that both delight and 
educate them (51a37ff, 48b9ff). As they engage with the poetic whole of a given 
artwork, the viewers “learn as they observe and infer what each thing is” and what 
role each part plays through their intellectual and emotional identification of what is 
presented with what they already know and the cathartic discharge of all the energies 
wrapped up with that experience (48b9ff). As Badiou writes, for classical thinkers 
“Art has a therapeutic function, and not at all a cognitive or revelatory one” because it 
relies on the viewer’s recognition of and concomitant working through what is in the 
artwork. 
 
Hacks’ explicit explanation for his recursion into the literary critical tradition to adopt 
an method and theory of art many centuries old is clear: if a classical age, like the 
period of GDR socialism that arrived after the sublation of the class antagonisms of 
capitalism, is to be represented truthfully and with all of its attending hopes about the 
future, it can only be represented in a grand classical form. Behind this, however, 
appears to be yet another explanation extending from his commitment to working 
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with that which appears to be stuck under the heading of the “das Unveränderliche,” 
meaning the unchangeable or the immutable. Hacks is far from comfortable with any 
stable categories, and he fears the fossilization of many of the natural objects of art, 
like landscapes, seasons, meteorological events, that is, things that are “outside of the 
grasp (Zugriff) of history, unrecorded by the category of becoming,” and, as a result, 
turns into clichés. But Hacks also sees potential in adopting these old words and 
symbols in a contemporary context. For one, it would prevent artists from relying too 
heavily on the “new,” as he feels the disciples of science (those, like himself, who 
were engaged with epic theatre, for example)  had.  Second, “Words, like things, must 
encamp in order to become poetic,” he explains, so they must be around for long 
enough that they have come to enjoy “a kind of simplicity” that is less complicated 
than the newer material around them. Rather than finding that they become so 
familiar that they also become invisible to viewers or readers, Hacks believes that the 
Unveränderlichen could actually find themselves to be more “vivid” when introduced in 
unusual ways and that they would “compel the audience to see the old as well as the 
new in the object” (MdK 144-145). 
I submit that Hacks’ return to the literary canon can be understood through a 
similar logic. Hacks implores the artists of time to adopt for their new context the old 
style and form of ostensibly staid, Unveränderlichen classicism so that they can prepare 
their audiences to recognize fully the great significance of the fact that they, too, live 
in a classical period, one that is both radically new and yet familiar. In this sense, the 
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audience of the Socialist-Classicist artwork comes to see not only the renewed tropes 
in the artwork, but even their own society, as poetic, they thereby come to imagine all 
that is possible in their remarkable new world. 
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CHAPTER 3 
 
MÜLLER’S OPEN DIALECTIC AND  
THE ANTI-LESSON OF THE LEHRSTÜCK 
 
Heiner Müller’s explosive play Mauser was written in 1970, some 21 years after 
the German Democratic Republic (GDR) had been founded, but was not performed 
until 1975 in Austin, Texas. The key problems raised by the play as well as its 
Lehrstück (learning or teaching play) form, were, however, already familiar to the 
German theatre community, as Mauser drew heavily on Bertolt Brecht’s Die Maßnahme 
(The Measures Taken 1930-31), a controversial work in its own right.1 Like Peter Hacks’ 
1979 adaptation of Goethe’s Pandora (1807-08), the motivations for which were 
discussed in the previous chapter, Müller’s play puts him in a dialectical relationship 
with his predecessor, taking a great deal from him while also reworking and revising 
Brecht’s work for a new time and new audience that had recently been turned against 
the latter author.2 For his part, Hacks believed that the GDR of the 1960s and ‘70s 
was enjoying the arrival of actually existing socialism, and this state of affairs 
encouraged him to create whole and balanced classical works of art that were to 
reflect the increasingly harmonious society around him and thereby inspire his viewers 
to imagine and even aim for a similar kind of greatness. Müller, it is safe to say, 
                                                 
1 The version of Die Maßnahme to be discussed here is from 1931. 
2 For more on the shift in the reception of Brecht in the GDR in the 1970s, see David Bathrick’s 
“The Dialectics of Legitimation: Brecht in the DDR,” New German Critique 2 (1974), 90-103. 
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disagreed strongly both with Hacks’ assessment of East Germany and with his 
classical artistic methodology. While Hacks basked in the achievements of a society 
that he believed had resolved (or would shortly resolve) all class conflicts, Müller was 
more concerned with the antagonisms that remained or had arisen in the post-
revolutionary GDR. In Mauser, they come to the fore most boldly and prominently in 
the Müller’s interrogations of the status of the individual relative to the party or 
collective and the significance of this relation vis-à-vis the individual’s knowledge or 
consciousness. 
 Like the other works discussed in this dissertation, Müller’s principle aim in 
staging these tensions in Mauser was pedagogically motivated. However, the 
knowledge or truth of the play or of other Lehrstücke, for that matter, is not just the 
theory of historical materialism that is championed in Gorky’s Mat’ and that hastens 
the creation of Hacks’ Socialist Classicism. More importantly, for Müller it is the 
opportunity or call to investigate the consequences of class struggle from a post-
revolutionary perspective. It is, in fact, potentially misleading to say that there is any 
truth in the play at all. As a Brechtian Lehrstück, the goal of Mauser is not to impart a 
specific message, but rather to introduce, facilitate, and encourage a way of acting and 
thinking; its related Truth, then—related because it is made possible by these new 
behaviors—is that reality is “changeable” (Brecht, “Realistisches Theater und 
Illusion” “Realistic Theatre and Illusion” 25: 176). Consequently, Müller’s play draws 
on Brecht’s model in order to offer yet another viable literary alternative to the mode 
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of Socialist Realism that predominantly relegated art to the position of a vehicle for 
the communication of the single doctrine of Marxist-Leninism.3  
The unidirectional pedagogical model of Socialist Realism closes the artwork 
off from its audience and keeps them in the same purely passive and consumptive role 
that is characteristic of their position in capitalist society. The Lehrstück model, on the 
other hand, offers an alternative in which the performers are the primary intended 
beneficiaries of the artistic experience. As “students,” the actors are encouraged to 
learn by engaging with the play self-reflexively and productively. The truth—again, 
not a fixed message, but a perspective or way of looking at the world—that they take 
away with them after a performance is an external one that has been both imported 
into the content and reflected in the dialectical formal structures as well as an internal 
one produced in the labor of the actors as they stage the play.  
These are two fundamentally different ways of understanding the relationship 
between art and Truth. One is didactic, like Socialist Realism, and one is quasi-
romantic, accepting that art itself can produce Truth. To be clear, I have no intention 
of saying that the Lehrstück model necessarily leads to the production of works of art 
whose truths are romantic and/or didactic in content, even though there are 
                                                 
3 Any details of Socialist Realism beyond its explicit didactic aesthetic commitments will not be 
discussed here largely because they have already been addressed in previous sections and the cultural 
politics of the policy have little concrete effect on the issues that are the focus of this chapter (other 
than the admittedly significant fact that Mauser was banned in the GDR when it was first written). 
For more on the young Müller’s relationship to Socialist Realism in works like Der Lohndrücker (The 
Scab 1956), Die Korrektur (The Correction 1957), and Die Umsiedlerin (The Resettler 1961), see “Müller as 
Mayakovsky” in Jonathan Kalb’s The Theatre of Heiner Müller (1998). 
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undoubtedly failed Lehrstücke that are dogmatic and authoritarian. I am instead making 
the claim that the underlying aesthetic theories about the art-Truth relation that 
support this method are formally romantic and didactic: the open truth that Lehrstück 
is supposed to communicate and make possible is both imposed on the play from the 
outside and produced in the development and experience of the play itself. The 
attempt to bring these two schemata together is what Badiou in “Art and Philosophy” 
says defines the avant-garde project at its most general level (8).  
It might seem to have been tricky for the avant-garde to have been pulled in 
two directions, and Badiou even believes that this naïve double allegiance is what 
doomed the avant-garde project to failure. This fate could even be said to have 
befallen Die Maßnahme, a critique made most clear when Brecht’s play is read alongside 
Müller’s revision. David Bathrick and others have observed that Mauser is “on a 
structural level a purer rendering of the Lehrstück aesthetic,” but I will take this 
statement further over the course of the following pages.  
Compared with Müller’s open and incessantly turning dialectical play and 
paradoxes, Die Maßnahme seems to simply acquiesce to its own didactic operations by 
closing off some of the creative and productive options made possible by the 
Lehrstück method and form. Mauser, however, makes Brecht’s play more Brechtian—a 
daring feat, considering his compromised position as an avant-garde, ostensibly vulgar 
materialist in the 1970s in the GDR—and, in so doing, presents a provocative 
alternative to Socialist Realism. It offers an example of an avant-garde form of 
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education through literature that allows for the artwork to serve as a carrier and 
producer of meaning, and hence it exhibits a seemingly contradictory commitment to 
competing aesthetic theories that respectively claim that Truth is external and 
immanent to the artwork. In the avant-garde spirit of finding Truth both outside and 
inside of art, I will examine Brecht’s own Lehrstück theory as well as Die Maßnahme and 
Mauser in the following analysis. 
 
Brecht: From Epic to Lehrstück 
In the first major monograph to be published on Heiner Müller in English, theatre 
scholar and critic Jonathan Kalb claims that “Brecht is Müller’s primary influence, a 
figure that stands behind all of his other alter egos and tactical masks” (The Theatre of 
Heiner Müller 23). Despite the fact that they had never worked together closely and 
that Müller’s ideas certainly developed a great deal over the course of his life, “there 
was no time after the 1950s when he was not consciously imitating, apostrophizing, or 
criticizing him” and his theory of the theatre (23). In 1980, Müller even claimed that 
“to use Brecht without criticizing him is betrayal” (qtd. in Kalb 24). This is precisely 
what will be proven to have been at work in Müller’s revision of Die Maßnahme, for 
even at his most reverent—evident in Mauser’s close devotion to the Lehrstück method 
and form—the student is unfailingly critical of his teacher.  
In The Powers of Speech, Bathrick makes the case that that, around 1975, a 
growing rift between long-dead Brecht and Müller, his self-styled “heir apparent,” is 
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detectable, as the latter comes to view the former’s dramatic theory as increasingly 
irrelevant for having “forfeit[ed] a radical subjectivity […] essential for a socialist 
society.” To leave out the subject, Müller believed, would be to assume the position of 
apologist for the authoritarian state (101-102, 94). While this sentiment does already 
seem to be taking shape in Mauser, prior to 1975, Müller was more or less on-board 
with (though, once again, not uncritical of) Brecht’s program for theatre, and Mauser 
but one of his most explicit engagements with it. Two of the other more prominent 
literary representations of this relationship are the plays Philoktet (Philoctetes 1958) and 
Der Horatier (The Horatian 1968), which together with Mauser make up Müller’s self-
proclaimed “Versuchsreihe” (experimental series) and “presupposed/criticized 
Brecht’s Lehrstück theory and praxis” (Mauser 68).4  
The conception of the Lehrstück with which Müller worked is one that Brecht 
had derived from his own theory of the so-called “epic theatre.” The aim of epic 
theatre is to provide a radical alternative and response to what Brecht identified as 
bourgeois dramatic theatre, which he viewed as propagating a consumptive, “culinary” 
style of art only concerned with pleasing the audience and providing them with 
entertainment. As he explained in “Vergnügungstheater oder Lehrtheater?” (“Theatre 
for Pleasure or Theatre for Education?” 1930), the key difference between the two 
has to do with their different “method[s] of construction” (22: 107). Dramatic theatre, 
                                                 
4 In Kleine Literaturgeschichte der DDR, Wolfgang Emmerich argues that Philoktet is Mauser in parable 
form, and he founds it with the claim that the two plays as taking on the same two central themes 
pitting (1) Realpolitik against humanist communism and (2) State reason against the individual (275). 
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in seeking to pleasure and distract its viewers from their everyday lives, allows itself to 
be formed and commodified by the conservative apparatuses in society, whereas epic 
theatre works to dismantle those same apparatuses by interrogating more broadly the 
function of art in society, i.e., how it works and what effects it has (“The Modern 
Theatre is the Dramatic Theatre” 1930, 34-35). Unlike Peter Hacks’ theory of Socialist 
Classicism, which was designed to formally reflect and serve the nascent and future 
socialist society, Brecht’s epic theatre was responsible to “the bourgeois society of the 
present, and its goal [was] to expose the hidden contradictions within that society” via 
a provocative, pedagogical staged works of art (Carlson, Theories of the Theatre 384). 
The form of the play is thus decisive both for understanding the work’s 
relationship to the establishment and, as a consequence, its relationship to its 
audience. The key differences—which Brecht explains are “changes of emphasis” or 
“shifts of accent”—between the dramatic and epic theatre forms are worked out over 
the two essays mentioned above. The spectator of dramatic theatre is engrossed by a 
series of events that he desperately wants to identify with and that can affect him at an 
immediate, emotional level. This is possible because of the superficiality of the play. 
Characters, for example, are shallowly depicted and static, and the plots that unfold 
around them are subject to an “evolutionary determinism” that produces an 
unstoppable momentum pulling the play forward linearly and placing all of its 
emphasis on the end of the action. Because he is always waiting for the final reveal or 
resolution, the spectator of dramatic theatre is made more and more passive over the 
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course of the play. The spectator of epic theatre, however, is increasingly aroused by the 
narrative presented to him. Because he is not caught up in trying to ascertain what will 
have happened by the end of the performance, he can focus on events as they take 
place, on their processes, and in that way see how the world presented before him 
changes and grasp the fact his world is also changeable. He is in a position where he 
can follow arguments for various positions that are presented, and he can consciously 
reflect on the parallels between the play and his own life. In so doing, he is forced to 
study the “picture of the world” that he is confronted with and make decisions about 
it. All of this is made possible by the montage form of epic theatre whereby the events 
of the play run in curves rather than a straight line and jump from one scene to the 
next without necessarily being developmentally connected (“Modern Theatre” 37, 
“Vergnügungstheater” 22: 109).  
Epic theatre demands that its viewers are active and thinking while the 
“observe” (not watch) the play, and it expects that when the curtain falls, they will 
break into discussion with one another, “forced as it were to cast [their] vote[s]” on 
what they have just seen. This kind of provocation, Brecht stated clearly, is “theatre’s 
social function” (“Modern Theatre” 39). Still, it need not come at the expense of all 
the pleasure or enjoyment that the theatre can provide, Brecht was careful to say. Like 
the dramatic form, the epic form must supply “some kind of palliative” to help the 
audience deal with the struggles they face every day, but the escape that it provides 
must be kept in check.  
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According to Marvin Carlson, Brecht’s concern that epic theatre became too 
focused on pleasure led him to overcompensate for his “slip” by devoting his efforts 
towards the development of the Lehrstück method in the 1930s. He was worried that 
the audience’s expectations for mindless entertainment might prevent the theatre 
from realizing its radical potential. Even in a brief note at the end of “Modern 
Theatre,” he explains that, in the three years that had passed he wrote the opera that 
had occasioned the essay, “attempts were made to emphasize the didactic more and 
more at the expense of the culinary element” (42). As Carlson explains, the Lehrstück 
satisfied Brecht’s “desire to explore the possibilities of a true socialist theatre for a 
future period when compromise forms [like the epic] would no longer be necessary” 
and theatre could focus solely on its “social function” as a facilitator of learning and 
education (384).  
To these ends, Brecht conceived as the Lehrstück as a play with a pedagogical 
purpose. Although the term means literally teaching (from lehren) play, Brecht’s own 
theories of the Lehrstück form suggest that a more fitting name for his invention might 
be Lern-stück, or learning (from lernen) play. The theory of the Lehrstück is scattered 
throughout a few short essays and fragments that Brecht wrote around 1930, the same 
period during which he was formulating his views on epic theatre. At its grandest 
level, the function of the Lehrstück is similar to that of the epic form, that is, its intent 
is not merely to “explain, but also to change” the world by provoking thought, 
discussion, and eventually concrete action in its “students” (“Vergnügungstheater” 22: 
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110). In the estimation of scholar Reiner Steinweg, whose work, including Lehrstück 
und episches Theater (Lehrstück and Epic Theatre 1995), comprises the definitive studies 
of the form, this coincidence of explanation and change is, in fact, the principle tenet 
of Brecht’s theory. Of greatest significance here is the point that the Lehrstück works 
to achieve these results not by providing the audience with answers, which is to say by 
“teach[ing] ‘Marxism’ or another philosophy/social theory,” but rather by showing its 
students “how to more precisely see reality” as mutable (19).  
The Lehrstück is intended to serve as a guide toward a certain kind of thinking 
and a certain kind of consciousness, rather than as a mere opportunity to instill a 
specific lesson. The distinction between a text that indoctrinates and a text that 
provides an educative or eye-opening experience is a crucial one for understanding 
Brecht’s Lehrstück. In their article “Producing Revolution” (1976), David Bathrick and 
Andreas Huyssen identify this as the primary difference between a pedagogical 
method that calls for object lessons and one that calls for example lessons. In an 
object lesson a specific principle or truth is given directly to the student and is 
expected to be accepted without reflection. An example lesson, however, is far less 
straightforward and involves the “demonstration of a process of contradictions” that 
must be “play[ed] through” in order to be discovered, recognized, and understood. 
The aim of the former is to “learn from” the concrete examples that are offered, while 
the aim of the latter is to learn “by actively reproducing” the examples, to “learn 
through them” in a “critical trying out of behavior” (111).  
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This is, once again, the difference between a Lehrstück true to its name—a 
play with an object, a play that teaches—and a Lehrstück qua Lern-stück—a play with an 
example, one through which a participant learns through practice, rumination, and 
experience. Therein lies the major innovation of this form. Whereas the educative 
tools of epic theatre are trained on audience members who are expected to work 
through the material that is presented to them, here these tools are trained primarily 
on the performers of the play. But by “performers” Brecht did not mean professional 
actors, he means lay people, i.e. workers, who are enlisted to act. In the process of 
performing, they learn and become “students.” As he emphasized in “Die Grosse und 
die Kleine Pädagogik” (“The Great and the Small Pedagogy” 1930), the Lehrstück 
“completely changes the role of playing (Rolle des Spielens). It sublates the system of the 
actor and the spectator” so that those involved are both the performers of and the 
ones who benefit/learn from the performance (21: 396). 
To step back for a moment, it is important to recognize that underlying this 
theory “is the expectation that the actors can be socially influenced through the 
execution of particular behaviors, the adoption of particular attitudes, the rendering of 
particular speech, etc.” (“Zur Theorie des Lehrstücks” “On the Theory of the 
Lehrstück” 1937, 22: 351). For example, the experience of acting like a child by 
straining one’s voice and body language as a child does when he attempts to be 
understood clearly can help the actor to grasp what is going on in the mind of a child: 
“Just as moods and series of thoughts can lead to attitudes and gestures,” so “attitudes 
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and gestures can also lead to moods and series of thoughts” (“Zur Theorie des 
Lehrstücks” “On the Theory of the Lehrstück” 1930, 21: 397).5 In Brecht’s estimation, 
the mere experience of behaving like someone else has a certain radical potential, 
especially for non-professionals who, he insists, “must stay lay people” in the roles 
that they play so that they can bring their own experiences to bear on them.  
The chief formal distinction of the Lehrstück is that the worker-actors are 
called to cycle through various roles over the course of the play, and ideally this 
happens at their own discretion, according to their own judgment. The point this is to 
provide them with an opportunity to act as if they were another person, to see 
through their eyes and share their experiences, as much as that is possible. Therefore, 
the play itself is a “frame in which one can discover and try out new possibilities of 
behavior” (Steinweg 19). At one moment the worker-actor may speak for the vulgar 
Communist party, and at the next she may champion a kind of bourgeois humanism. 
Accordingly, the pedagogical goal of this rotation is not merely to expose the actors to 
different perspectives, but rather to compel them to perform contradictory ones. As 
they do so, they must work through both intellectually (“series of thoughts”) and 
instinctively (“moods”) the real, everyday struggles in their society by occupying and 
then playing through these antagonistic positions. 
This is a collective effort. One actor does not a Lehrstück make. The 
                                                 
5 For more on these exercises, see “Über die Aufführung von Lehrstücken” (“On the Performance 
of Lehrstücken” 1930, 21: 397). 
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production necessarily involves a number of worker-performers who collaborate on 
the play as they decide how to assign and exchange roles and thereby learn from each 
other’s experiences and assist in the creation of new ones together on stage. When all 
of these parts come together in a production, the rotating form of the Lehrstück causes 
the actors to recognize the connection between their particular experiences of 
conflict, those of their peers, and the structure of conflict more generally (Steinweg 
19). As the players perform a Lehrstück by embodying different character types, 
particular socio-historical contradictions are laid bare through this experience: the 
actors learn about the contradictions in society, and they learn to see the deeper social 
structures that are at the root of their individual troubles. Yet still more significantly, 
however, they also learn a form of dialectical thinking that will help them see these 
contradictions even once they leave the theater and return to the city streets. Their 
consciousness, in other words, will have been raised through this group effort, and 
they will have been radicalized through this collective behavioral exercise in a way that 
has the potential to change their behavior outside of the theater, as well. 
As Brecht noted, “The Lehrstück teaches through the fact that it is played, not 
seen” (“Theorie” 22: 351). The experience of working through its formal 
requirements puts the actors in the position of confronting a manifold of possibilities 
in what Steinweg calls a “mind/spirit athletics” (18). This exercise allows them to 
engage with and reflect on the particular concerns of various characters in various 
situations. In their efforts to stage the play, the actors thus learn to overcome what 
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Brecht lamented as the philosopher-politician divide of Taylorized bourgeois society, 
which cedes the domain of thought to the philosopher and action to the politician. 
According to Brecht, this is a false distinction because “There is no difference 
between true philosophy and true politics,” and it is even in the interest of society and 
the state to support the development of well rounded, well socialized citizens by 
encouraging the active engagement of those who would prefer to sit back and the 
careful meditations of those who tend to act before they think. To this end, the 
greatest measure and most significant social contribution of theatre, as Brecht 
maintains, is as an educator that can provide a stage for just this kind of civil project: 
“Beauty does not decide the value of a sentence or a gesture or a plot, but rather [it is 
decided by] whether or not the state has a use for it” (“Theorie der Pädagogien” 
“Theory of the Pedagogies” 1930, 21: 398). 
With the transition from epic theatre to Lehrstück, the pedagogical stress shifts 
from Mitdenken (thinking with) to Mitspielen (playing or acting with). Those to be 
educated are not mere consumers; they are part of the work of art. To the extent that 
they bring their own stories to bear on a play that already carries with it a truth built 
into the performance by the author for the benefit of the worker-actors, the Lehrstück 
is a didactic educational exercise. But the fact that the real lesson of a Lehrstück can 
only be achieved through a collective performance and the fact that this lesson cannot 
be divorced from the experience of producing the artwork suggests that there is some 
other, non-didactic and perhaps immanent way that the Lehrstück form generates its 
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own meaning and Purpose. 
Examples will help to draw this relationship out further. Brecht’s Lehrstück 
period lasted roughly from 1926 to 1933 and included a reinterpretation of Gorky’s 
Mat’ as Die Mutter (1930-31), as well as Der Jasager/Der Neinsager (He Said Yes, He Said 
No 1929-30), Die Ausnahme und die Regel (The Exception and the Rule ca. 1930), and Die 
Horatier und die Kuratier (The Horatians and the Curiatians 1933-34), the last of which was 
based on a Roman legend that Heiner Müller also adapted as Der Horatier. Müller’s 
reworking of Brecht’s Die Maßnahme is the focus of this chapter because both plays 
follow closely to the Lehrstück form and put their actors through the same dialectical 
exercises, and given these constants, this comparison will bring the operations of each 
play into stronger relief. Brecht’s work will prove to fall short as a Lehrstück by fixing 
the educative and productive conflicts in it. With a concession and the pull of a 
trigger, the dialectic at the heart of his play is resolved and its contradictions are 
sublated in the achievement of the revolution. As a result, Die Maßnahme proves to be 
a dramatic piece with a message that is true to the Lehrstück name, but not to its spirit 
as a learning play. Müller’s text, however, leaves the dialectic open, and Mauser’s 
pedagogical effect is less didactic and more resourceful with respect to the potential of 
art as art. In the end, this comparison helps to demonstrate how Müller’s adaptation 
of Brecht’s method and form provides a politically viable and useful alternative to 
Socialist Realism as well as a forceful rejoinder to the Party’s didacticism. 
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Die Maßnahme as Lehrstück 
Die Maßnahme has a number of provocative themes running through it, but two of the 
more classic Marxian ones stand above the rest. First is the tension between the 
collective or Communist Party and the individual, and as we shall see, this relationship 
is what frames the events of the play. Second is the topic of education, which is tied 
up with questions of proper class consciousness and consciousness raising. Keeping a 
close eye on these themes will help to both classify this play as Lehrstück and to 
understand the way that the formal presentation of these themes is constructed in a 
way that allows the worker-actors to learn from them as they play through them. 
 The background of Die Maßnahme is that communist activists have been sent 
from Moscow to China to organize the workers for the anticipated revolution. It 
opens with the Kontrollchor, or monitoring chorus, inviting “the four agitators” to come 
before them and praising them for the work they have done spreading the word of the 
revolution. Before they can get very far, the agitators interrupt them and announce in 
unison that they have killed a comrade who “often did the right thing, sometimes did 
the wrong thing, but finally he endangered the movement.” The reason they give for 
his transgression is that, even though the comrade “wanted the right thing [he] did the 
wrong thing.” The agitators present their case abstractly at first and as a moral issue, 
and the norm they use for their evaluation is implied to be the word of the 
Communist Party that trained them and in whose name they radicalize new 
revolutionaries. The agitators do not approach the chorus in order to report the 
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killing, but rather because they “ask for your judgment.” They are not looking for 
permission to act, because “they” have already killed the man; instead they wish to 
review the events that led up to his death—“what happened and why”—so that they 
can hear the official verdict on his performance in the field (67). 
 What follows are a few thematically connected scenes featuring the traitor, who 
is only ever called “the young comrade.” Each is named and numbered, and they 
simply serve as snapshots of the young comrade’s failures with no additional story 
filled in. His successes, which are alluded to on the first page (“the right thing”), are 
never even relayed. In “The Stone,” for instance, the young comrade attempts to 
convince the overseer of a band of coolies that it is in his best economic interest to 
provide his workers with better shoes. As the young comrade becomes more and 
more vocally irritated with the boorish overseer, the latter catches on to the former’s 
“propaganda” and sends his men out to catch the comrade. According to the 
agitators, “He was hunted for two days and met us, and with him we were hunted 
through the city of Mukden for a week.” The young comrade’s short fuse not only 
compromises the agitators’ schedule, but it also compromises their mission, as they 
are undercover and cannot work where they might be recognized (77).  
 The other two scenes presented by the agitators to the chorus as examples of 
the young comrade’s transgressions—“Justice” and “What Really Is a Man?”—unfold 
in similar ways. First, the young comrade allows his sympathy for the workers to get 
in the way of his covert mission or he comes to identify with the workers. This leads 
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him to blow his cover and eventually jeopardize the propaganda campaign he and the 
agitators are working on. Because the consciousness-raising work that he has been 
drafted to do is one early phase in a much bigger mission for the revolution, his 
missteps are said to have significant consequences for the movement as a whole. 
 In these scenes, the young comrade acts as an individual and in accordance 
with his own judgment rather than as a part of the collective. When he does so, he 
does not only fail to fulfill the task that is given to him by the movement; he also fails 
as an ally of the movement, and, as the agitators explain, he no longer serves on the 
same front as they do. “See the reality!,” they exclaim: “Your Revolution” is one 
thing, “But our Revolution” is another (89). In distinguishing himself, the young 
comrade also threatens the integrity of the movement’s supposedly unified front. As 
they have told the coolies, one of their principle tenets is to “help yourself by helping 
us: exercise / solidarity!” (79). At this stage in the revolutionary process, the individual 
is useful only insofar as he is part of something bigger than himself. The single, 
emancipated man does not yet exist, as the agitators make clear to the young comrade: 
“You betray us!”; “when you speak, / we are lost”; “Because you were recognized, 
our work is betrayed” (91, 95).  
 The errors of the young comrade are uniformly attributed to an ideology of 
individualism that leads to an underdeveloped consciousness, though not in those 
words, that is too susceptible to spontaneous feeling. Before his first assignment in 
“The Stone,” the agitators warn him not to “fall victim to sympathy.” Not long after, 
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in what we are lead to believe is his first mission, he admits that this specifically is his 
weakness, for “it is hard to see these [coolies] without sympathy” (73, 75). At the 
discussion following this scene, the agitators complain that “He didn’t help [the weak 
man], but he hindered” our mission by “separat[ing] feeling from reason” and 
responding to the former rather than the latter (77). A man with a more developed 
consciousness—which is, after all, what the agitators are trying to cultivate in the 
workers who are the target of their propaganda campaigns—would have been able to 
keep his emotions in check and his eyes on the prize, as it were. 
Because, by the end of the play, he can think of no “exit” from the position 
he has put himself in, it seems that more education for this “young” and 
inexperienced comrade may have been his saving grace, and it is clear that no one is 
above continuing education in the play (95). As the chorus notes, quoting Lenin, 
“Clever is not one who doesn’t make any mistakes, / clever is rather one who 
understands how to improve them quickly,” and even these Party representatives are 
not excluded (77). It is perhaps for this reason that the agitators approach the chorus 
in the first place to work through and ask for judgment on the events that lead to the 
young comrade’s death. Although the chorus members are consistently treated like 
adjudicators, like they who already know because they represent the Party, even they 
still have something to learn. Just over halfway through the play, they begin to pose a 
number of questions, confessing that “We haven’t been listening to you / as judges 
for a while, but / as students,” and by the end they say that the agitator’s “report 
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shows us how / important it is to change the world / […] / Only taught by the reality 
can we / change the world” (85-86, 96). 
The short scenes of the young comrade’s failures presented by the agitators 
could be understood as individual example lessons, as demonstrations and exercises 
about what can happen given a certain set of circumstances in “reality,” as the 
agitators put it. The play itself is organized to this end. Were it written according to 
what Brecht called the bourgeois dramatic form, the fate of the comrade would have 
been the culminating moment giving meaning to all of the play’s other events; all of 
the other moments would have either been leading up to or picking up the pieces 
from the climax. Moreover, the audience would have been consumed with and 
emotionally invested in the question of whether or not the young comrade would 
have to pay for his transgressions.  
However, the structure of the Lehrstück prevents its observers—both the 
audience and its actors—from getting lost or caught up in the plot. The young 
comrade’s death is announced within the first five lines of the play, preventing the 
possibility of any emotional dramatic tension or attachment through identification 
and/or concern for him, which allows reason rather than sympathy to rule the minds 
of the viewers and performers as they engage with the play. Additionally, every one of 
the individual example scenes also demands conscious reflection. Each opens with the 
agitators providing background on the events to come and is followed by 
“Wiederholung” (review, reenactment) of the scene. Then, at the end, each closes 
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with a “Diskussion” between the agitators and chorus of what took place. These 
“discussions” allow the groups of characters as well as those who play them the 
opportunity to ruminate on the actions of the comrade and where he may have gone 
wrong. They also give the agitators a platform for explaining what could have 
happened had the young comrade acted otherwise. For instance, when they suggest 
what he “could have said to the coolies” after one failed organizing attempt, their 
conditional past tense is instructive. Nevertheless, they are not trying to offer 
corrections to his behavior—there are no “should”s—but they are noting how he 
could have acted otherwise in the situation he was in and how it could have had a 
different outcome if he were to have done so. 
Both the overall structure of the play as well as the individual example lesson 
scenes are organized by the order of (1) introduction, (2) demonstration, and (3) 
discussion, and this puts those involved in the position of going through the 
intellectual exercises in the play with the text as it moves through them. In so doing, it 
provides theses and counter-theses on the events from the perspective of the comrade 
(acting as an individual) and the perspective of the agitators and chorus (acting for the 
Party). The strongest instance of this is in the penultimate scene, titled “The Betrayal,” 
in which the young comrade and the agitators debate whether or not it is time to 
“begin the action” in the town that they have been working in for some time (86). 
When the comrade approaches the agitators to express that he is convinced the time 
is ripe for some kind of demonstration, the agitators respond that he is wrong, “But 
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give us your reasons and try to convince us!”, and a debate ensues (86-87). 
But the “mind/spirit athletics” that the actors undergo are not limited to 
these content-focused debates or to the argument/demonstration structure of play. 
As a Lehrstück, Die Maßnahme requires that its actors rotate through various positions 
over the course of a performance. This is written into the stage directions. The only 
people ever on the stage are the same ones who are present in the opening scene (the 
chorus and the four agitators), and in each subsequent scene, the agitators take turns 
playing different roles: one agitator might stand in for the young comrade, one might 
become a policeman, and two might play coolies. Once again, the point of this is to 
understand the motivations of various characters by performing them and “playing 
through” their contradictory perspectives. The educational import of this experience 
is augmented by the fact that the actors are encouraged to decide for themselves how 
to stage the play and determine who should play which role when. This turns them in 
to even more active participants, as it forces them to make decisions. 
While pedagogical style of this Lehrstück is deeply concerned with opening up 
and facilitating discussion mostly through its formal structure and performance 
requirements, even this is offered as just one approach to education. The space for 
thought provided by the dialectical exercises in Brecht’s work is presented in stark 
contrast to the rigidness of the propaganda uttered by the play’s representatives of the 
Communist Party. Utterly impersonal stock expressions, often replicated word for 
word, are littered throughout the speech of the agitators and the chorus, as well as the 
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young comrade before the holes in his consciousness are detected: “Man must help 
man”; “In the interest of Communism, / in agreement with the advance of the 
proletarian masses / of all countries, / saying yes to the revolutionizing of the 
world…”; “we bring […] instruction about their position to the ignorant, class 
consciousness to the oppressed, and the experience of revolution to the class 
conscious” (the three steps of inciting revolution) (e.g., 68, 69, 95). The 
“kommunistischen Klassiker,” or communist classics, are also mentioned in a knee-
jerk way. “The ABC of Communism” by Bukharin and Preobrazhensky is named 
several times, as is Lenin. 
This rote, mechanical way of speaking are practically tics in the speech of 
these characters, and in comparison with Brecht’s dialectical pedagogical method of 
education, its messages appear closed and fixed. This is not to say that there is 
necessarily any value judgment made in the play itself about its propagandistic 
language; it is simply presented as an alternative method of instruction or agitation. 
However, Brecht did appreciate one over the other in the domain of theatre, at least 
where this play is concerned. Once again, theatre’s great value is that it can bring out 
both the politician and the philosopher, the actor and the thinker, in those who engage 
with it, helping them to realize that the world is changeable and encouraging them to 
be active in changing it. In order for this to happen and for the value of art to be 
achieved, art must encourage dialectical, not dogmatic, thinking. 
As the formal exercises of Die Maßnahme stage and raise questions about the 
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struggle of the individual relative to collective and about different educational 
paradigms, they bring to light an additional dimension of the play related to 
philosophical aesthetics, namely, the relationship between art and Truth. What are 
then the aesthetic underpinnings of the Lehrstück’s method and performance? 
Badiou’s cursory evaluation of Brecht in “Art and Philosophy” is that the playwright 
is the consummate didact. For him, “art produces no truth, but is instead an 
elucidation—based on the supposition that the true exists,” and the “philosopher [is 
the] leading character in [his] didactic dialogues” (6, 5). This is largely true. Even 
though Die Maßname as a Lehrstück seems to avoid proffering a clear, didactic message, 
it operates according to a didactic understanding of the art-Truth relation. Both the 
philosopher and the politician are devoted to a truth that may be communicated in, 
but that is nonetheless external to, art. Furthermore, as the lay actors play through and 
switch around various roles, they seek to observe and grasp the experiences of others, 
which are, of course, not immanent to the work of art itself.  
In “The Author as Producer” (1934), Walter Benjamin reminds us that 
Brecht’s attempt to make philosophers and politicians out of his lay actors was a kind 
of “Umfunktionierung,” which is a “functional transformation” or radical alteration 
of old forms of the apparatus of artistic production “in accordance with socialism” 
(774). But it cannot be overlooked that the Lehrstück’s Umfunktionierung changes the 
status of its lay actors from people who would be mere consumers of dramatic theatre 
into producers of art. They think and are active both on and (it is hoped) off stage by 
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“transcending the specialization in the process of intellectual production” (777). Like 
the author himself, the actors generate meaning not only by sharing the truth of their 
personal experiences with others, but also by creating or realizing a work of art with 
each other. The staging of the play produces its own truth that can neither be 
anticipated nor reduced to an extra-textual something. It may still have an external 
aim (to change the world), but the significance of the collaboration of the 
participators is internal to the play’s production. 
With this in mind, it is easy to see that there is more than blunt didacticism 
going on here. The Lehrstück does not only serve an outside truth, and there is a 
reason why Brecht’s pedagogical method relies on art rather than, say, a stump speech 
or a pamphlet. The “truthful” content of many of the classic works of Socialist 
Realism—and Mat’ is among them—could be (and were!) repackaged in various ways, 
and not one bit of their message would be lost. And from another point of view, the 
novels themselves could be thought of as new packaging for the familiar Marxist-
Leninist Weltanschauung. This is not the case for the Lehrstück, for its form, like its 
content, is believed to have the potential to provoke radical and dialectically open 
ways of thinking as it is played through. The educational opportunities it provides do 
not rely solely on the exposure of its actors and audiences to new ideas. The experience 
of performing the artwork has an effect on the minds of the collaborating 
participants, stimulating their imaginations, viewing themselves as individual parts of 
something bigger, and forcing them to think about how they, now producers, can 
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change the world or create a new one. 
Because of the premium Brecht placed on the Lehrstück’s ability to 
communicate a specific content and to develop in the minds of its participants 
productive new forms of thought as a result of their experience with the play, I wish 
to claim that the aesthetic model informing his method is both didactic and pseudo-
romantic. According to Badiou, the attempt to bring together these two schemata is 
the hallmark of the 20th-century avant-garde tradition. The impetus behind this 
seemingly paradoxical hybrid was a “search for a mediating schema,” he explains: it 
was didactic in that it had a “desire to put an end to art” because the avant-garde 
longed for authentic and immediate experiences to counter the alienating effects of 
capitalism, and it was romantic in its concomitant “conviction that art must be reborn 
immediately as absolute,” as self-determining, as Truth itself (8). Critic Peter Bürger 
explains in Theory of the Avant-Garde (1974/1984) that this is possible because, in the 
avant-gardiste work, the “individual element is no longer necessarily subordinate to an 
organizing principle,” and “Where the work is no longer conceived as organic totality, 
the individual political motif also is no longer subordinate to the work as a whole but 
can be effective in isolation” (90). Thus, a work of art can aim for “revolutionizing the 
praxis of life” just as it maintains that art in general should be taken serious as “its 
own end” (91, 89).6 
                                                 
6 For more on this issue, Bürger spends much of his chapter “Avant-Garde and Engagement” 
discussing Brecht specifically in the context of the Adorno/Lukács debates on modernism (83-94). 
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While Brecht’s theory certainly does not strive for the holism described by the 
Frühromantiker and achieved by Gorky’s Nilovna (cf. Chapter 1), there is still 
something somewhat romantic about his emphasis on the consciousness-raising 
experience of the worker-actors as they stage the play, and a great deal of this has to 
do with the fact that it implies that art has a unique facility to do just that. Not only 
does the Lehrstück reveal truths, but its performance produces them. Furthermore, it is 
because the Lehrstück has no fixed, didactic truth—only a didactic relationship to 
Truth—that this is possible. This is certainly a far cry from Brecht’s model of epic 
theatre and from the Socialist-Realist method of art, a fact that comes into better 
focus when Müller’s Mauser is analyzed and revealed to be an even stronger example 
of the Lehrstück form than Brecht’s own Die Maßnahme. 
 
Mauser as Lehrstück 
The narrative of Mauser draws heavily on Die Maßname, and this includes sharing most 
of Brecht’s thematic material. The most recognizable similarity is the tension between 
the individual soldiers for the revolution, represented by characters simply named A 
and B, and the collective/Communist Party, represented by the chorus. Like the 
conflict in Brecht’s play that grows between the young comrade and agitators, the 
ones that develop between each solder and the chorus/Party arise from events in 
which A and B act according to either their own judgment or their own impulses.  
 B’s major transgression in the eyes of the movement occurs when he is sent on 
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a mission to execute a group of peasants. Defending himself before the chorus after 
the fact, B describes the scene—the peasants standing before him, hands bound, faces 
towards a quarry—and explains that in that moment he was overcome with the 
feeling that, even though he had been told they were his adversaries, he and the 
peasants were on the same side in the greater fight for emancipation. They all come 
from the underclasses, yet they have been pitted against each other. After some 
thought, B’s decision was to “take my hand out of the contract” with the revolution 
and “cut through the ropes on [their] hands,” with the explanation that “your [the 
peasants’] enemies are our enemies” and sending the peasants “back to your work” 
(58).   
 While B’s act of letting the peasants go was the manifestation of a somewhat 
impulsive, but still deliberate, decision that he had made after identifying what he 
believed to be the misplaced targets of the revolution, A’s offense is less calculated 
and more spontaneous. As he speaks before the chorus and attempts to piece together 
the story with them, it becomes clear that his break came after he was assigned to kill 
B, which he did coldly and with only the reflection that “Against doubts in the 
revolution: no / Other remedy than the death of the doubters” (59). “[W]e killed him 
with my hand,” he continues, “we” connoting the revolution. This moment launched 
A into a bloody rampage that lasted for more than a week, all courtesy of the revolver 
assigned to him by the movement and discharged by his hand, which was “bound to 
[that] revolver / with the mandate of the revolution” (60).  
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 As A reflects on these events, he recollects the revolutionary slogans—
recognizable as such because they are rehearsed several times throughout the play by 
all of the characters—that were running feverishly through his head at the time of his 
killing spree: “With the mandate of the revolution […] / To dispense death on its 
enemies / So that killing ends […] / DEATH TO THE ENEMIES OF THE 
REVOLUTION” (60). That final statement, which he calls his “order” or Kommando, 
he admits to having repeated out loud during his fury as almost a battle cry. But like 
his hand, which is controlled by the revolution, he says that was not speaking with his 
own voice as he rampaged through the town, and, similarly, when he happened to see 
his face in a mirror, it was “not with his eyes” that he gazed upon himself (60-61). 
Even in the judgment of the chorus, “you [A] were one with your work” during the 
spree, “And you were no longer conscious of it” (67).  
 Once the “battle noise” died down, A gazed upon his bloody hands, again able 
to see “Him who was I” and hear “my voice,” and finally beginning to “ask with my 
voice about the certainty” of the task he carried out (63-64). This becomes a major 
point of recognition for A once he reflects on his life as a solider, and he is able to 
present as such because the entire play is more or less an occasion for A to try to 
make sense of this rage he went through for ten days. This is an opportunity for A to 
defend himself before the chorus, who is determined to make him pay for his violent 
outburst, because they maintain that “You yourself killed with your hand / Not our 
enemies” and overstepped his orders (emphasis added 55). But A sees his actions as 
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entirely consistent with the mandate he was given by the revolution. “I did my work,” 
he demands, “I killed for the revolution,” and he asks to be “let out of the contract” 
because he is “too weak” to continue fighting the way he believes they want him to 
(ibid).  
 Upon reflection, both A and B believe that they acted in line with the goals of 
the chorus. The latter soldier’s judgment is informed by a bourgeois humanist 
interpretation concerned with long-term goals that A’s short-sighted, vulgar 
revolutionary instinct counters forcefully and decisively when he kills B along with 
many innocent civilians. In the estimation of the chorus, however, neither is 
successful in the one task given to them. The failure of characters is that they acted as 
independent agents rather than as dutiful soldiers. The evidence of this agency is 
clear—B’s seeming cowardice before the enemy and A’s bloody outburst—and, like 
Brecht’s young comrade, it is the manifestation of their incomplete, undialectical 
consciousnesses, according to the chorus. A’s spontaneous activity prevents him from 
thinking, whereas B’s reasoning and sympathy prevents him from following through 
with his duty. Neither seems to have a proper revolutionary education, for despite 
their constant mechanical rehearsal of the Party’s stock phrases, which only 
demonstrates the superficial indoctrination of the soldiers, there are still “holes” in 
their consciousnesses (this is said explicitly of A), and the events just discussed are 
evidence of that (62, 63). 
 The final test of A and B as soldiers for the revolution is how they face their 
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punishment, their “last assignment,” as the chorus puts it, which is to “die for it,” for 
the revolution that “needs your death” (56, 55). B’s last statements have him asking 
“To what end the killing and to what end the dying,” and although he does stand 
before A’s gun, begrudgingly granting that he must be punished, he holds on to his 
principles until the end (59). A, however, refuses to acquiesce to his own death, which 
also means that he refuses his final task as a soldier. “Learn your final lesson” “Learn 
deine letzte Lektion,” the chorus demands; “Learn to die. / What you learn increases 
our experience. / Die learning. Don’t abandon the revolution.” “Lern sterben. / Was 
du lernst, vermehrt unsre Erfahrung. / Stirb lernend. Gib die Revolution nicht auf” 
(56, 67).7 Once again, it is clear that his “weakness,” as chorus often calls it, is related 
to his underdeveloped consciousness, and it is the “one hole in our front” (62). In 
order to repair that front, the chorus says that A must fill in the “hole in his 
consciousness” by “learning” and then performing his final duty by once again ceding 
his autonomy to the will of the revolution in agreeing to his own execution (67). “The 
revolution needs / Your yes to your death,” they proclaim, but A refuses to grant 
them that: “My life belongs to me […] I don’t want to die” (66-67). 
 Before diving into the consequences of A and B’s protests in comparison with 
the reaction of Brecht’s young comrade when he is told that he must die for his 
                                                 
7 This statement is likely an allusion to a short text by Brecht later titled “To Teach to Die”: “people 
are worthless for society / human help is not common / nevertheless help is given to them and even 
though the death of / the individual is simply biologically uninteresting for society / dying should be 
taught” (Brechts Modell der Lehrstücke 58). Here Brecht is stressing the function of the Lehrstück to 
teach behaviors rather than specific lessons. The teachings of Müller’s chorus, however, though they 
echo Brecht here, are more often laden with doctrine. 
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disobedience, it might be helpful to make a couple more points specifically comparing 
the Lehrstück forms of Mauser and Die Maßname. As in Brecht’s play, the overall 
structure Mauser is based on the retelling of key events, but in Müller’s text, these 
moments are conveyed to the chorus directly by the soldiers themselves rather than 
by a third party. Mauser opens with the chorus sentencing A to death for his 
transgression, and it seems as if he shares his story so that he can try to convince his 
judges that he had acted in line with their wishes. “I killed for the revolution” is his 
most common line of defense (55). B, we learn, has already been killed by A by the 
time the play begins, but he appears as a kind of phantom in A’s story so that he, too, 
can provide his perspective on his moment with the peasants.  
 Moreover, in Die Maßnahme, multiple instances of the young comrade’s failures 
are shared with the chorus, and each time they are followed by brief discussions. In 
Mauser, however, only a third the play is filled with the retelling of one story from A 
and B each. The rest of it is devoted to a discussion and debate between A and the 
chorus not only about the details of his killing spree and his guilt, but also about the 
more general goals of the revolution. The latter are often introduced via the Party’s 
stock phrases and modified with slight, but meaningful, variations and rhetorical play 
that illuminate the growing gulf between the perspectives of A and the chorus. One 
example of an often repeated phrase and its modification is the order for soldiers to 
kill the enemies of the revolution is “is a job like any other,” but A’s rampage is “a job 
like no other” (57 and elsewhere). There are more. 
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 What makes the discussions and language games in Mauser even more 
interesting is the all-important Lehrstück role switching. As in Die Maßnahme, Müller 
more or less built this in to the play itself in his stage directions, and as the author 
explained in the note that follows the play, “The proposed distribution of the text 
[into parts] is variable” (Weber 133). Already on the third page, Müller signals that the 
actor initially playing A may change places with a chorus member (the character tag 
reads “A [CHOR]”), and immediately after the three peasants are released by B, they 
are allowed to speak through the mouths of whichever chorus members choose to 
take on the roles. Like Brecht’s agitators, who, by the end of the performance, will 
have played through several different characters, Müller’s chorus members may have 
the opportunity to play different ones, with the important prohibition that “no 
performer can assume another’s role all the time.” Even the audience may be brought 
in, Müller explained. One way of doing so would be to have one half of the audience 
read for the chorus and the other read for the individual characters, but if they do, 
“the text not read by each group should be blotted out in the script” so all participants 
they must pay close attention to and carefully think through the text together as they 
read. Ultimately, “the mode and degree of variants” in how each group decides to 
stage the play, is, according to Müller, “a political choice that has to be made in each 
individual [performance] case.” It is political because it involves both making 
decisions that will govern the behavior of others on stage and making judgments 
about the relationships between and the motivations of people.  
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There are two decisive differences between these plays, and they are critical for 
understanding my claim that Müller’s text is a more Brechtian version of Brecht’s own 
play as well as the great import of Müller’s decision to draw on the avant-garde 
Lehrstück form in his experimentations with political and pedagogical theatre in the 
GDR. The first has to do with the fact that neither A nor B consents to his 
punishment for acting out of order. In their refusals to submit willfully to their “final 
duty,” they become enemies of the revolution according to the chorus’ black-and-
white logic. This in turn means that they must be killed because, as is repeated several 
times throughout the play, “the daily bread of the revolution / Is the death of its 
enemies” and the “holes” in their consciousnesses are “the one hole on the our front” 
(68, 62). If they should live, the revolution could simply not survive.  
 A is more obstinate than B, and his refusal to label himself as an enemy 
presents a strong challenge to the concrete future of the revolution, partly because the 
movement does not know whether or not it can continue in such a vulnerable state. It 
claims, after all, to be malnourished and presenting a porous front. A’s tenacity also 
has the effect that the play devotes a significant amount time to important discussions 
and debates between the chorus and himself about the theoretical foundations of the 
revolution, including the status of the individual within it and the Party’s values.  
 While Die Maßnahme confronts these same tensions, Brecht resolves them for 
his observers and actors by the end of the play. In the final scene presented by the 
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agitators to the chorus, the young comrade is asked if he “know[s] any way out” from 
his act of betrayal, and his simple response is “No.” When they subsequently ask him 
if he is “in agreement” with their proposed punishment, his reply is equally direct, and 
he say “yes” to his death in the way that neither A nor B chooses to (95). With the 
young comrade’s consent and the pull of a trigger, one side gives in and goes silent; 
only the Party still stands. 
As Harry Louis Roddy Jr. points out in his essay “A Revolutionary Critique of 
Individualism” (2000), Brecht’s play has long been criticized for a “totalizing 
adherence to the Party line” (198). In one example, Georg Lukács censures Brecht in 
The Meaning of Contemporary Realism (1963) for “imposing intellectual schemata on the 
spectator [that turn] his characters into mere spokesmen” and, in the process, 
harmfully reducing the universal and important “problems of humanity” to local ones, 
like “inner conflicts and contradictions of the warring parties” (87-88).8 A decade 
later, Wolfgang Schivelbusch writes about the difference between “socialist 
consciousness […] as the consciousness of fixed positive values [and] as the 
consciousness of contradictions” (105). Even though the impetus behind this 
distinction is Schivelbusch’s claim that the latter is characteristic of Müller’s work, it is 
not difficult to read the former as describing Die Maßnahme.  
To be fair, Brecht had no problem with his text presenting a positive content. 
                                                 
8 For additional examples in this vein, including the critiques of Adorno, see Elizabeth Wright, 
Postmodern Brecht: A Re-Presentation (1989). 
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In his comments on this play, he wrote that “The aim of the Lehrstück is then to show 
politically incorrect behavior and, through that, to teach correct behavior” 
(“Politischer Lehrwert” “Political Value of Teaching” 1930, 92). But the twice-
repeated word here is significant. Brecht did not mean that a play conceived according 
to his Lehrstück theory and method should provide a single answer or truth. The 
Lehrstück should instead compel its participants to conduct themselves in such a way 
that they bridge the philosopher-political divide he describes in “Theorie der 
Pädagogien.” But Die Maßnahme veers from this intention when it allows the Party, 
presented as the philosophers with the proper consciousness and, more importantly, 
with the correct answers, to triumph over the spontaneously sympathetic young 
comrade. 
 In contrast to the closure presented in Brecht’s play, the content Müller’s work 
manages to stay open throughout, and it is enhanced and supported by an open 
structure. In Die Maßnahme, the young comrade never has a chance. As Bathrick and 
Huyssen remark, “given the tight construction of the play, the audience cannot but 
interpret the death of the young comrade as the telos of the entire play” (112). What’s 
more, he is already dead before the curtains open and, consequently, he never stands a 
chance against the Party in the context of the play. In Mauser, however, the future of 
A (and B, for a brief time) is unknown throughout the performance. Even though in 
the final moments the chorus leads the audience and actors to believe that A will be 
killed by them (he “went to the wall and said the order / […] / DEATH TO THE 
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ENEMIES OF THE REVOLUTION”), his death does not take place on stage or 
even during the play (68). The curtain falls before any shots can be fired.9  
 The choice not to reveal the outcomes of A and B might seem to place Müller 
in the same realm as the authors of dramatic theatre, who, per Brecht, rely on 
suspense rather than intellectual provocation to garner the attention of their 
audiences. Yet the question of whether or not A will actually die is never suspenseful 
primarily because it is constantly under discussion throughout the play and often as a 
general theoretical, rather than an actual, problem to be dealt with. Even B’s death, 
which is swift, seems to draw out this abstract conversation further, rather than 
serving as an omen in the text or foreshadowing some tragic ending for A.  
 Furthermore, not only are the discussions of the soldiers’ deaths neither 
conventionally “dramatic” nor tragic for these characters, but they reflect more on the 
prospects of the movement than they do on those of the individuals A and B. Given 
that the future of A, who has betrayed the revolution and is called an “enemy,” is 
technically unknown at the end of it, the future of the movement is also put into 
question. As the chorus makes clear time and time again, it is sustained by the “death 
of its enemies,” so if A does not die, what will transpire? From the first lines of 
Brecht’s play, in contrast, we already know that this will not be a problem in Die 
                                                 
9 It is worth pointing out that many have read A’s final line (“DEATH TO THE ENEMIES OF 
THE REVOLUTION”), which is the order that was given to him and that set him off, as his 
submission to the will of the chorus, given that he is now their enemy. This interpretation is not only 
inconsistent with A’s behavior throughout the play, but it also overlooks the ambiguity of the label 
of “enemy” in Mauser. 
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Maßnahme, for the success of the revolution, which is so efficient at purging its bad 
elements, is never question.  
 Accordingly, Müller’s openness extends from the formal structure of the play 
to his rhetorical style, as well, which comes to generate even more evidence of his 
revolution’s vulnerability, when, for instance, we press further the question of who, 
exactly, are the “enemies” of Mauser’s Communist Party. Although they are typically 
only defined negatively as those who are not fighting for the revolution, the more 
nuanced answer is that the enemies are both outside and inside of the movement, as 
the chorus cagily confesses: “the revolution itself / Is not one with itself” (59). This is 
a fact that B had already recognized when he sympathized with the peasants, saying 
that “Ihre Feinde sind meine Feinde” (58). The ambiguity of “Ihr” is notable. Because 
it is at the beginning of a line of verse and is capitalized, B could be addressing the 
peasants in the plural formal form (Ihr) or talking about die Revolution itself, as a 
feminine noun (ihr). The first case would read, “Your enemies are my enemies,” and 
the second, “Her enemies are my enemies.”10 Of course, B is already an enemy of 
both groups; he is the adversary of the peasants for fighting them in the war and the 
revolution for betraying it in the sympathy he feels for the peasants. This line then 
takes this antagonism further to reveal not only that he is the adversary of both 
groups, but that he shares their enemies, including himself. B is thus his own enemy. 
In a Lehrstück in which all logic is expected to be formally dialectical, it does not make 
                                                 
10 English translator Carl Weber’s text mirrors the first option (123). 
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sense for B to occupy the position of an extra floating term that is the rival of the 
peasants, the revolution, as well as himself. 
 Müller’s style presents an additional paradox in an early monologue delivered 
by B when he asserts the following: “Der Revolver meine dritte Hand / […] mit 
meiner Hand tötet die Revolution” (58). The uncertainty of this statement is in its 
syntax. There are two ways that this could be translated into English: (1) “The 
revolver [is] my third hand / […] the revolution kills with my hand,” as it is not 
uncommon for Müller to leave out the verb in sentences made up of just a subject 
and a predicate noun, and (2) “The revolver[,] my third hand[,] / […] kills the 
revolution with my hand.”11 The question that remains is if the revolution kills with 
B’s hand (option 1) or if the revolver, which is what the movement uses to control the 
hands/actions of its soldiers, kills the revolution with the soldier’s hand (option 2).  
 These lines impart ambiguity around issues related to agency in Mauser, and 
variations on them surface for both B and A more than once throughout the play, 
usually delivered in similarly phrased utterances spoken by both the soldiers and the 
chorus. It is notable that the first and most prominent instances of each of these 
paradoxes are voiced by B, who, as scholars like Bathrick and Huyssen have argued, 
should be viewed as Müller’s surrogate for Brecht’s “young comrade,” as the primary 
“weakness” of both figures is their spontaneous sympathy (with some rational basis), 
                                                 
11 Weber’s text once again follows the first version: “The revolver my third hand / […] the 
Revolution kills with my hand” (123-124). 
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and is meaningful that B’s language is the primary motor to set back in motion the 
playfulness closed off by Brecht with the young comrade’s utterly unambiguous 
demise. 
 At the conclusion of Die Maßnahme, Brecht’s staged revolution is in a position 
to move forward—perhaps even towards victory—after having purged the traitorous 
element within its ranks. There are undoubtedly other contradictions that it will face, 
but the principle one, the one within its immediate influence and impeding its own 
movement, has been resolved. The revolution of Müller’s Mauser, however, is 
hopelessly doomed for two reasons: (1) if it is to progress, the enemy that it must kill 
is both outside and inside of the movement and (2) traitors A and B have not only 
killed for the revolution as soldiers, but also killed the revolution itself with their “third 
hands,” the revolution’s revolvers. Each of these paradoxes prevents victory for the 
revolution and foreshadows its inevitable self-destruction. 
 All of this boils down to the fact that there is no “right” answer provided to the 
actors (or audience members) of Müller’s play. Brecht’s, on the other hand, are told by 
the chorus that the judgment given by the agitators and accepted by the young 
comrade was not “his sentence” “sein Urteil,” “but rather / the reality” “sondern / 
die Wirklichkeit” (94). Even though the chorus does later admit that reality is 
changeable, the implication is that that they themselves will be the agents of that 
change. In the final two lines of the play, after having noted what the report of the 
four agitators had revealed to them personally, they proclaim, “Only taught from 
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reality can we / change reality” (96).  
The great achievements of Müller’s play are best appreciated when Mauser is 
read next to Die Maßnahme. In its refusal to teach, in its lasting contradictions, its open 
and incessantly turning dialectic, it is not merely a correction of Brecht’s text for a 
new time, but also an enhancement of the Lehrstück form. As Stefan Mahlke notes on 
an essay on Müller’s appropriation of the Lehrstück, “Mauser radically changes the 
available prototype of Maßnahme” (66). When Brecht’s work sides with the revolution, 
it hinders and perhaps even precludes the potential of the play as a Lehrstück to set in 
motion or inspire a dialectical, revolutionary consciousness in the minds of its actors. 
Instead, it offers a resolution, an object lesson about the necessity of obedience and 
violence. This is eine Lehre der “Wirklichkeit” rather than one of behavior, as the chorus 
freely admits, and Die Maßnahme is indeed a Lehrstück true to its name—more invested 
in teaching than setting the stage for learning.  
 The content of the play reinforces this. The young comrade, for example, is 
never taken all that seriously, and even when the agitators allow him to state his case 
as to why he believes that the time is ripe for the great action, they only respond with 
stock phrases (87). Even more significant is the fact that he never truly has the 
opportunity to speak for himself. Because the frame of the play has the agitators 
present the young comrade’s stories to the chorus, all of his attitudes and actions in 
these situations are filtered through them. While at first glance this “playing through 
of behaviors” in different roles may seem to be a useful exercise for the Lehrstück 
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method, the fact remains that the young comrade, who most needs to be heard in 
order to balance out the perspectives offered in the text, is and can never heard from 
directly. 
 The education that the actors in Die Maßnahme receive is entirely mediated by 
the perspective of the Party, either through the agitators or through the chorus, but 
Mauser is able to direct the traffic on Brecht’s one-way street in two directions. 
Although A and B are played by members of the chorus and members of the chorus 
are played by A and B, neither side is privileged. A defends himself before his judges 
and never gives in. In the end, Mauser is more faithful to the spirit of the Lehrstück as 
Lern-stück, allowing for his performers to experience a true example lesson by working 
through various behaviors. In turn, this provides his actors with more options as they 
bring their own individual perspectives to bear on the staging of the play and as they 
are moved to reflect on and discuss the events of the play with each other. 
It is important to situate historically what Mahlke calls the “optimism” of the 
Lehre of Die Maßnahme in contrast to Mauser. As Benton Jay Komins describes it, 
“Müller’s effective re-writing of Brecht’s play injects historical consciousness into 
perceptions of the course of socialist and communist revolution in the Eastern Bloc, 
which changed dramatically between the utopianism of the late-1920s and the 
uncertainty of the postwar period” (99). Brecht’s was a time when “Soviet dictatorship 
offered one of few alternatives to fascism,” whereas “Müller wrote Mauser against the 
precedents of Soviet-style authoritarianism” (100). In other words, Brecht was writing 
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from a pre-revolutionary perspective about a pre-revolutionary time, which produced 
some anticipation and excitement. But he was also unsure of what was to come. His 
positive ending is “intermingled with doubts” and does not completely “forget the 
costs of the revolution” (Mahlke 66). The agitators do, after all, approach the chorus 
for a reason. They seek a judgment. As Mahlke argues, Die Maßnahme’s optimism as 
well as its doubts are actually what makes it possible for Müller—writing after the 
revolution, about a revolutionary time, and “with the experience of socialism that has 
not found peace”—to work through the “the long-term effects” of the events of 
Brecht’s play in his own and, in the process, update and improve on the original (ibid).  
 Even with these differences in mind, it should still be clear that both Müller 
and Brecht subscribe to the notion that the stage can and should serve as a platform 
for Truth, whether that truth is a doctrine of some kind or a behavior. As a 
pedagogical tool, the form of the Lehrstück is intended to provide a literal and 
metaphorical stage for different voices and positions that will incite and facilitate 
discussion and debate among its performers, who decide how to stage the play, as well 
as among its audience members. In both Die Maßnahme and Mauser, the principle 
issues explored both through form and content have to do with matters that come 
from or exist in a reality external to the works themselves, and these include the 
position of the individual with respect to the collective, the role of education 
(consciousness) in the movement, and whatever its own participants might bring to 
the play. The major difference between the this aspect of these two works, however, is 
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that Müller’s relies on this didactic schema to offer up for discussion the irresolvable 
tensions inherent in these issues, whereas Brecht’s falls comparatively short and 
instead ends up communicating a didactic and fixed message through his didactic 
schema.  
 An additional benefit of reading Müller’s text next to Brecht’s is that, as a more 
successful work in the avant-garde aesthetic tradition (as argued above), it highlights 
the limitations of the didactic schema, even as it engages with it. Not only does Mauser 
underscore just how predominantly didactic Die Maßname is, but it also reveals 
through its formal paradoxes, its open structure, and its variable performance 
organization the enormous potential of the Lehrstück’s avant-garde pedagogy, one that 
is interested in truths that are both communicated through art and produced in the 
experience of it. In committing itself to a single message, Brecht’s own play limits or 
undercuts the great creative possibilities made available by Lehrstück method. Müller 
keeps these flexible and augments them further through his own rhetorical play and 
other formal choices that he described as facilitating the “training of the (individual) 
capacity to make experiences” that carry truths with them while producing their own 
(Weber 133). In his comments following Mauser, Müller called this the “function” of 
the artistic performance, and it is the result of the actors’ collaboration with one 
another, because “Experiences are only transmitted by and in a collective” (ibid). In 
the avant-garde Lehrstück theatre, those who once served as mere vessels for the 
material of dramatic theatre now harness their collective energies and perspectives to 
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become thinkers and creators. This shared effort produces not only a stage 
performance, but also an aesthetic experience (the part is understood in relation to the 
whole, the particular in relation to the general) that can generate radical dialectical 
thinking in the minds of participants reinforced by the open and unresolved content 
in Müller’s play. 
 
As a work of politically committed art operating in an avant-garde mode, Mauser takes 
advantage of its form in a way that ensures that it will be not simply a bearer, but also 
a producer of meaning. The shared experience of performing this Lehrstück and the 
related “mind/spirit athletics” of its logical and behavioral exercises make possible the 
aesthetic experience that is at least as pedagogically consequential for the actors as the 
play’s more explicit subject matter. This is the most meaningful difference between 
Mauser as a Lehrstück and the mode of Socialist Realism, for Brecht’s theory and 
method allowed Müller to create an activist role for art as art in the revolutionary 
socialist context. 
But Mauser’s stylistic and formal play also leaves us with a major problem, 
namely, that close reading the rhetorical play of the text reveals that the only way the 
revolution can continue is through self-destruction. What is being said about the 
pedagogical and political project of the Lehrstück when its most faithful imitator forces 
itself into the position of self-annihilation? What of the task of teaching a certain kind 
of thinking through acting, through a shared performance and production? One 
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answer is that Mauser stages yet another contradiction at the level of form. Müller’s 
play is effectively a pedagogical text that questions the ethics of combining art and 
political prescription, and to this end, it is a paradoxical success. As it does with 
Brecht’s play, Mauser productively appropriates the educational, avant-garde Lehrstück 
form only to dismantle it from within. 
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CONCLUSION 
 
The present project was motivated by the belief subscribed to by so many 
committed artists and theorists over the past few centuries that art can and should be 
used to educate on behalf of a leftist political program. But behind this belief are two 
more fundamental questions often overlooked by critics of socialist literature from the 
Eastern Bloc who either find offensive its ostensibly crass instrumentalization of art 
or simply disagree with the content presented in it: namely, (1) why art is used for 
political ends, that is, what makes it distinct from other means of delivering political 
content (its form); and (2) how is used for political ends, that is, by what means art 
can serve politics. From this starting point, it is a short drive to matters of aesthetics 
and method. 
The selections by Maxim Gorky, Peter Hacks, and Heiner Müller discussed in 
the preceding pages were all chosen for their coupling of a formalist aesthetics and 
political pedagogy, approaches which flew brazenly in the face of the Socialist-Realist 
method Gorky himself helped to articulate at the 1934 Writers’ Congress in the Soviet 
Union. All three texts reveal that an engagement with art—the experience of it—can 
initiate a transformation in the reader of a novel or the viewer or actor of a play that 
may lead to the discovery of truth and further that this development does not occur 
only (or even necessarily) because of any tendentious dicta communicated in the 
words of the text. Rather, the form of art itself—the very characteristics that 
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distinguishes art from other types of content—can inspire spiritual (Gorky), 
ontological (Hacks), and behavioral (Müller) exercises that in turn can enable readers 
(Gorky), viewers (Hacks), and actor-participants (Müller) to develop true forms of 
consciousness and thought. As Gramsci demonstrates, free thinkers are not parrots 
who merely imitate what they have been told; they are autonomous agents, creative 
producers of thought, philosophers who experience a more sustainable and liberating 
education than didactic Socialist Realism could ever provide. 
Finally, just as all three authors put their audiences through exercises that 
force the latter to reflect on their works’ artistic forms, so, too, do the authors 
themselves self-consciously reflect on the aesthetic underpinnings of their own work. 
In turning away from Socialist-Realism’s didacticism, each resurrects, embraces, and 
revises an ostensibly outmoded and (certainly in the Eastern Bloc) unpopular 
understanding of the relationship between art and truth: Gorky’s novel illustrates a 
romantic revelation of truth in art, Hacks’ Socialist Classicism describes a classical 
image of truth that should be achieved in art, and Müller’s Lehrstück demonstrates 
and embodies an avant-garde, dialectical, truthful form of thought. In so doing, these 
authors engage critically and productively with a tradition often derided or ignored by 
their peers, proving that committed art need not simply dismiss or reject the past in 
order to advance. 
In the end, it is Müller’s development of a true Lehrstück in response to 
Brecht’s Lernstück that gets at the heart of what makes Mat’, Socialist Classicism, and 
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Mauser so compelling, especially against the backdrop of Socialist Realism: these works 
and theories of art share a commitment to teaching how to think over learning what 
to think.  
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